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Abstract 
A new perspective is provided on the South African company law through the 
comparative analysis of a shareholders’ remedy known as the Oppression Remedy 
under section 163 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and section 241 of the Canada 
Business Corporations Act. Despite the introduction of the new Companies Act 71 of 
2008, the statute still remains unclear as to the rights, duties and powers of each 
individual within a company.  In an aim to address this lack of clarity, this thesis takes a 
“back-to-basics” approach by discussing the fundamental principles of corporate 
personality and majority rule. This thesis provides a historical analysis of the English 
company law, its influence on the South African company law as well as the 
development of Canadian corporate law specifically through section 241. This study 
analyses the English, South African and Canadian statutes, cases and secondary 
materials. 
KEYWORDS: company, corporate personality, corporation, director, judicial powers, 
juristic personality, legal person, majority rule, oppression remedy, shareholder.  
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INTRODUCTION 
As of 1 May 2011, South Africa adopted its new Companies Act 71 of 2008.1 This new Act 
is said to include provisions from various jurisdictions around the world. In 2004, the 
Department of Trade and Industry in South Africa published a document on the South 
African company law reform for the 21st century.2 The DTI policy document provides a 
set of guidelines for the South African corporate law reform. One of the general 
principles mentioned in the DTI policy document, is the harmonisation of company laws. 
The policy document states two reasons for the importance of this general principle.  
First, it reduces the costs and increases certainty both for overseas 
companies and investors, and for our own companies involved in 
international trade and investment. Secondly, it reduces costs involved in 
the application of our company law, by enabling it to develop along the lines 
and in the light of a great range of judicial precedent, practice and 
commentary, making it practicable, minimising uncertainty... [However] 
while the harmonisation of [the] new South African Company law with that 
of international jurisdictions may be desirable, it may not always be 
appropriate for South African conditions.3  
 
In this case, however, the South African Legislature considered it appropriate to 
incorporate the oppression remedy under section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act 
which significantly resembles the Canadian oppression remedy under section 241 of the 
Canada Business Corporations Act.4 The Canadian oppression remedy is known as “the 
broadest, most comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder remedy in the 
                                                          
1 Companies Act, (S Afr), No 71 of 2008 [2008 SA Companies Act]. 
2 South African Company Law Reform for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, 
South African Department of Trade and Industry, Government Gazette No 26493 (June 2004) 
(“the DTI policy document”). 
3 Ibid at 29. 
4 Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA]. 
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common law world.”5 Now that South Africa has adopted a similar provision, it is hoped 
that South Africa will take advantage of its wide provisions, as it provides a much wider 
scope than section 252 of the previous Act, Companies Act 61 of 1973.6  
This thesis aims to provide an insightful, historical, comparative perspective on the 
South African company law within the context of section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies 
Act. The analysis is provided with specific reference to English company law as well as 
Canadian corporate law. English company law is the common foundation between the 
two jurisdictions, South Africa and Canada.  This thesis will be articulated within the 
context of the following cases, Foss v Harbottle7, North-West Transportation Company v 
Beatty8, Burland v Earle9, Salomon v Salomon10 and Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd 
& Others11. The historical perspective includes a comparison of the fundamental 
principles of corporate or juristic personality and majority rule within the South African 
company law and the Canadian corporate law. This thesis is set out in five chapters.  
Chapter 1: Types of Corporations. This chapter discusses the various types of 
corporations that have existed over the years and provides the foundation for the 
analysis undertaken in Chapter 3. Chapter 1 addresses the distinction between the 
                                                          
5 820099 Ontario Inc. v Harold E. Ballard Ltd (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 113 citing Stanley M. Beck 
"Minority Shareholders' Rights in the 1980's”. 
6 Companies Act, (S Afr), No 61 of 1973 [1973 SA Companies Act]. 
7 Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 ER 189.  
8 North-West Transportation Company Limited v Beatty [1887] 12 AC 589 HL (Eng). 
9 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 HL (Eng). 
10 Aron Salomon v A Salomon and Company Limited [1897] AC 22 HL (Eng) [Salomon v Salomon]. 
11 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others [1973] AC 360 HL (Eng). 
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terms “company” and “corporation”, and considers the importance of this distinction 
and the impact of the interpretation or common understanding of these terms has had 
on the development of the South African company law within the context of its new 
oppression remedy. 
Chapter 2: The History of the South African company law and Canadian corporate law. 
This chapter provides the historical development of the South African company law and 
considers where South African company law stands in regards to the interpretations of 
the following fundamental principles, corporate personality and majority rule.12 This 
chapter also considers the history of the Canadian corporate law in regard to what led 
to its reform in 1975.  
Chapter 3: The Predicament- English company law. Chapter 3 identifies the 
predicament, how it was created and its effect on the South African company law. This 
chapter analyses the interpretation of the fundamental principles that have contributed 
to the creation and understanding of the Canadian oppression remedy. This analysis is 
made with specific reference to the judgments in Foss v Harbottle, North-West 
Transportation Company v Beatty, Burland v Earle, Salomon v Salomon and Ebrahimi v 
Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others. 
Chapter 4: The Oppression Remedy. This chapter provides a detailed comparison 
between the specific provisions under the oppression remedy in both jurisdictions, 
                                                          
12 In this thesis, reference made to “fundamental principles” will mean the principle of corporate 
personality and majority rule. 
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Canada13 and South Africa.14 This chapter addresses aspects of the Oppression Remedy 
which seeks to assist South Africa in the interpretation of its own section 163 of the 
2008 SA Companies Act.  
Chapter 5: Solving the Predicament. The solution to the Predicament is clarity of the 
statute and subsequent application of the statute, therefore, this chapter provides 
various recommendations, through proposed statutory amendments to the 2008 SA 
Companies Act as a solution to the Predicament.  
This thesis seeks to contribute to the further development of the South African company 
law by proposing amendments to the 2008 SA Companies Act. This thesis aims to 
provide better protection for South African shareholders as well as to provide clarity on 
the fundamental principles that have governed the South African company law over the 
years. 
  
                                                          
13 CBCA, supra note 4  at s241. 
14 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1  at s163. 
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Chapter 1: Types of Corporations  
Introduction 
As one considers the similarity or resemblance between section 163 of the South African 
Companies Act 71 of 200815 and section 241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act16, 
the question often raised, is whether there is a difference between the terms 
“company” and “corporation”. This chapter aims to clarify this question through the 
analysis of the history or origin of these terms and their effect on minority shareholders 
protections. 
1. The Corporation vs. the Company 
Although the words “corporation” and “company” are sometimes used interchangeably, 
their differences are significant within the context of their history.17 The difference 
between the terms is not only historically relevant but also currently relevant. Canada 
uses the term “corporation” whereas South Africa uses the term “company”. This was 
not always the case in South Africa; the concept of a corporation was introduced 
through the Roman-Dutch Law. The concept was found in the term universitas 
personam,  
[An] universitas personam in Roman Dutch law is a legal fiction, an 
aggregation of individuals forming a persona or entity…[An] universitas is 
                                                          
15 Companies Act, (S Afr), No 71 of 2008 [2008 SA Companies Act]. 
16 Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA]. 
17 Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate Law (Emond Montgomery, 2005) [Corporate Law] at 5.  
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distinguished from a mere association of individuals by the fact that it is an 
entity distinct from the individuals forming it, that its capacity to acquire 
rights or incur obligations is distinct from that of its members, which are 
acquired or incurred by the body as a whole and not for the individual 
members…The main characteristics of [an] universitas, therefore, are the 
capacity to acquire certain rights as apart from the rights of the individuals 
forming it and perpetual succession. 18 
 
Despite the Roman-Dutch law introduction of the term corporation, the influence of the 
Roman Dutch law did not last in the South African company law. In the 18th and  19th 
centuries, South Africa found the Roman Dutch law on commercial principles 
inadequate, and sought the development of the English company law instead.19 English 
company law has been part of South African law since 1861,20 and that is where South 
Africa acquired the use of the term “company”.  Let us now consider the word 
“corporation”. 
The word “corporation” has often been considered in the context of a large entity 
existing to make a profit, however “the popular modern tendency to associate the word 
‘corporation’ almost exclusively with profit making entities obscures an important 
fact.”21 The corporation is a “concept that may be (and historically invariably was) 
understood quite apart from the profit making commercial enterprises that are 
                                                          
18 JTR Gibson & RG Gibson, South African Mercantile and Company Law, (4th ed) (Cape Town: 
Juta & Company Limited, 1977) at 285. 
19 Steven D Girvin, “The Antecedents of South African Company Law” Vol 13 No.1 Journal of 
Legal History (Frank Cass: London, 1992) 63-77 at 69-70. 
20 DTI policy document, supra note 2 at para 2.1 citing the Cape Colony Joint Stock Companies 
Limited liabilities Act, (S Afr), No. 23 of 1861. 
21 Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 2. 
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operated in corporate form today.”22 A corporation is defined as follows in the Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles,  
corporation n. (15c) An entity (usu. a business) having authority under law to 
act as a single person distinct from the shareholders...a group or succession 
of persons established in accordance with legal rules into a legal or juristic 
person that has a legal personality distinct from natural persons who make it 
up, exists indefinitely apart from them, and has a legal powers that its 
constitution gives it. – Also termed corporation aggregate; aggregate 
corporation; body corporate; corporate body. 23  
 
Today, Canada uses the term “corporation” in its corporate law statute, whereas South 
Africa mainly uses the term “company” within its statute. The difference between the 
two terms is based on how they were created. It is important to note that the 
association of the word “company” does not imply a profit- venture.24 The word 
“company” was in fact used regularly when describing an unincorporated partnership25, 
the modern English business corporation has evolved from the 
unincorporated partnership, based on mutual agreement, rather than from 
the corporation, based on a grant from the state, and owes more to 
partnership principles than to rules based on corporate personality. Thus, 
we in England still do not talk about business corporations or about 
corporation law, but about companies and company law. 26 
 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 CT Onions, The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol 1 A-M 3d ed 
(London UK: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1959) sub verbo “corporation”. 
24 Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 6. 
25 An unincorporated partnership was another word for a business organisation; a business 
organisation is not a separate legal entity. 
26 Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 6 citing L.C.B Gower, “Some Contrasts Between British and 
American corporate law” (1956) 69 Harv L Rev, 1369 at 1371-72. 
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Therefore, the distinction between the terms “corporation” and “company” is based on 
whether one existed through the grant from the state (“corporation”) or through an 
unincorporated partnership by mutual agreement (“company”). The way the entity27 
was created also affected the documents that governed that entity. For example, 
corporations granted by the state were required to strictly comply with their governing 
document, which was a statute. The existence of that corporation was derived from the 
state and the statute was its governing document. By contrast, in a “company” created 
by mutual partnership, the existence of the company was derived from the individuals 
within the partnership.28 A company was not a juristic person. The individuals within the 
company complied with their agreement, but if they wanted to amend it, they could do 
so by mutual agreement, signed by all members in the company.29 This mutual 
agreement was referred to as the governing document of the company and was known 
as the memorandum and articles of association. 
The governing documents contained the following: how the entity was governed, the 
rules of the entity as well as the powers and the duties of particular individuals within 
                                                          
27 “entity” is referred to as a collective term for corporation and company in order to clarify the 
distinction between the terms. 
28 Partnership is used to describe a group of people who come together seeking a common goal 
and in 1844, an Act came into force to regulate these partnerships or business organisations. 
These business organisations were described as companies under that Act, the term “company” 
was used regularly, and during that period of the 19th century, a company was known as just a 
business organisation. 
29 How many members were required to sign in order to effect an amendment to the mutual 
agreement, also the known as the memorandum and articles of association, was determined in 
the mutual agreement itself, usually, it required a special resolution. A special resolution was a 
resolution of a meeting of the members which was voted on by three-quarters of the members 
present at the meeting having the right to vote. 
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that entity, such as directors and shareholders. The important distinction between the 
“company” and the “corporation” was their origin in relation to where each derived its 
power, either from the statute or the mutual agreement. This aspect is elaborated upon 
below, within the context of the various types of corporations.  
2. Corporation created by... Company created by... 
In light of the distinction between the term “corporation” and “company”, it has always 
been known, since as early as 1850, that a juristic person is a corporation and not a 
company, “…it is quite true that a corporation aggregate is… altogether distinct from the 
aggregate individual members, as much so as they are from the rest of her Majesty’s 
subjects.”30 Various types of corporations have been acquired from the 1800’s to 2012, 
and the types of corporations differed in different jurisdictions.31  
Before we proceed, we must first understand why we are considering the various types 
of corporations. The importance of ascertaining the type of corporation will help us to 
understand the type of governing document under that particular type of corporation, 
which will ultimately lead us to determine whether adequate shareholder protections 
were provided under that particular governing document. 
                                                          
30 James Grant, Grant on Corporations: A Practical Treatise on the Law of Corporations, (London, 
UK: Butterworths Dublin, 1850) at 1. 
31
 Corporations have been acquired by partnerships or companies and natural persons all 
seeking to obtain corporate personality for their business endeavours. For example a natural 
person can apply to acquire a Letter Patent statute and a company can apply to acquire a special 
Act of Parliament. Further discussion on the types of corporations is provided below. 
10 
 
 
In regard to the significance of different jurisdictions, consider the following. If South 
Africa fits into one of the types of corporations and Canada another, the adequacy of 
shareholder protections provided, if at all, under the provisions of the particular 
governing document may differ in each country. Therefore, the manner in which the 
courts enforce those rights under the particular governing document may also differ. 
For example, in one jurisdiction, the courts may need to adhere to the statute, whereas 
in another, the courts would consider the mutual agreement between the parties.  A 
shareholder seeking redress in each jurisdiction would obtain different relief because 
the court would consider two different documents which were supposed to be applied 
differently by the courts.32  
It is therefore the aim of this thesis to find the bridge between these two jurisdictions in 
light of South Africa’s newly adopted Canadian oppression remedy. Ascertaining this 
“bridge” will enable South Africa to adequately seek guidance and to take full advantage 
of the Canadian court decisions made under the Canadian oppression remedy.  
Although the differences in the type of corporation are only theoretical, they 
have a significant impact on the way a court decision is made as to which 
cases, from a particular jurisdiction may be applied. A case from another 
jurisdiction, for example England, is liable to be concerned with a different 
type of corporate constitution. One needs to understand the different types 
                                                          
32 I say “supposed” because, although the governing documents were different, English courts 
applied different principles drawn from one particular type of governing document and applied 
it another type without regard to the duties owed by the individuals in a particular type of 
corporation as well as to whom those duties were owed. Different principles were applied all 
over the place, which led to an interesting predicament. This predicament is discussed further in 
Chapter 3. 
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in order to understand the case and to know whether it has any bearing on 
the type of corporation with which you are concerned. 33 
 
 
As mentioned above, the importance of considering how corporations are created is 
further emphasised by South Africa possibly seeking guidance on the interpretation of 
section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. Section 163 “closely resembles the Canadian 
oppression remedy under section 241 of the CBCA and it is possible that courts may also 
look to Canadian cases for guidelines on the interpretation of certain parts of section 
163.”34 Now that we have established the significance of considering the types of 
corporation, I will now discuss the various types of corporations. 
Corporations have been created in five different ways, by Royal Charter, by a special Act 
of Parliament, by a Letters Patent statute, by registration of the memorandum and 
articles of association, and by registration under a division of powers statute. 35These 
are the various ways juristic personality is acquired. Each type of corporation is 
discussed with reference to how they are created and the powers obtained through the 
governing document. How each type of corporation provides for relief in the event of 
non-compliance with the governing document is also discussed below. 
 
                                                          
33 Bruce Welling, Lionel Smith & Leonard I Rotman, Canadian Corporate Law: Cases, Notes & 
Materials, 4th ed (Markham: Lexis Nexis Canada Inc, 2010) [Cases, Notes and Materials] at 111. 
34 Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 2011) 
[Henochsberg] at s12. 
35
 All, except for the division of powers statute, were established in the UK. The divisions of 
powers statute was established in Canada. 
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2.1 Royal Charter 
Corporations created by Royal Charter, were created for a particular purpose, this 
purpose would be expressly stated in the Charter. These corporations were created on 
the discretion of the Crown and the powers of the directors and shareholders were 
specifically identified in the Charter. In relation to non-compliance with the Charter, 
“the common law of standing [would] determine whether a court [would] listen to the 
particular person’s argument that someone else is not complying with the Charter.”36 An 
example of a Charter corporation is the Hudson Bay Company.  
The governing document in this type of corporation was the Charter granted by the 
Crown. However, after 1688, the English system of Government underwent vast 
restructuring, to the extent that the powers of the Crown to grant Charters were 
restricted. It therefore became standard for Parliament to pass a statute authorising the 
Crown to issue a Charter creating a corporation.37 
2.2 Special Act of Parliament 
The special Act of Parliament was created through a grant given to the particular person 
requesting a corporation. For example, companies38 would form and apply for an Act of 
Parliament. Similar to the Charter, the Parliament had the discretion to grant or refuse a 
                                                          
36 Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 111. 
37 Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles, 3d ed (London, Ont; 
Scribbles Publishing, 2006) [Corporate Law in Canada] at 91. 
38 These were the groups of individual seeking a common goal (business organisations or 
partnerships). 
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request to establish a corporation. The source of power, for the directors and 
shareholders rights, was derived directly from the Parliament and was provided under 
the special Act of Parliament. The special Act of Parliament would provide directors with 
the power to create by-laws to govern certain aspects of the corporation.39 The by-laws 
had to comply with the provisions of the special Act of Parliament. In the event of non-
compliance with the special Act of Parliament, “the grievance procedures [would have 
been] provided explicitly in the special Act [of Parliament]. If not, a dissatisfied party 
[would have to] rely on the general principles governing the situation…including the law 
of standing.”40  
The difference between the Charter and the special Act of Parliament, prior to 1688, 
was that the Charter derived its power from the executive branch of government while 
the source of power of the special Act of Parliament, was from the legislative branch. 
After 1688, the source of power of the Charter was indirectly through the legislative 
branch whereas the source of power for the special Act of Parliament was directly from 
the legislative branch. An example of this type of corporation is found in the Foss v 
Harbottle case.41 The corporation’s governing document was titled “An Act for 
Establishing a Company for the Purpose of Laying Out and Maintaining an Ornamental 
Park within a Township of Rushlome Charlton-upon-Medlock and Moss Side, in the 
                                                          
39
 Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 112. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 ER 189. 
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County of Lancaster”. The governing document in this type of corporation is the special 
Act of Parliament. 
2.3 Letters Patent statute 
In the case of corporations created by Letters Patent, if an application to acquire a 
corporation was granted by the Legislature, the corporation was created and its 
governing document was the Letters Patent statute. Similar to the Charter “a letters 
patent corporation is one incorporated under the registration statute that adopts the 
charter corporation as its model”.42 This type of corporation was used in Canada until 
the early 1970’s. Today, the only Canadian province that retains this type of corporation 
for business purposes is Prince Edward Island. 
The fact that the corporation was created by a Letters Patent statute meant that all 
persons were bound by the provisions of the statute, to the extent to which the person 
dealt with the corporation. The powers of the directors and shareholders were set out 
expressly in the statute, for example, by-laws could be created by the directors, and 
“the usual technique [was] to grant managerial power to the board of directors.”43  
However, this was not the case in the contractarian type of corporations, which is 
                                                          
42 Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 91. 
43 Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 113. 
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discussed below. Furthermore, in the event of non-compliance with the Letters Patent 
statute, the provision of the statute itself would dictate the recourse available.44  
2.4 Registration of Memorandum and Articles of Association, the 
Contractarian or English statute model  
A corporation created by registration of its memorandum and articles of association is a 
corporation by virtue of the registration itself.45 Once the memorandum and articles of 
association were signed and filed with the Registrar, a certificate of incorporation was 
issued and the corporation could commence business as a juristic person.  
As mentioned earlier, a company is not a juristic person. Only a corporation is a juristic 
person, separate from its members. Over the years the distinction has blurred and 
caused some confusion. Below is a discussion of the origin of the term “company”.  
The word “company” has “no strict meaning; the term implies an association of a 
number of people for some common purpose.46 With reference to the unincorporated 
                                                          
44 “In general, letters patent statutes do not provide for grievance procedures to correct or 
restrain violations of the corporate constitution.” (Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33  at 
113). 
45 Over the years this type of corporation has been referred to as a company, but as was 
discussed in paragraph 1 above, a company was not a juristic person. Today however, English 
company law and South African company law refer to a juristic person as a company. This, as 
will be seen in the following chapters, has led to some confusion within the company law. 
46 L C B Gower, The Principles of Modern Company Law 3d ed (Stevens & Sons; London UK, 1969) 
[Modern Company Law] at 3. 
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partnerships, mentioned earlier, the registered companies47 were derived from these 
unincorporated partnerships during the 18th century. 
Initially, during the 17th century and the early 18th century, prior to the South Sea 
bubble, in 1720, the only way to obtain corporate personality was from the methods 
stated above, by Charter, by a special Act of Parliament or by a Letters Patent statute.48 
These methods were all quite expensive, so the business world tried to adapt the 
partnership form to an organisation with a large and fluctuating membership, this 
combination was known as a quasi- partnership or unincorporated partnerships.49  
These partnerships were governed by deeds of settlement. A deed of settlement was a 
cross between the articles of association and a debenture trust deed. In terms of the 
deed of settlement, the subscribers agreed to be associated in an enterprise with a 
prescribed joint stock divided into a specified number of shares; under the deed, 
management would be delegated to the committee of directors.50 
The period of the South Sea Bubble and the enactment of the Bubble Act were marked 
by corruption and illegality in relation to the partnerships and companies.51 In 1844, the 
                                                          
47 Registered companies were companies that registered their memorandum and articles of 
association under the Companies Act, 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict c 89. 
48 Modern Company Law, supra note 46 at 24. 
49 Modern Company Law, supra note 46 at 4. 
50 Modern Company Law, supra note 46 at 33 and 34. 
51 The vast scope of South Sea Bubble and further discussion on the subject is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. 
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Joint Stock Companies Act52 was enacted to regulate these partnerships and provide 
them with some legal personality. These large partnerships were called joint stock 
companies. These companies were registered with their memorandum and articles of 
association which were in fact merely the registrations of their deeds of settlement.53  
However, it was always known that a company was not a corporation in its complete 
sense because it did not have limited liability.54 The liability of members under the joint 
stock company remained with unlimited liability, just as a partnership. The definition of 
a joint stock company under 1844 Companies Act confirms its partnership origin. 
And be it enacted, That this Act shall apply to every Joint Stock Company... 
and  that the Term “Joint Stock Company” shall comprehend, - Every 
Partnership whereof the Capital is divided into Shares, and so as to be 
transferrable without the express Consent of all the Copartners.55 
 
In 1862, the Companies Act, 186256 was enacted and provided that the memorandum 
and articles of association would bind the company and the members. The statute 
stated that,  
The Memorandum shall bear the same stamp as if it were a deed and shall 
be signed by each subscriber, in the presence of, and attested by one 
                                                          
52 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c110) [1844 Companies Act]. 
53 Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 12 citing Ronald Ralph Formoy, The Historical Foundations of 
Modern Company Law (London UK: Sweet& Maxwell, 1923) at 41. 
54 Having corporate personality or being a separate legal entity meant that the assets and 
liabilities of the corporations belonged to the corporations, separate from its members. 
Therefore, a member in a corporation would not be liable for the debts owed by the 
corporation; the members’ risk of investment is limited to value of his or her investment, his or 
her shareholding in the corporation. 
55 1844 Companies Act, supra note 52 at 1030, s II. 
56 Companies Act, 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict c 89. 
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witness at the least... it shall, when registered, bind the company and the 
members thereof to the same extent as if each member had subscribed his 
name and affixed his seal thereto, and there were in the Memorandum 
contained, on the part of himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, a 
covenant to observe all the conditions of such Memorandum subject to the 
provisions of this Act.57 
 
This provision established that the registered memorandum of association and articles 
of association formed the contract between the company and the members or 
shareholders. This contract was based on the deed of settlement that was originally the 
document that governed the partnership.58 
Therefore in this type of corporation, the shareholders were the theoretical source of all 
power within the governing document and the directors were not usually given 
managerial powers by the statute. If the directors had any such powers, they were 
delegated by the shareholders, in accordance with the Articles of Association.59 In 
relation to non-compliance with the Articles of Association, the position was uncertain 
and created difficulty in the application of minority shareholder provisions and it seems 
that it still creates difficulties in the application of minority shareholder provisions. 
These difficulties are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
The difference between the Letters Patent statute and the contractarian statute was 
“the retention of the discretionary element in the creation of the corporation. Letters 
patent statutes always provided that the relevant governmental official ‘may’ issue the 
                                                          
57 Companies Act, 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict c 89 at s 11. 
58
 Further details on the deed of settlement are provided in Chapter 3. 
59 Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 115. 
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incorporating [governing] documents, while the contractarian…statutes state ‘shall’.”60 
This meant that anyone who registered his or her memorandum and articles of 
association obtained a corporation. Provided that all requirements were met, the 
Registrar was statutorily obligated to grant the corporation. In the case of a corporation 
created by a Letters Patent statute, the Civil Servant could decide whether or not to 
grant the application for corporation despite compliance with the requirements. In the 
case of non-compliance with the governing document in the contractarian statute, 
English precedents were often considered in this regard.61  
Throughout this particular type of corporation, reference has been made to 
partnerships, corporate personality (juristic personality), corporations and how 
companies are not juristic persons. The apparent misunderstanding between the 
partnerships and corporate personality was created through various legal 
interpretations and statutory wording. South Africa adopted this type of corporation 
through the English company law. I elaborate on this aspect in Chapter 2. 
2.5 Division of Powers statute  
Until the early 1970’s, when the Canadian corporate law underwent major reforms, 
Canadian corporations were mainly governed by Letters Patent statutes. In Canada 
today, a corporation may be created by any of the provincial statutes or under the 
                                                          
60 Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 113. 
61 Although Canadian corporate law mainly grew from a Letters Patent statute, some Canadian 
provinces had corporations created under a contractarian statute and for those types of 
corporations, Canadian courts would seek guidance from English precedents (Cases, Notes and 
Materials, supra note 33 at 113). The types of corporations within the Canadian jurisdiction are 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
20 
 
 
federal corporate statute. Each province has its own corporate legislation and each 
province has a particular type of corporation. 62   Prior to the 1970’s reform Manitoba, 
New Brunswick, Ontario and Prince Edward Island were the common law provinces 
where incorporation took place by way of a Letters Patent statute.63  The provinces that 
had a history of the contractarian statute were Alberta, British Columbia, 
Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan.64  
Today, the only provinces that retain their original statutes are Prince Edward Island, 
Nova Scotia and to a certain extent British Columbia.  The rest of the provinces now 
follow a division of powers statute, by adopting provisions from the Canada Business 
Corporations Act (“CBCA”) into their own provincial corporate law statutes. 
The division of powers statute is characterised as a CBCA type of statute which is 
established when the corporation is created by filing its articles of incorporation under a 
model of division of powers.65 The filing of the articles of incorporation “invokes a 
statutory division of powers among the participants- directors, officers, shareholders 
and, to a limited extent, creditors- in the internal workings of the corporation.”66 The 
governing documents in this model are the articles of incorporation. In comparison to 
                                                          
62 Quebec is excluded as the province applies Quebec law which is not within the scope of this 
thesis.  
63 J L Stewart, Handbook on Canadian Company Law, 5th ed (Toronto: The Carswell Company 
Limited, 1960) at 3. 
64 Ibid at 12. 
65 Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 59.  
66 Ibid. 
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the contractarian type of corporation, the governing document under this model does 
not form a contract between the company and the shareholders.67  
Now that we have identified some characteristics of the five types of corporations, we 
now know that Canada comes from a Letters Patent statute and South Africa, through 
its historical relationship with English company law, adopted a contractarian statute. Let 
us therefore proceed to the historical development of the corporate law in Canada and 
South Africa. 
Conclusion 
As South Africa will seek guidance from the Canadian courts on the interpretation of 
section 163 of 2008 SA Companies Act, it is important to understand Canada’s corporate 
law history. The historical analysis will lead us to understand why certain court decisions 
were made under section 241 of the CBCA and why this section was created.  Chapter 1 
provided the foundation of this understanding by identifying the terms “corporation” 
and “company”. This led to the discussion on the particular types of corporations and 
their significance.  
Ascertaining the type of corporation is important because it determines the source of 
the corporation’s power. The source of corporation’s power could be from the Crown, 
the Legislature or in the case of the contractarian statute, the shareholders. These 
governing bodies determine the provisions within the corporation’s governing 
                                                          
67 Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 60. 
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document and through these provisions they identify the rights and duties of the 
individuals within the corporation.  
The rights provided in the governing document are what the shareholders seek to 
enforce when obtaining relief on non-compliance of these governing documents. This 
leads us to determine the adequacy of the shareholder protection within the particular 
governing document. In Chapter 2, I delve into the history and current development of 
the South African company law as well as the history of the Canadian corporate law and 
the development of the oppression remedy under section 241 of the CBCA.   
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Chapter 2: The History of the South 
African Company Law and the 
Canadian Corporate Law 
Introduction 
South Africa and Canada share a history in English company law. Their common 
foundation is based on how each has developed its own shareholder remedies from 
section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies Act.68 Considering the discussion on the different 
types of the corporations in Chapter 1, understanding how each jurisdiction developed 
from the same shareholders’ remedy with the different types of corporation is 
fascinating. South African companies developed from contractarian statutes and Canada 
developed from a Letters Patent statute. As of May 2011, South Africa adopted a new 
shareholders remedy, one that resembles the Canadian oppression remedy.  The 
question to consider is whether, the different types of corporations in each jurisdiction 
will affect the way section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act is applied in South Africa.  
This chapter begins with the history of the South African company law, the statutory 
provisions under the old South African company law statute- the predecessors of the 
2008 SA Companies Act- will be discussed. In addition, the chapter will consider the 
impact the type of corporation in South Africa has had on its development. Lastly, this 
                                                          
68 Companies Act, 1948 (UK), 11 & 12 Geo VI c.38 [1948 UK Companies Act]. 
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chapter will discuss the development of the Canadian corporate law, with emphasis on 
the development of the oppression remedy. 
1. History of the South African company law 
Company law has existed in South Africa since 1861 and has consistently followed the 
English company law69 beginning with the Joint Stock Companies Act of the Cape 
Colony.70 The Cape Colony Act was essentially a replica of the 1844 Companies Act.71 
During the 19th century, South Africa was divided into colonies and each colony was 
governed by its own company regulations, similar to Canada’s provinces.  
After South Africa became a Union in 1910, it adopted its first national company law, 
the Union Companies Act, 1926.72 The statutory member’s remedy was provided under 
section 111bis of the 1926 Union Companies Act. The purpose of this section was to 
provide alternative relief to winding up, in cases of oppression.73  
After tracing the history of section 111bis of the 1926 Union Companies Act, the Judge in 
Bader v. Weston concluded that, 
                                                          
69 H R Hahlo, The South African Company Law Through the Cases (Cape Town: Juta & Company 
Limited, 1977) at 10 [South African Company Law]. 
70 Joint Stock Companies Act, (S Afr), No 23 of 1861 [Cape Colony Act]. 
71 Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844 (UK) [1844 Companies Act]. 
72 Companies Act, (S Afr), No 46 of 1926 [1926 Union Companies Act]. 
73 Ordinarily, if there was a case of oppression within the company, the only relief available was 
to liquidate the company, which meant that the company would no longer exist. Instead of this 
final ending to the existence of the company, this section was created as an alternative to 
liquidation. However, the remedy under the section could only be provided if one could show 
that on just and equitable grounds, the company had reached the point where it needed to be 
dissolved. 
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[t]he section had been intended essentially as an alternative remedy 
available only to persons who would otherwise have been entitled to an 
order for the winding-up of a company upon the just and equitable 
ground[s].74 
Although the Union Companies Act came into force in 1926, the alternative remedy to 
winding up was introduced in 1950, as an amendment to the 1926 Union Companies Act 
under the Companies Act 37 of 1950.75 The wording of the section makes it clear that 
the section was derived from section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies Act.76 The English 
company law was incorporated into the South African company law; not only did South 
Africa adopt English company law provisions but it also relied heavily on the cases 
decided under the various English company law statutes.  
The 1926 Union Companies Act was later repealed by the South African Companies Act 
61 of 1973.77 The 1973 SA Companies Act was hailed as the first company law statute 
that finally cut the umbilical cord between South African and English company law.78 
Despite South Africa’s aim to part from the English company law, it continued to 
influence the South African company law, “it is true that the new Act [1973 SA 
Companies Act] continues to be based on the English company law principles”.79 These 
                                                          
74 R.C Beuthin, “Company Law” 1967 Ann. Surv. S. African L. 230 citing Bader v Weston 1967 (1) S 
Afr LR 134 (Cape Prov Div). 
75 Companies Act, (S Afr), No 37 of 1950. 
76 Refer to Appendix A below for section 111bis and section 210.  
77 Companies Act, (S Afr), No 61 of 1973 [1973 SA Companies Act]. 
78 South African Company Law, supra note 69 at 10. 
79 South African Company Law, supra note 69  at 11 citing RC Beuthin Commission Annual 
Survey, 1970. 
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general principles referred to above, include principles of corporate personality and 
majority rule.  
“The strongly felt need to strengthen shareholder democracy and provide more 
effective protection for the small investor motivated many of the reforms in the 1973 
Act”.80 Today, with reference to the DTI policy document, shareholder protection was 
also one of the motivating aspects of the 2008 SA Companies Act. Before we discuss the 
2008 SA Companies Act let us first consider South Africa’s position on the fundamental 
principles of corporate personality and majority rule.  
In South African company law, the nature and extent of the enforcement of the 
shareholder remedy is dependent on three factors, (i) separate legal personality, (ii) 
majority rule and (iii) the non – interference principle.81 These factors will be discussed 
below within the context of the South African statutory provisions and South African 
cases as well as the arguments made in Chapter 1 relating to types of corporations.  
1.1 South Africa: Statutory Analysis 
The South African company law falls into the category of corporations created by 
registration of memorandum and articles of association, the contractarian statute. As 
discussed in chapter 1, this type of corporation is identified through the particular 
“contract” provision within the statute. In order to provide an overall understanding of 
the South African company law position, an example is provided.   
                                                          
80 South African Company Law, supra note 69 at 11. 
81 MS Blackman, Law of South Africa Vol 4 (2) Part 2 (Durban: Butterwoths, 1995) [LAWSA] at 
para 189.   
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The Yuri Example82 Let us assume that there is a person in a coma named Yuri. Before 
he fell into the coma, Yuri left a document with the hospital stating how he wanted his 
affairs to be handled in his absence (“the Document”).  
In the first scenario, Yuri was diligent and thought ahead. In the Document he stated the 
responsibilities of the individuals he wanted handling his affairs. He identified Ben to do 
certain tasks. He also identified Ruth and provided her with certain tasks as well. Soon 
thereafter Yuri fell into a coma. 
In the second scenario, Yuri was under pressure and was not able to identify the 
individual’s tasks as clearly as the first scenario. Luckily, Yuri knew that Ben, his friend, 
had a document of his own that set out how Yuri’s affairs would be handled if a case like 
this should arise. Yuri simply stated in his Document, that “If anyone wishes to see how I 
have chosen to have my affairs handled, please refer to Ben’s Document.” Soon 
thereafter Yuri fell into the coma. 
Consider that Yuri represents the Corporation, the Document represents the statute, 
Ben and Ruth represent the shareholders and the directors respectively. The first 
scenario illustrates a corporation created by a Letters Patent statute or a special Act of 
Parliament and the second scenario illustrates a corporation created by a contractarian 
statute. South Africa falls into the second scenario. 
                                                          
82 The Yuri Example identifies the relationship at play in a corporation in the context of ordinary 
people. 
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The lack of clarity as to who is responsible for what as well as the lack of distinction 
between the Yuri’s rules regarding his affairs and Ben’s intentions regarding Yuri’s affairs 
creates interpretation problems when this is considered in the corporate law context. 
The shareholders’ wishes and the company’s wishes are all intertwined in one 
document, the memorandum and articles, but this does not mean the company and 
shareholders are the same. Ben’s wishes and Yuri’s wishes seem to exist simultaneously 
within Ben’s Document (2nd Document): it should be clear that despite this, Yuri and Ben 
are two different people.  
In the context of South Africa, the shareholders and company are seen as separate, only 
because of the clarity provided in the well-known case of Salomon v Salomon. The case 
had clarified the position regarding corporate personality in the case of corporations 
created by the contractarian statute. The Salomon v Salomon case held that a 
corporation created in this manner is separate from its members. If it were not for the 
clarity in Salomon v Salmon the section of the Act would leave one uncertain about the 
nature of this type of corporation. The ambiguity in the wording of the statutory 
provision is clear below. In the context of the South African company law, section 65(1) 
of the 1973 SA Companies Act provides the following. 
From the date of incorporation stated in the certificate of incorporation, the 
subscribers of the memorandum together with such other persons as may 
from time to time become members of the company, shall be a body 
corporate with the name stated in the memorandum, capable of exercising 
all the functions... 
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This provision states clearly that the shareholders (subscribers) are the corporation. 
They are the same person. In another statutory provision, the legislature allows a 
binding contract between the company and shareholder. This statute- based contract is 
found under section 65 (2) of the 1973 SA Companies Act, 
The memorandum and articles shall bind the company and the members 
thereof to the same extent as if they respectively had been signed by each 
member, to observe all the provisions of the memorandum and of the 
articles, subject to the provisions of this Act. 
 
This statute-based contract is the main characteristic of the contractarian statute. The 
provision was first created in the 1862 Companies Act and due to South Africa’s 
relationship with English company law; it also adopted this same provision. The original 
wording of the section and the history of the section as to why the provision was 
inserted into the statute is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. For now, let us 
return to the ambiguity of the provisions and its effect on the interpretation of the 
principles of corporate personality ad majority rule in the South African company law.83 
2.2 South Africa: Corporate Personality  
 
A corporation is a person in the legal sense of the word. As such, it is a legal 
entity altogether separate and distinct from its members. Its existence is 
independent of the continued existence of its members; and it is capable of 
having rights and incurring obligations apart from those of its members. 
Corporations are usually referred to as “juristic” persons to distinguish them 
from human beings, or “natural” persons.84 
                                                          
83 Where necessary I will apply the second scenario of the Yuri example in order to provide 
clarity. 
84 LAWSA, supra note 81 at Vol 4:1 para 18. 
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A corporation is a juristic person and how juristic personality is acquired has been 
identified in South Africa in three main ways:85 by special Act of Parliament, such as 
Eskom (incorporated by the Electricity Act 40 of 195886, replaced by the Electricity 
Amendment Act 46 of 199487); by incorporation by an enabling act, for example, the 
1973 SA Companies Act, and; by means of conducting oneself as a juristic person.88  
The key corporate personality case in South Africa is Salomon v Salomon.89 The facts and 
decision of Salomon v Salomon are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, but for the 
sake of context, this case confirmed the concept of corporate personality or separate 
legal personality in the “company” created under the contractarian statute.  
South Africa has applied this case since 1920. The cases discussed below reflect South 
Africa’s position on the corporate personality principle and also shows the difficulty or 
uncertainty that still remains when applying this fundamental principle, especially in 
cases of fraud. The facts and decisions of Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council and 
                                                          
85 South African Company Law, supra note 69 at 25. 
86 Electricity Act, (S Afr), No. 40 of 1958. 
87 Electricity Amendment Act, (S Afr), No. 46 of 1994. 
88 This last method of acquiring juristic personality is outside the scope of this thesis. Only a brief 
description of what it entails is provided here. This last method of acquiring juristic personality 
relates to a discussion of realist and concession theories. “According to the “concession theory”, 
a juristic person is a fictitious body which can only be created by an act of concession of the 
State, either by charter, Act of Parliament or administrative act. According to the “realist 
theory”, it is a reality and does not necessarily require State concession.” (South African 
Company Law, supra note 69 at 1). 
89 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 10. 
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Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation and Another are discussed 
below. 
2.2.1 Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal Council90 
Dadoo registered a company, Dadoo Ltd, in the Transvaal with a share capital of 150 
shares. Dadoo held 149 shares in the company and 1 share was held by Dindar. Both 
Dadoo and Dindar were “Asiatics”.91  In March 1915, the company obtained transfer of 
Stand 340 in the township of Krugersdorp from Spiller (this title contained no restrictive 
condition). In May 1916, the company obtained transfer of Stand 171 in the same 
township, from Fouchee and Howell. The deed of transfer embodied a condition which 
prohibited the owner from transferring or subletting the land, to any coloured person.92  
The company thereafter leased both Stands to Dadoo. Dadoo carried on a grocery and 
general dealer’s business on Stand 340 and he lived on Stand 171. In October 1919, the 
Krugersdorp Council made an application and obtained an order setting aside both 
transfers as being contrary to law. The appellant argued that the Council did not have 
standing93 and there was no illegal evasion of the law.  
The question before the court was whether ownership by the company was in 
substance ownership by the shareholders. In response to the trial court decision, the 
                                                          
90 Dadoo Limited v Krugersdorp Municipal Council [1920] AD 530 (S Afr SC). 
91 “Asiatic” refers to a person of Asian descent; in South Africa they were classified under 
“coloured” people. 
92 The first law prohibited Asiatics from owning fixed property and the second law prohibited 
coloured persons from acquiring or occupying ground held under Gold Law. 
93 The trial court found that on the arguments made by the Council, the Council had standing. 
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Supreme Court (“the court”) said that the spirit and intent of the legislature exists only 
in the context of the provisions of the statute.94 The court further held that to use this 
approach would be difficult and dangerous.  
I know of no case in which the expressed intention of the lawgiver has been 
clothed with authority to affect a transaction which could not under ordinary 
rules of construction be brought within the written statute.95 Such a 
principle would be dangerous and difficult to apply to the meticulous 
provision of the modern legislation.  In this case the intention of the 
Legislature is apparent upon the face of the clear definite language used, 
and no further extension of it is warranted.96 
 
The court then discussed the issue of corporate personality and applied Salomon v 
Salomon. The court said that in law it is clear that property owned by Dadoo Ltd is not 
the same as property owned by the shareholders. 
This result follows from the principle of the separate legal existence with 
which such corporations are by statute endowed, and the principle has been 
accepted in our practice. In the words of LORD MACNAGHTEN (Salomon v 
Salomon & Co., 1897 AC 22 at p 51), "the company is at law a different 
person altogether from the subscribers to its memorandum; and though it 
may be that, after incorporation, the business is precisely the same as it was 
before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the 
profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee 
for them”.97 
                                                          
94 The trial court regarded the transactions as being an evasion of the statutes spirit and intent 
not as a breach of the literal provisions and ordered the transfer of the Stands to be set aside on 
these grounds. 
95 Ibid at 544. 
96 Ibid at 550. 
97 Ibid at 550. 
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The court was also aware of the difficulty in applying this principle. The court said that 
the corporation could not be referred to as a coloured person like its shareholders; 
therefore, Dadoo Ltd did not contravene the Act. The court also said that applying the 
principle of separate legal personality in general, can get confusing, “[g]reat confusion 
arises from distinguishing the body corporate for the individual members who at one 
time constitute not the corporation, but all the members of the corporation.”98 A clear 
example of this great confusion is in the dissenting judgment of the court by De Villiers J.  
In the application of these facts to the law, De Villiers J combined both principles of 
partnership with principles of corporate personality (separate legal personality), to 
provide his judgment as follows.  
Although a company has a legal persona distinct from its shareholders it can 
hardly be denied that a company is in essence a partnership (of which the 
shareholders are the partners) which the law clothed with the persona for 
lawful purposes. 99 
 
If we apply the Yuri example here, the Supreme Court had identified the principle of 
corporate personality clearly, in that both Yuri and Ben are two different people. 
However, the dissenting judgment of De Villiers J confuses the issue by interpreting the 
concept of corporate personality incorrectly.  The judge said that although Yuri and Ben 
are different people, it cannot be denied that in fact Yuri and Ben are the same person, 
but this is wholly inaccurate. Yuri is in a hospital bed and Ben is handling Yuri’s affairs, 
similarly, the property was transferred to Dadoo Ltd, therefore the property belonged to 
                                                          
98 Ibid at 556. 
99 LAWSA, supra note 84 at 4:1 Part 1 para 20 citing Dadoo Limited v Krugersdorp Municipal 
Council 1920 AD 530 at 573. 
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the corporation and not its members; Dadoo only leased the property from Dadoo Ltd. 
The principle of corporate personality is quite clear. However the lack of clarity, when it 
comes to understanding separate legal personality or corporate personality, is based on 
the contract characteristic of the contractarian statute. Therefore, even though the 
intentions or wishes of Ben and Yuri regarding Yuri’s affairs are intertwined in one 
document, it does not mean that Ben and Yuri are also intertwined as one person or 
should be regarded as one person for any particular purpose. They are not. The next 
case discusses the issue of fraud. Courts have found that there are instances, like fraud, 
where the corporate personality of company may be disregarded. This is also inaccurate. 
2.2.2 The Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation100 
The respondent carried on a business, inter alia, as the owner and charterer of ships. In 
terms of a charterparty101 signed by the charterer in New Delhi, the President of India, 
acting on behalf of the Government of India, chartered the vessel MV “Kavo Peiratis” 
from Evdomon. The purpose of the charter was to carry a cargo of bagged rice from 
Thailand to India. The vessel duly completed the voyage. The Government of India failed 
to pay a portion of the freight due under the agreement and despite continuous 
pressure from the managers of Kavo, it still owed US$109 962.47.  
Two years later Evdomon ascertained that the MV “Vallabhbhai Patel” (“the vessel”) 
was docked at the port of Saldahna Bay, where she had been undergoing repairs. 
                                                          
100 Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation and Another [1994] 2 All SA 11 (S 
Afr SC). 
101 An agreement relating to the sale of charters. 
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Claiming the vessel belonged to the Government of India and in the belief that the 
vessel was imminently due to depart, Evdomon attached the vessel in order to obtain 
payment of the freight due under the agreement relating to Kavo. The vessel was 
actually registered to the Shipping Corporation of India (“SCI”) and owned by SCI. SCI 
therefore intervened in the application.102 SCI was a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
Government of India. The question before the court was whether SCI’s property should 
be treated as the Government’s property because of the status of SCI and its 
relationship with the Government.103 With reference to the Dadoo case, the court held:  
It seems to me that generally it is of cardinal importance to keep distinct the 
property rights of a company and those of its shareholders, even where the 
latter is a single entity, and that the only permissible deviation from this rule 
known to our law occurs in those (in practice) rare cases where the 
circumstances justify “piercing” or “lifting” the corporate veil. And in this 
regard it should not make any difference whether the shares [are] held by a 
holding company or by a Government. I do not find it necessary to consider, 
or attempt to define, the circumstances under which the court will pierce 
the corporate veil. Suffice it to say that they would generally have to include 
an element of fraud or other improper conduct in the establishment or use 
of the company or the conduct of its affairs. In this connection the words 
“device”, “stratagem”, “cloak” and “sham” have been used...104 
 
Courts in South Africa have found that there are instances that give rise to the situations 
where corporate personality may be disregarded. In the well-known South African case 
of Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited,105 the court proceeds 
                                                          
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid at 24. 
104 Ibid at 25 and 26. 
105 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Limited [1995] 2 All SA 543 (S Afr SC). 
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to discuss the importance of corporate personality and the “piercing of the corporate 
veil”.  
It is trite law that “[a] registered company is a legal persona distinct from the 
members who compose it”. Equally trite is the fact that a court would be 
justified in certain circumstances in disregarding a company’s separate 
personality in order to fix liability elsewhere for what are ostensibly acts of 
the company. This is generally referred to as lifting or piercing the corporate 
veil. (I shall confine myself to the use of the word piercing.) The focus then 
shifts from the company to the natural person behind it (or in control of its 
activities) as if there were no dichotomy between such person and the 
company. In that way personal liability is attributed to someone who 
misuses or abuses the principle of corporate personality.106 
 
The Court has often held that in certain circumstances of fraudulent acts one could 
disregard the corporate personality of the company and go after the shareholders.  
Let us consider the Yuri example. If Ben acted fraudulently in regards to Yuri’s affairs, 
the courts, based on the decision above, would say that it was appropriate to disregard 
Yuri, as though he did not exist: again this argument is ridiculous.107 The courts would do 
this in order to ensure that Ben was held accountable for his actions. But the problem 
here is that one cannot disregard Yuri’s existence, he is in the hospital. The question 
therefore, is how does one address the fraudulent conduct by Ben? Well, here is where, 
the clarity of the Document becomes crucial.  
Unless, Yuri stated how Ben will be dealt with if he steals from Yuri, there is no way of 
holding Ben accountable because all his powers come directly from Yuri because Yuri 
                                                          
106 Ibid at 552 citing Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 550. 
107 Granted he is in a coma but that does not mean he was never born, he is merely lying in the 
hospital bed. 
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adopted the 2nd Document as his own. There is therefore no cloak that Ben is 
supposedly hiding behind; it all depends on detail, clarity and specificity in the 
Document, i.e. the governing document of the corporation.  This responsibility of 
providing statutory clarity, regarding the individual duties, rests directly with the 
Legislature. In addition, the governing documents in all the various types of corporations 
are the statutes, except for the contractarian statute, due to its statute based-contract.  
In order to assist the South African Legislature I provide recommendations of statutory 
provisions in Chapter 5 that will, if adopted, eliminate this issue of “piercing the 
corporate veil” or disregarding the corporate personality. The issue of the interpretation 
of corporate personality as well as issue of piercing the corporate veil are based on the 
history of the terms “company” and “corporation” and their relationship with 
shareholders. This relationship is captured in the binding contract between company 
and shareholder. Lastly, issues relating to corporate personality stem from the 
Legislature’s ambiguous language within the English company law, specifically, section 
11 and 18 of the 1862 Companies Act which were adopted by the 1973 SA Companies 
Act. These aspects are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.   
The next part of this discussion relates to majority rule. The majority rule itself is a fair 
and strict principle but when the rule is applied to undefined or uncertain principles it 
can lead to unfair results.  Due to the lack of clarity when it came to the corporate 
personality principle, the majority rule was applied to the rules governing the 
corporation and it yielded the following results. 
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2.3 South Africa: Majority Rule 
When discussing majority rule in South Africa, the discussion begins with the often cited 
case of Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Company.108  The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in this case reiterated the majority rule, stating that:  
by becoming a shareholder in a company a person undertakes by his 
contract to be bound by the decisions of the prescribed majority of 
shareholders, if those decisions on the affairs of the company are arrived at 
in accordance with the law, even where they adversely affect his own rights 
as a shareholder… that principle of the supremacy of the majority is essential 
to the proper functioning of companies.109 
 
This case was applied or referred to by various cases in the South African company law 
especially within the context of shareholders’ remedies.110 A shareholder who sought a 
remedy for a particular director’s conduct when the majority had already made a 
decision on that conduct, needed to be aware of this majority rule.  If the majority of the 
shareholders made a decision which was unfair to the minority shareholders, the court 
would often revert to the principle of majority rule and send the minority shareholder 
back to have the matter decided by the majority shareholders.111  It was a consequence 
of being a shareholder.  The courts would often state that they could not interfere in the 
internal management or affairs of the company, because majority decisions were part of 
                                                          
108 Sammel v President Brand Gold Mining Company, [1969] 3 S Afr L 629 (S Afr SC) [Sammel]. 
109 Ibid at 678 G. 
110 Louw v Nel [2011] 2 S Afr L 172 (S Afr SC) (available on SAFLII).; Hickman v Oban Investments 
[2010] ZAGPJHC 9 (Available on SAFLII); McMillan v Pott [2011] 1 S Afr LR 511 (WCC); Garden 
Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd [1979] 2 Sfr LR 525, (D&C Local Div); Donaldson 
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo Transvaal Collieries [1979] 3 S Afr L 713 (Wit Local Div).  
111 The principles of partnerships and majority rule are elaborated upon in Chapter 3. 
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the affairs of the company. The relationship between majority rule and court 
interference is confirmed below.  
Company law is based on the premise that within the framework of the 
Companies Act, companies are self-governing republics in which the majority 
should be allowed to govern unhindered by outside interference. From this 
follows two basic rules: the ‘Non-Intervention’ Rule and the ‘Proper Plaintiff’ 
rule, both are subject to common law and statutory exceptions. 112  
 
The internal management principle in South Africa113 is based on the case of Foss v 
Harbottle114, which states, as a general rule, that the courts will not interfere at the 
instance of an individual shareholder in matters of internal management. The internal 
management principle denies the member an action against the company whenever the 
result would be “that a meeting has to be called, and ultimately the majority [would get] 
its wishes.”115 Other cases that applied the majority rule with the context of the 
shareholders remedy are provided below. 
2.3.1 Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd116 
The facts of this case are briefly as follows: the minority shareholders of the first 
respondent sought to prevent the meeting of the company from being held, where a 
resolution authorising the sale of the company's assets, was to be passed by the 
majority of shareholders, until the investigation by the Minister of Economic Affairs had 
                                                          
112 South African Company Law, supra note 69 at 510. 
113 LAWSA, supra note 84 vol 4:2 Part 2 at para 191. 
114 Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 ER 189. 
115 LAWSA, supra note 84 vol 4:2 Part 2 at para 191 citing Foss v Harbottle. 
116 Investors Mutual Funds Ltd v Empisal (South Africa) Ltd (1979) 3 S Afr LR 170 (Wit Local Div) 
[Empisal]. 
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been completed or for a period of three months (whichever was the sooner). With 
reference to majority rule and the principle of non-interference, the court said that,  
[i]t is a fundamental principle of company law that majority rule prevails... It 
is a well-known principle that the Court will not normally intervene in the 
internal domestic affairs of a company and will not enquire into the 
commercial wisdom of a particular transaction which is left to the decision of 
the shareholders. The Court will intervene only if it can be shown that the 
minority shareholders are being unfairly prejudiced by the transaction... it is 
clear that s 252 contains no provision empowering the Court to interfere 
with the ordinary running of the business of a company by its directors or 
controlling shareholders.117 
The court proceeded to discuss what it would do if it were empowered to intervene by 
section 252 of the 1973 SA Companies Act. The court would not allow the meeting to be 
stopped, as requested by the minority shareholders, it would instead, order the 
purchase of the shares of the company by the majority shareholders from the minority 
shareholder at a fair price.118 Now that section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act 
empowers the court to do much more, it is hoped that the interpretation of the majority 
rule will not be a factor inhibiting the potential for better shareholder remedies. 
This general rule of court non-interference is further reiterated in Porteus v Kelly119 
where the court said that “the general rule is that the Court has no jurisdiction to and 
will not interfere with the internal management of companies acting within their 
                                                          
117 Ibid at 175 G-H; 177 B. 
118 Ibid at 177 C-D. 
119 Porteus v Kelly [1975] 1 All SA 176 (Wit Local Div). 
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powers unless a fraud has been perpetrated upon the minority.”120 Majority rule as 
stated in the Sammel case was applied in the following cases.121 
2.3.2 Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd122 
The respondent in this case was a company that owned a building in the city of Durban. 
The shareholders of the respondent company resolved to sell the building to a third 
party at a fair and reasonable price under the circumstances. The minority shareholders 
invoked section 252 of the 1973 SA Companies Act in an attempt to impeach the 
transaction as being unfairly prejudicial, unjust and inequitable.  
The court said that it was true that shareholders would be deprived of an investment 
which the majority in number wish to retain, but this itself is not a result which is 
necessarily prejudicial. Friedman J of the court added that this was merely the result of 
being a minority shareholder in a company who takes a view of company policy different 
from that of the majority. If one were to consider this instance as unfair and unjust then 
it would mean that the wishes of the minority would override those of the majority.123 
FRIEDMAN J said the following. 
[I]t is true that shareholders will be deprived of the investment which the 
majority in number wish to retain. But this in itself is not a result which is 
necessarily prejudicial, unjust or unfair. It is, as I see it, a result which occurs 
not infrequently and is the result of being a minority shareholder in a 
company who takes a view of company policy different from that of the 
majority. If one were to hold that this were true prejudice, injustice or 
                                                          
120 Ibid at 179. 
121 The shareholder undertakes by his contract to be bound by the decision of the majority. 
122 Garden Province Investment v Aleph (Pty) Ltd [1979] 2 Sfr LR 525 (D&C Local Div). 
123 Ibid at 533-4. 
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inequity, the other side of the coin would be that because the minority in 
number of shareholders wish as a matter of policy to retain the property 
they can block the wishes of the majority shareholders who wish to sell it. As 
I have said, when persons acquire shares in property holding companies as 
minority shareholders they know they are minority shareholders and it 
seems to me  that it is not unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to them 
to find their investment being sold against their wishes, provided of course 
that it is done at a fair and realistic price.124 
 
Similar to the Empisal case above, the courts will often adhere to the majority rule 
despite the unfairness that may exist because it is a consequence of being a 
shareholder. The court in the following case also applied majority rule. The difference in 
this case, was that the court mentioned the partnership analogy of a company125.  
2.3.3 Louw v Nel126  
 
Louw, Nel and Du Preez had formed a partnership. In 2003, the partnership was 
involved in certain projects with another, Mothupi. During that time, the partners 
decided to implement a black economic empowerment policy. After negotiations, the 
partners decided that the future business of the partnership should be conducted 
through a company, which was subsequently formed. Over time, the relationship 
between Nel and the others deteriorated, until a shareholders’ meeting was held and 
the shareholder’s resolved, by majority vote, that Nel was to be removed as director of 
the company on the alleged grounds that he had breached his fiduciary duty as a 
                                                          
124
 Ibid at 534. 
125 The court refers to “company” however as discussed in Chapter 1, the term company relates 
to partnership. Due to South Africa’s use of the term “company” in its statute, I have used the 
term “company” in order to be consistent with South African company law; where a company is 
known as a separate legal entity. 
126 Louw v Nel [2011] 2 S Afr L 172 (S Afr SC) (available on SAFLII). 
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director, that he had stolen the company’s intellectual property, and that he had 
conducted himself dishonestly and to the prejudice of the company.127 The court said 
that, 
generally speaking an application of this kind, based upon the partnership 
analogy cannot succeed if what is complained of is merely a valid exercise of 
the powers conferred on the majority. To hold otherwise would enable a 
member to be relieved from the consequences of a bargain knowingly 
entered into by him. 
 
The bargain referred to by the court relates to the contract between the shareholder 
and the company. Here it is clear that the both principles of corporation and partnership 
are being applied.  
The South African courts were already aware of three important points of company law, 
when they made their decisions. First is the contract, the relationship that existed 
between the company and shareholder. This contract coupled with the statutory 
provision that members are the “company” meant that corporate personality principle 
was left uncertain. Second, the majority rule would always be there to qualify any type 
of action brought by a minority shareholder if it related to conduct that the majority 
could do ordinarily in the course of its affairs. Lastly, the court would not interfere if the 
conduct complained related to something that could be remedied through a general 
meeting. These points of law represent where the South African law stands on these 
fundamental principles of corporate personality and majority rule. It is these points of 
law that need to be clarified for the South African company law to truly develop and 
                                                          
127 Ibid at para 6. 
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provide shareholders with a proper remedy through section 163 of the 2008 SA 
Companies Act. 
If these fundamental principles are not clarified within the South African company law, 
the uncertainty and confusion may be perpetuated when applying the shareholder 
remedy under section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. In fact, it has already begun. A 
company law commentary published in November 2011 explained the application of 
section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.  
The section is essentially intended as a statutory means of seeking redress, 
given the common law position deriving from Foss v Harbottle. But this is not 
to say, of course, that conduct by the majority, which constitutes a wrong to 
the company necessarily constitutes conduct unfairly prejudicial or 
oppressive to a shareholder within the meaning of section 163. 128 
 
Although South Africa adopted a wide shareholders’ remedy from the Canadian 
oppression remedy, it is clear, that its potentially wide remedy may be limited by 
application of majority rule. The commentary argues that, if the majority shareholders 
conduct themselves in a manner that may harm the company, the harm may not be 
seen as unfairly prejudicial to the minority shareholder. Because, the majority may 
simply decide to allow the harmful conduct, the harm done to the company is harm 
done to the shareholders and if a minority shareholder disagrees then it is merely a 
consequence of being a shareholder.  
                                                          
128 Henochsberg, supra note 34 at s 163. 
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Now let us consider how the Canadian corporate law developed from a Letters Patent 
statute and section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies Act to create the oppression remedy 
under section 241 of the CBCA. 
2. History of the Canadian Corporate law 
 
Most of the Canadian provincial statutes used the Letters Patent model, but there were 
other provincial statutes that used the contractarian statute.129 However, for most of 
them this only lasted until 1975 when the federal corporate statute, known as the 
Canada Business Corporations Act130 was enacted. The CBCA followed a division of 
powers type of statute and most of the provinces adopted this model of a division of 
powers. One of the main aspects of the division of powers model under the CBCA was 
the wide shareholder remedy known as the oppression remedy. This type of remedy did 
not exist in the Letters Patent or the contractarian type of statute. In fact as mentioned 
in Chapter 1, one of the characteristics of the Letters Patent statute was that if the 
remedy was not included in the statute, there was no recourse provided. In the 
contractarian statute, the shareholder remedy was found in the English company law; in 
fact, the first Canadian shareholder remedy was introduced in British Columbia131 in 
1960 and took the form of a provision similar to section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies 
                                                          
129 The provinces were Alberta, British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan. 
130 Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44 [CBCA]. 
131 One of the Canadian provinces that used a contractarian type of statute. 
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Act.132 Below is a discussion of how the Canadian corporate law developed from the two 
types of statutes, Letters Patent and contractarian to the current division of powers type 
of statute under the CBCA. 
History of the Canadian Oppression Remedy 
During the 1970’s, a committee was mandated to review Canada’s particular type of 
statute, the Letters Patent statute, in comparison to the English company law. The 
committee was also mandated to provide a proposal for the new Canadian Federal 
corporate statute.133  
The Proposal described as the Dickerson Report was published in 1971. It provided 
drafted sections of a Proposed Federal Act, in each area of corporate law as well as 
providing an extensive commentary on each provision and the reason for its insertion. In 
reference to the oppression remedy, it stated that,  
[t]he CBCA oppression remedy was substantially broader than its British or 
British Columbia antecedents. The Dickerson Report was guided by its 
conception of corporate law as a balancing of interests among shareholders, 
creditors, management and the public, essentially ensuring adequate 
investor protection and maximum management flexibility, if they were 
given broad discretion to apply general standards of fairness. 134 
 
While the Dickerson committee were drafting the Report they looked at the UK Cohen 
and Jenkins reports for guidance on some statutory provisions. When the Report was 
                                                          
132 Markus Koehnen, Oppression and Related Remedies (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) at 5. 
133 Robert W.V. Dickerson, John L. Howard & Leon Getz, Proposal for a New Business 
Corporations Law for Canada, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) [Dickerson Report] at 
162. 
134 Oppression and Related Remedies, supra note 132 at 5. 
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completed, it was amended and in 1975, the Report formed a substantial part of the 
provisions of the CBCA. 135 Soon after the CBCA was enacted the province of Alberta 
decided to publish its own report on the changes to its statute known as the Alberta 
Companies Act136, which was a contractarian type of statute. The Alberta Proposal was 
published in 1980.137  
Alberta had originated from a contractarian type of statute. In 1980 it chose to adopt a 
division of powers statute based on the new 1975 CBCA. Although Alberta was not the 
only province that amended its statute from a contractarian model to the CBCA type of 
statute, it was the only province that documented its amendments and the reasons for 
the amendments. In the Alberta Proposal, the reasons provided for the inclusion of the 
oppression remedy provisions were drawn from the following reasons in the Dickerson 
Report.  
[The recommended provisions were made] to strip away the self-imposed 
judicial qualifications that have limited the application of section 210 and 
that have therefore cast considerable doubt upon the effectiveness of the 
original provision. [The aim was] to set a standard that gave life to the often 
cited case Elder v Elder and Watson138 “...the essence of the matter seems to 
be that the conduct complained of should at the lowest involve a visible 
departure for the standard of fair dealing, and a violation of the conditions 
of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a 
company is entitled to rely”. 139 
                                                          
135 Christopher C Nicholls, Corporate law (Toronto; Edmond Montgomery Publication Ltd, 2005) 
at 422. 
136 Companies Act, RSA 2000, c C-21 [Alberta Companies Act]. 
137 Proposals for a new Alberta Business Corporations Act, vol 1 Report No. 36 (Institute of Law 
Research and Reform; Edmonton, 1980) [Alberta Proposal]. 
138 Elder v Elder and Watson [1952] SC 49 at 58. 
139Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 163 para 485. 
48 
 
 
 
The “self-imposed judicial qualifications” mentioned above, relates to the reluctance of 
the courts to interfere in the internal management of a corporation. “The complex 
wording of the Canadian statutes was designed to get around the failures of the English 
section.140 Canadian legislatures have recognised that it is difficult to create minority 
rights that can be asserted against the majority.”141 These failures coupled with the self-
imposed judicial qualification may be summarised here.  
Judges adopted a hands-off approach, saying that they were powerless to 
deal with the internal management of corporations. Ironically, their 
attitudes were formed by principles that had nothing to do with the 
individual shareholders rights; they had to do with a mistaken view of the 
relationship between majority rule and corporate personality. 142 
 
The mistaken view is an area that the South African company is already familiar, as 
mentioned previously, in the history of the South Africa company law. When it comes to 
applying the corporate personality principle, South African courts have admitted to the 
confusion it creates and when it comes to the majority rule, the courts have shown their 
reluctance to interfere in the internal management of the corporation. However, as of 1 
May 2011, South Africa chose to develop its company law by adopting a division of 
powers model, similar to the case with Alberta in 1980. Despite this development, South 
Africa may still be faced with this mistaken view.  
                                                          
140 Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada; The Governing Principles 3d ed (London, Ont: 
Scribbles Publishing, 2006) [Corporate Law in Canada] at 534. 
141 Ibid at 493. 
142 Ibid at 493. 
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Conclusion 
South Africa has come from a contractarian statute, although today the 2008 SA 
Companies Act follows a division of powers type of statute, clearly changes have been 
made in order to move away from this contractarian statute. However, the principles 
established under the 1973 SA Companies Act may seem to be applicable in 2012, but 
this thesis will show that this is not true. The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate 
the confusion that existed within the statutory provisions as well as the South African 
cases and how this confusion ultimately affects the adequacy of the shareholder 
remedy. It is clear from this chapter, that the position of the South African company law 
on the principles of corporate personality and majority rule has been adopted through 
the influence of English company law.  
In light of the fact that Canada and South Africa share an English company law 
background, let us consider what lead to the confusing view of the principle of 
corporate personality and the majority rule.   
The next chapter therefore considers the origin of this mistaken view, it identifies the 
Predicament in detail and refers to key English cases such as Foss v Harbottle143, North-
West Transportation Company v Beatty144, Burland v Earle145, Salomon v Salomon.146  
                                                          
143 Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 ER 189.  
144 North-West Transportation Company Limited v Beatty [1887] 12 AC 589 HL (Eng). 
145 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 HL (Eng). 
146 Aron Salomon v A Salomon and Company Limited [1897] AC 22 HL (Eng). 
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Chapter 3: The Predicament- English 
Company Law  
Introduction 
Chapter 1 and 2, refer was to a legal misunderstanding, “great confusion” or a 
“mistaken view” of the fundamental principles, corporate personality and majority rule. 
In this chapter this mistaken view will be elaborated upon and referred to as the 
Predicament. The Predicament originated in the English company law as far back as the 
19th century and over the years has been adopted by South Africa company law. The 
Predicament only exists in the type of corporation created by a contractarian statute. 
The reason is because in a contractarian statute, the corporation derives its power from 
a statute-based contract instead of the statute itself. This is the significant difference.  
In order for South African company law to develop, this Predicament needs to be 
clarified and addressed. After identifying the Predicament, the first step to addressing 
this Predicament is to understand its origin, through English legislation and the English 
precedents. This chapter discusses the Predicament through the 1844 Companies Act147, 
the 1862 Companies Act148 and through the following cases Foss v Harbottle, North-
West Transportation Company v Beatty, Burland v Earle, Salomon v Salomon.  
                                                          
147 Joint Stock Companies Act, 1844 (UK) [1844 Companies Act]. 
148 Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c.89) [1862 Companies Act]. 
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1. The Predicament 
The confusion created under the contractarian statute in the interpretation of corporate 
personality and majority rule was based on the lack of clarity in the statute. The point of 
reference for all corporations created over the years was the statute; the reason is that 
the corporation exists through the power derived from the statute, the governing 
document.149 The key is the statute expressly stated the rights and duties of the 
individuals within the corporation.  
In a contractarian statute, the statute-based contract shifts the shareholders’ and 
directors’ powers, which are supposed to be derived directly from the statute, to 
powers derived from the statute-based contract. Therefore, instead of seeking guidance 
on how the company should be governed, from the statute; one seeks guidance from 
the statute- based contract. Similarly in South Africa, the ambiguity in the contractarian 
statute led to various confusing interpretations of corporate personality and majority 
rule within the South African company law. 
However, the Predicament is not about problems created in the method of 
incorporation. It is in fact about the lack of attention given to the application of the 
statutory provisions by the courts, when considering and applying the rights and duties 
of the individuals in a corporation, a shareholder and a director. The major factor is the 
lack of clarity in the statute regarding the duties of the individuals in a corporation. 
                                                          
149 Corporation created by a special Act of Parliament or by a Letters Patent statute. 
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In South Africa, when discussing the rights and duties of each director or shareholder, 
the first point of reference is the Memorandum of Incorporation150, thereafter one 
considers whether the provisions in the Memorandum of Incorporation comply with the 
provisions in the statute.151 As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, South African company law 
developed from a contractarian statute and the wording of the statute led to legal 
misunderstandings regarding corporate personality and majority rule which were drawn 
from the English company law. However, it is important not to lose sight of the key 
factor which is the lack of clarity in the statute regarding the powers of the individuals in 
a company. In ascertaining the clarity of the statute and duties of the individuals in the 
company, the questions to answer are: what is the duty or the power? And where is the 
duty or power derived from i.e. is it statutory, is it common law or is it the law of equity?  
South African company law was influenced by English company law. South Africa not 
only adopted statutory provisions from English legislation but also adopted the 
principles established under the common law system.152 Considering the law of equity, 
South Africa adopted the principle that each director owes a fiduciary duty to the 
company, for example, if there are five directors, each director within that group of five, 
owes a fiduciary duty to the company. Therefore if we apply the questions above to this 
                                                          
150 In a recent case, the Shareholder’s Agreement was the point of reference in the determining 
the powers of the directors, Kudumane Investment Holding Ltd v Northern Cape Manganese 
Company (Pty) Ltd [2012] ZAGPJHC 116, 2012 SA (GSJ) (Available on SAFLII).  
151 The Memorandum of Incorporation under the 2008 SA Companies Act. The first point of 
reference under the 1973 SA Companies Act was the Memorandum and Articles of Association.  
152 The common law and the law of equity.  
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example, the answers would be as follows: the duty is the fiduciary duty, which is 
derived from the law of equity and is owed to the company by each director. 
The board of directors on the other hand, does not owe any fiduciary duty to anyone. 
The statutory duty imposed on the board of directors is to manage the affairs of the 
company.153 The board of directors is empowered by the statute to exercise its power to 
manage the company’s affairs. The next step is to determine how this statutory power is 
exercised by the board of directors.154 Firstly a meeting is held regarding a particular 
matter or transaction; secondly, each director exercises his or her fiduciary duty towards 
the company by casting his or her vote, and lastly, once each vote is cast, a decision is 
made using majority rule. It is important to note that when ascertaining how each 
director exercised his or her fiduciary duty, the courts of equity considered the 
knowledge of each director in regard to that particular matter tabled at the meeting.  
The point of this discussion is to illustrate that the key to the Predicament. If the courts 
were to consider the questions above before delving into the analysis of the complex 
facts before it, the South African company law will be become less complicated and 
uncertain.  
                                                          
153 Under the 1973 SA Companies Act the duty to manage was conferred on the shareholders 
who then delegated those powers to the directors. In the 2008 SA Companies Act, section 66 
provides that “the business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction 
of its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the 
functions of the company, except to the extent that this Act or the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise”. 
154 Now that we have established what the Board of Directors is empowered to do, we 
must also consider how the Board exercises this statutory power. 
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If we accept that a company is a person created by statute then it is clear that the 
statute is the point of reference.155 The existence of the company is derived from the 
statute only. However, since 1973, the South African courts have not considered a 
company from this perspective; the point of reference was the memorandum of 
association and then the statute, instead of the statute and only the statute. Therefore, 
if the statute is the only point of reference when determining the duties of the 
individuals, it is crucial that the statute is clear regarding those duties, as the lack of 
clarity affects how effective the shareholder remedy will be. 
If a minority shareholder approached the court seeking redress for his or her exclusion 
from the management of the company by the director defendant, the South African 
courts consider manner in which the decision was made by the board of directors, the 
board meeting, the procedure followed in the board meeting and the requirements for 
granting relief.156 However, because a company is a legal person empowered by the 
statute, the individuals are also bound by the statute; therefore the fundamental 
question is what does the statute state regarding who has a duty to manage the 
company’s affairs?  
Section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act empowers the board of directors to manage 
the affairs of the company. Therefore, the director defendant must then provide 
evidence of the exercise of that statutory power of management. The evidence is 
                                                          
155 The company is a legal person through the registration of a Memorandum of Incorporation or 
the memorandum and articles of association (1973 SA Companies Act). 
156 These are all clearly found in the statute however duties of the individuals within the 
corporation are less clear in the statute. 
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provided through the exercise of his or her fiduciary duty owed to the company, 
considering his or her knowledge as to why the minority shareholder should be 
excluded. This is essentially a subjective exercise because the knowledge each director 
possesses, differs.157 Therefore the facts of each case will differ in light of the knowledge 
each director possesses when exercising his or her fiduciary duty that each director 
owes to the company. In the case of a shareholder, a shareholder does not owe any 
fiduciary duty towards the company.158  
If there was no mention of who was empowered to manage the company’s affairs in the 
statute, the South African courts sought other sources of law as points of reference.  In 
the 1973 SA Companies Act, the statute did not expressly empower the board of 
directors to manage the affairs of the company. The board of directors was empowered 
by the shareholders, by virtue of the shareholder’s powers of delegation. Despite being 
bound by the statute the South African courts still considered other laws, laws of 
partnership just as the English courts. This was essentially due of the statute-based 
contract.  
Therefore the Predicament exists where the point of reference when discussing a 
company’s powers is not the statute but other sources of law, even though it is 
                                                          
157 Some may argue that where a director complies with his or her fiduciary duty owed to the 
company, such compliance could be a defense against an application for the oppression remedy 
from a minority shareholder. This however, is not true. The oppression remedy was in fact 
created was for that purpose, the oppression remedy is provided where the duties applied 
strictly  causes unfair circumstance and situations for the minority shareholder, the remedy the 
consequence of the strict compliance with the statute.  
158 Refer to Chapter 5 regarding the recommended amendment to section 66 of the 2008 SA 
Companies Act. 
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accepted that a corporation created by a statute, a corporation created under a 
contractarian model is a legal person, meaning despite the existence of the statute-
based contract the point of reference is still the statute. Let us now consider how this 
Predicament was created in the English company law and thereby adopted by South 
African company law. The first case that confirmed that a company is a legal person was 
Salomon v Salomon, the court referred directly to the statute. 
2.  English company law provisions: Salomon v Salomon 
The corporation created by a contractarian statute has its origins in partnerships. As I 
discussed in chapter 1, regarding the distinction between a “company” and a 
“corporation”, a company, despite its current definition, has always been known as a 
business organisation. A company is not a juristic person and this has been the position 
since 1844. In 1844, the Joint Stock Companies Act came into force. The purpose of this 
statute was to “allow the many different business organisations that had evolved after 
the 1720 Bubble Act159, to legitimize their activities by registering under the statute. The 
stated legislative plan was to turn them into ‘companies’ with some, but not all the 
characteristics of ‘corporations’.”160 After the Bubble Act and the level of uncertainty 
and corruption in the trade industry, business people were not sure of the nature of 
business organisations that existed. The 18th century was “marked by an almost frenetic 
boom in company flotations which led to the South Sea Bubble.”161 Due to the cost and 
                                                          
159 Bubble Act, 1720, 6 Geo I, c 18 [Bubble Act]. 
160 Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 65 at 95. 
161 Modern Company Law, supra note 46 at 28. 
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the long process of obtaining a corporation by Charter, or special Act of Parliament or by 
a Letters Patent statute, business people opted to use charters from companies that 
were not using their charters.  
 Most company promoters were not particularly fussy about whether they 
obtained charters (an expensive and dilatory process), and those who felt it 
desirable to give their project this hallmark of respectability  found it simpler 
and cheaper to acquire charters from moribund companies which were able 
to do a brisk trade therein. [Therefore, this meant that] [a]n insurance 
company acquired the charters of the Mines Royal and Mineral and Battery 
Works, and a company which proposed to lend money on land in Ireland and 
a banking partnership in turn acquired the charter of the Sword Blade 
Company which had been formed to manufacture hollow sword blades.162  
 
The confusion created then, was that while one could identify a company’s business 
from its name or its objects in the Charter, these transactions led one to be uncertain 
about the nature of the company he or she was in business with. These transactions 
were in essence illegal. In 1720, the Bubble Act was enacted and made the situation 
worse by allowing the illegal activity to persist due to its lack of clarity as to what kinds 
of businesses were illegal and which ones were not illegal according to the statute. 
During the period between 1720 and 1844, there were a few unincorporated companies 
and regularly chartered companies but not many due to the effect of the Bubble Act. 
“The lasting effect of the Bubble Act and the crisis of 1720 was to make the Law Officers 
of the Crown more chary of advising the grant of charters, and to insist on restrictive 
conditions in those that were granted...It was not until towards the end of the century 
with the growth of canal building which necessarily involved an application to the 
                                                          
162 Modern Company Law, supra note 46 at 28. 
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Parliament for special powers, that the Parliament became least strict in its 
requirements and that direct statutory incorporation became common.”163 So, the 1844 
Joint Stock Companies Act was therefore created to legitimise these business 
organisations164. Section 25 of the 1844 Companies Act limited the company’s purpose, 
to purposes stated expressly in the provisions of the Act.165 Even though the statute had 
this characteristic of a corporation, the members were still liable for the debts of the 
company.  
It is clear that efforts were made to move this illegal company into a state of legitimacy 
by conferring on it characteristics of a corporation. In 1855, the Legislature’s effort 
continued. The 1855 Limited Liability Act166 came into force and limited members’ 
liability to “the portion of his Shares not paid up”167 thereby reducing the liability of 
                                                          
163 Modern Company Law, supra note 46 at 32. 
164 As I mentioned in Chapter 1, these business organisations were termed joint stock companies 
through this statutes. 
165 Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 (7 &8 Vict. c110) [1844 Companies Act] at 1042, s XXV: And 
be it enacted, That on the complete Registration of any Company being certified by the 
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies such Company and the then Shareholders, shall be and are 
hereby incorporated as from the Date of such Certificate by the Name of the Company as set 
forth in the in the Deed of Settlement, and for the Purposes of carrying on the Trade and 
Business for which the Company was formed, but only according to the Provisions of this Act… 
and for the Purpose of suing and being sued… but so as not in anywise to restrict the Liability 
of any Shareholder of the Company under any Judgment, Decree… which shall be obtained 
against the Company … but every such Shareholder shall, in respect of such Monies … be and 
continue liable as he would have been if the said Company had not been incorporated. 
166 Limited Liability Act 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c 133 [1855 Limited Liability Act]. 
167  Ibid at s VII. 
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shareholders provided under the 1844 Companies Act.168 In effect, the company was 
looking more and more like a corporation. 
However, in 1862, the Legislature seemed to take step back. The Companies Act 1862 169 
was enacted, “and consolidated the two earlier statutes”.170 The cause of all the 
statutory ambiguity was based on section 11 and 18 of the 1862 Companies Act.  
11. The Memorandum shall bear the same stamp as if it were a deed 
and shall be signed by each subscriber, in the presence of, and attested by 
one witness at the least... it shall, when registered, bind the company and 
the members thereof to the same extent as if each member had subscribed 
his name and affixed his seal thereto, and there were in the Memorandum 
contained, on the part of himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, a 
covenant to observe all the conditions of such Memorandum subject to the 
provisions of this Act.171 
18. Upon Registration of the Memorandum of Association and Articles 
of Association… the Registrar shall certify under his hand that the company 
is incorporated. The subscribers’ of the Memorandum of Association, 
together with such other persons as may from time to time become 
members of the company, shall thereupon be a body corporate by the 
name contained in the Memorandum of Association, capable of forthwith 
exercising all the functions of an incorporated company. 
 
These provisions were adopted by the South African company law statute, under section 
65(1) and 65 (2) of the 1973 SA Companies Act. The provisions were also adopted in the 
Canadian provincial statutes in Alberta172, British Columbia173, Saskatchewan174 and 
                                                          
168 Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 65 at 95. 
169 Companies Act 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict. c 89 [1862 Companies Act]. 
170 Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 65 at 95. 
171 Companies Act, 1862 (UK), 25 & 26 Vict c 89 at s 11. 
172 Companies Act, RSA 2000, c C-21 at s 28 and s29. 
173 Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 at s17 and s19. 
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Nova Scotia.175 The Predicament is evident in these two provisions. Firstly, under section 
18 of the 1862 Companies Act, the statute provided that the shareholders were the 
corporation. This was not true. The corporation was a juristic person separate from its 
shareholders. The second provision was the creation of the contract under section 11 of 
the 1862 Companies Act. The inclusion of this section meant that the governing 
document of the company was not the statute; it was the statute- based contract. The 
statute failed to clarify that the source of the company’s existence was the statute (like 
every other corporation), it was now the contract (which is a characteristic of business 
organisations).  
The requirement that the company, registered under the 1862 Companies Act, was to 
be governed by a contract was familiar to companies due to their origin of partnership 
or business organisations. Before the Legislature started to legitimise companies and 
require registrations, companies were governed by their contracts. When the 1862 
Companies Act came into force and provided for a contract between the company and 
shareholders, it became familiar territory for these companies. The companies that 
registered under the statute were now corporations. But this was not the way they were 
viewed by the courts. 
 The significant aspect of statute-based contract was the contracts’ origin.  Prior to the 
registration of companies, when they were seen as business organisations or 
partnerships, the document that regulated their partnership was called a Deed of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
174 Companies Act, RSS 1978, c C-23 at s23 and s24. 
175 Companies Act (NS), RSNS 1989, c 81 at s24 and s26.  
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Settlement. The Deed of Settlement was a written agreement between the parties 
which was sealed and the seal ensured that the parties that agreed to the Deed of 
Settlement were able to enforce their rights under the Deed in court. 176 
In the 1862 statute, the Legislature simply adopted this deed of settlement. But the 
existence of the contract did not negate the existence of the corporate personality of 
the company.  Despite this, courts saw these new corporations as mere partnerships.  
The decisions of the courts below show that the concept of corporate personality has 
been uncertain. The House of Lords in Aron Salomon v A Salomon and Company 
Limited177 aimed to rectify or clarity the nature of the corporation of these companies. 
In 1896, the courts in Salomon v Salomon sought to clarify the position regarding 
corporate personality in these registered companies. The House of Lords held that the 
Salomon Company was a juristic person, separate from its members. Let us review how 
they arrived at this decision.  
                                                          
176 This was before the Judicature Act of 1875. The Judicature Act was enacted in order to 
consolidate the various types of courts that existed in England. Therefore, prior to the Judicature 
Act, these courts had grown separately and had created their own strict rules. For example, the 
Common Law Courts dealt with the law and applied the provision of the law strictly. Courts of 
equity on the other hand applied equity rules strictly. One went to the courts of equity to 
enforce the rights that fell outside the strict provisions of law, “relief against the rigidity of the 
law”. The rules of equity or the principle of equity stemmed from interests of good faith and fair 
dealing. After the Judicature Act was enacted these court disappeared in to the High court of 
Justice and the Court of Appeal (known collectively as the Supreme Court of Judicature) “It 
provided that in the High Court rules of law and equity should be administered concurrently.” 
The Deed of Settlement already contained the elements of good faith but once it was sealed, 
the parties could enforce their rights under the Deed of Settlement in the Common Law 
Courts.[WS Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol 1 (London, UK: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1956) at 
452-469]. 
177 Aron Salomon v A. Salomon and Company Limited [1897] AC 22 HL (Eng) [Salomon v 
Salomon]. 
62 
 
 
Salomon v Salomon 
The facts involved a sole proprietor named Aron Salomon who carried on business as a 
boot leather manufacturer. Mr. Salomon wanted to incorporate a joint stock company. 
Prior to incorporation Mr. Salomon and another (trustee of the future company) 
entered into a preliminary agreement whereby the trustee agreed to buy and Mr. 
Salomon agreed to sell his business. The consideration to be provided upon registration 
of the company would be secured debentures issued to Mr. Salomon. The company was 
registered in compliance with the 1862 Companies Act. In terms of the Memorandum of 
Association, Salomon held 20001 shares and his wife and five children who had 
subscribed for the shares in the company held 1 share each.  
At the third meeting of directors, it was resolved that the seal of the company should be 
affixed to debentures to be issued to Aron Salomon (in accordance with the agreement). 
At the fourth meeting of directors, the 10000 debentures were sealed and delivered to 
Aron Salomon. At the fifth meeting of directors, the resolution of the fourth meeting 
was rescinded and the debentures were cancelled, however, at the same time, at the 
meeting, they were issued to Edmund Broderip (“Broderip”). The issue was made as 
security for the money lent to Aron Salomon of £5000.  
Aron Salomon then lent the £5000 to the company at 10 per cent. The company later 
defaulted on its payment to Aron Salomon which was in fact owed to Broderip. About 
eight months later, Broderip gave notice to claim on the £10000 debenture security 
from the Company, because to Broderip, Aron Salomon had defaulted on his payment. 
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One month thereafter, the company was ordered to wind up, but because Aron 
Salomon was a secured creditor under his agreement with the company he was paid 
and no money was left for the other creditors. Broderip, as creditor, brought the 
following application to court. 
Court of Appeal Decision 
The Court of Appeal struggled with the argument brought by Mr. Salomon, that he was 
separate from the Salomon Company and that his conduct was not an effort to defraud 
the creditors. The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial court, that Mr. 
Salomon should indemnify the company for the money owed to the creditors.178 The 
following reasons were provided by Lindley LJ. 
Lindley LJ’s reasons were accepted by the other judges of the court. He said that Mr. 
Salomon’s scheme was a device used to defraud creditors; that the so called business 
was a sham; and that the sale of business was a mere scheme to enable Mr. Salomon to 
carry on business in the name of the Salomon Company in a manner contrary to the 
intent and meaning of the 1862 Companies Act. The other judges of the court, Lopes LJ 
and Kay LJ agreed with Lindley LJ’s decision and added that “[t]o legalize such a 
transaction would be a scandal”179, Kay LJ added that “[t]he pretended sale to the 
company was an utter fiction.”180 The decision of the Court of Appeal was as follows. 
                                                          
178 Broderip v Salomon (1894) [1895] 2 Ch 323. 
179 Ibid at 341. 
180 Ibid at 345. 
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Mr. Aron Salomon’s scheme is a device to defraud creditors...I regard the so-
called sale of the business to the company as a mere sham, and... The Court, 
being of opinion that the formation of the company, the agreement... and 
the issue of debentures to Aron Salomon... were a mere scheme to enable 
him to carry on business in the name of the company with limited liability, 
contrary to the true intent and meaning of the Companies Act, 1862 and 
further enable him to obtain preference over the creditors of the company 
by procuring on first charge on the assets of the company by means of such 
debentures, dismiss the appeal of Aron Salomon with costs.181 
 
Aron Salomon appealed to the House of Lords. 
 
The House of Lords decision 
The House of Lords allowed the appeal of Aron Salomon and held that the Salomon 
Company was separate from its members in terms of the 1862 Companies Act. Lord 
Halsbury set out the following conclusions. 
1. In order to determine the question of whether the artificial creation was validly 
constituted in this instance, “it is necessary to look at what the statute itself has 
determined in that respect... The sole guide must be the statute itself.”182 
 
2. “[O]nce the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other 
independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself.”183 
 
3. In response to the Court of Appeal decision that, “the formation of the company 
was a mere scheme to enable Aron Salomon to carry on business in the name of 
                                                          
181 Ibid at 340. 
182 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 146 at 29. 
183 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 146 at 30. 
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the company.”184 Lord Halsbury said “I am wholly unable to follow the 
proposition that this was contrary to the true intent and meaning of the 
Companies Act. I can only find the true intent and meaning of the Act from the 
Act itself; and the Act appears ... to give a company legal existence with rights 
and liabilities of its own, whatever may have been  the ideas or schemes of those 
who brought it into existence.”185 This is a key point as South African courts have 
sought to consider this, a valid reason to disregard the principle of corporate 
personality. 
4. In response to the decision of the trial court, that Aron Salomon had chosen to 
employ the limited liability company as his agent,186 Lord Halsbury LC., said that 
“either the limited company was a legal entity or it was not; If it was, the 
business belonged to it and not Mr. Salomon; if it was not, there was no person 
and no thing to be an agent to, at all.”187 
Lord Macnaghten, added the following comments.  
 
When the memorandum is duly signed and registered, though there be only 
seven shares taken, the subscribers are a body corporate “capable 
forthwith” to use the words of the enactment, “of exercising all the 
functions of an incorporated company.” Those are strong words. The 
company attains maturity on its birth. There is no period of minority – no 
interval of incapacity. I cannot understand how a body corporate thus made 
capable by statute can lose its individuality by issuing the bulk of its capital 
to one person, whether he be a subscriber to the memorandum or not. The 
                                                          
184 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 146 at 31. 
185 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 146 at 31. 
186 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 146 at 31. 
187 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 146 at 31. 
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company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum; and though it may be that after incorporation the business is 
precisely the same as it was before, the same persons are managers... the 
company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for them. Nor 
are the subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form except to the 
extent and in the manner provided by the Act. That is I think the declared 
intention of the enactment. 188 
 
It is clear from the reasons provided by the Court of Appeal that the court struggled with 
the concept of corporate personality applying in a case where only one man obtained a 
corporation created by contractarian statute.189 The House of Lords clarified the 
position by reiterating that the court was bound by the statute. Mr. Salomon had 
complied with the all the requirements in the statute and therefore there was no 
contravention of the law. The reason why the corporation was created was insignificant. 
The Predicament, lack of clarity in the statute never existed in the other types of 
corporations because, firstly they did not have a contract between the shareholders and 
company and secondly the courts were bound by the provisions of the statute, the 
corporation’s governing document. A clear example of this is in the Foss v Harbottle 
decision.  
This case serves two purposes in this thesis, firstly, it provides an example of a case 
involving a corporation created by a special Act of Parliament and secondly, this case 
forms an integral part of English company law and South African company law. Its 
                                                          
188 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 146 at 51. 
189 These companies, like the Salomon Company, were incorrectly named one-man companies. 
The name gave people the idea that a company where only one man was the holder of the 
majority of the shares etc. was shifty and was involved in some scheme to defraud creditors. But 
this was wholly inaccurate.  
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significance is based on how the court addressed the fundamental principles of 
corporate personality and the majority rule. The facts and decision will now be 
discussed. 
3. Foss v Harbottle190 
In September 1835, certain persons had thought of a plan to purchase about 180 acres 
of land in Manchester. The land belonged to the defendant Denison. The plans included 
enclosing and planting on the land in an ornamental and park-like manner and erecting 
houses on the land with attached gardens and pleasure-grounds, as well as selling, 
letting and disposing of the land. The Defendants, Harbottle, Denison and others agreed 
to form a joint stock company191 for the purpose above.  
In October 1835, the plans were prepared. Harbottle and others purchased portions of 
the land from Denison with an aim to sell it at a profit. Two years later, Royal assent was 
received for An Act for Establishing a Company for the Purpose of Laying Out and 
Maintaining an Ornamental Park within a Township of Rushlome Charlton-upon-
Medlock and Moss Side, in the County of Lancaster.  
For six years they continued selling property and complying with the special Act of 
Parliament. Then, in October 1843, a bill (a type of pleading) was filed by two 
shareholders on behalf of the company incorporated by the special Act of Parliament, 
                                                          
190 Foss v Harbottle (1843), 67 ER 189.  
191As mentioned in Chapter 1, the term company merely describes a business organisation. 
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and the other shareholders. The bill or pleading was made against the Defendants, five 
of whom were directors of the corporation (Denison, Harbottle and three others).  
The bill alleged that the Defendants were involved in various fraudulent and illegal 
transactions, where the corporation’s property, was being misapplied and wasted. 
These allegations were based on the Defendants’ actions, which included, selling the 
property to others at exorbitant prices and retaining the profit, the misappropriation of 
corporation funds, and raising money on behalf of the corporation, in a manner not 
authorized by the special Act of Parliament. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, one of the characteristics of the special Act of Parliament is 
that the source of power of the rights of the directors and shareholders was derived 
from the statute, the special Act of Parliament (“special Act”). The statute would also 
often authorise directors to govern certain aspects of the corporation. The special Act 
would entrust the directors with those powers. 
The Plaintiffs in the case argued that due to the relationship of trust between the 
directors and the corporation under the special Act, the corporation should not be 
treated as an ordinary corporation. It should rather be treated like a partnership and 
based on this partnership analogy, the Plaintiff claimed the remedies that would 
ordinary be available to it if it was a partnership and the directors had abused their 
powers. The Plaintiffs argued that it should not be deprived of those remedies merely 
because they requested and obtained a corporation. 192  The Defendants on the other 
                                                          
192 Foss v Harbottle, supra note 190 at 200 para 486. 
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hand argued that the Plaintiffs’ arguments could not be sustained because they were 
not authorised by the statute to act on behalf of the corporation, even if the case, like 
the current one, involved a director’s abuse of power. The question to determine is who 
can then bring an application. 
3.1 Who may bring an application on behalf of the corporation? 
In response to the Plaintiffs’ arguments about treating this corporation like a 
partnership, the court stated that the corporation is a separate person from its 
members and this principle of corporate personality is what the court referred to as the 
Rule. 
In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the corporation are 
not the same thing for purposes like this; and the only question can be 
whether the facts alleged in this case justify a departure from the rule which, 
prima facie, would require that the corporation should sue in its own name 
and in its corporate character, or in the name of someone whom the law has 
appointed to be its representative.193 
 
 
Therefore, the Rule referred to by the court is the principle of corporate personality, 
which states that:  
 
1. corporation should sue in its own name and in its corporate character or  
2. the corporation could sue in the name of someone whom the law has appointed 
to be its representative. (Section 74 of the Act of Parliament provided that the 
directors or treasurer may represent the company.) 
                                                          
193 Foss v Harbottle, supra note 190 at 202 para 491. 
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The second aspect relates to statutory representation. Often times focus is placed on 
the first point, that the corporation is the proper plaintiff but on analysing this case it is 
clear that there is a second applicant. This applicant is specifically empowered by the 
statute to represent the corporation.  
3.1.1 Strict requirements when anyone else other than the corporation may 
bring an application.  
 
The court said that although it may seem too strict for the court to hold the corporate 
character against the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff still could not sue the directors on behalf of 
the corporation; this was the principle of corporate personality.  But the judge provided 
strict requirements that, if met, could allow the Plaintiff in this case to sue the directors 
of behalf of the corporation. 
Corporations like this, of a private nature, are in truth little more than 
private partnerships; and in cases which may easily be suggested it would be 
too much to hold that a society of private persons associated together in 
undertakings... are to be deprived of their civil rights, inter se, because... the 
Legislature may have conferred upon them the benefit of a corporate 
character. If a case should arise of injury to a corporation by some of its 
members, for which no adequate remedy remained, except that of a suit by 
individual corporators in their private characters and asking in such 
character the protection of those rights to which in their corporate character 
they were entitled, I cannot but think that the principle so forcibly laid down 
by...other cases would apply. But on the other hand, it must not be without 
reasons of a very urgent character that established rules of law and practice 
are to be departed from, rules which, though in a sense technical, are 
founded on general principles of justice and convenience.194 
 
The Judge said that in the future if the members of a corporation have no remedy 
available to them, three elements need to be established in order for the Plaintiff to 
                                                          
194 Foss v Harbottle, supra note 190 at 203 para 492. 
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sue:(1) whether he or she has a right under the Act; (2) no remedy is available under the 
Act, except to sue the incorporators; and (3) he or she must provide an urgent reason, 
to justify the departure from the principle of corporate personality195, which was 
created on the principles of justice and convenience. Once all these requirements have 
been satisfied, a Plaintiff may bring an application against the incorporators on behalf of 
the corporation. The judge proceeded to discuss one of the key aspects of the Foss v 
Harbottle decision that added to the existing confusion on the principles of majority rule 
and corporate personality, which is shareholder approval. 
3.2 Shareholders’ Approval 
One of the other characteristics of the special Act, which is common in all corporate 
statutes, is that all persons are bound to comply with the provisions of the statute, to 
the extent that it is applicable to the person. In this case the court was bound to the 
provisions of the special Act in order to determine the rights and duties of the directors 
and shareholders in this corporation. The court observed the following. 
The result of these clauses [under the Act of Incorporation] is that the 
directors are made the governing body, subject to the superior control of 
the proprietors so assembled in general meetings and as I understand the 
Act, the proprietors so assembled have the power... to originate proceedings 
for any purpose within the scope of the company’s powers, as well as to 
control the directors in any Acts which they may have originated. There may 
possibly be some exception to this proposition but such is the general effect 
of the provisions of the statute.196 
 
                                                          
195 Principle of corporate personality is that only the corporation or its statutory representative 
may bring an action against the directors. 
196 Foss v Harbottle, supra note 190 at 203 para 493. 
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With reference to the provisions of the statute the court said that although the 
directors’ act of selling the property was voidable, the corporation could choose to 
confirm the conduct, meaning that the corporation could simply allow the conduct.  
It is only necessary to refer to the clauses of the Act to show that, whilst the 
supreme governing body, the proprietors at a special general meeting 
assembled, retain the power of exercising the functions conferred upon 
them by the Act of Incorporation, it cannot be competent to allow individual 
corporators to sue in the manner proposed by the Plaintiff on the present 
record. 197 
 
This meant that the Plaintiff could not bring an application if the shareholders still had 
the power to confirm or condone the action complained of by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff 
had to ensure that the shareholders had exhausted all avenues available to them in 
order to address the abuse of power. In terms of the special Act or the Act of 
Incorporation, the shareholders were authorised to condone any action of the directors 
through a general meeting: those were the powers of the shareholders the court 
referred to. 
Whilst the Court may be declaring the acts complained of to be void at the 
suit of the present Plaintiffs, who in fact may be the only proprietors who 
disapprove of them, the governing body of proprietors may defeat the 
decree by lawfully resolving upon the confirmation of the very acts which 
are the subject of the suit. The very fact that the governing body of 
proprietors assembled at the special general meeting may so bind even a 
reluctant minority is decisive to shew that the frame of this suit cannot be 
sustained whilst that body retains its functions. In order that suit may be 
sustained it must be shewn either that there is no such power as I have 
supposed remaining in the proprietors or at least that all means have been 
resorted to and found ineffectual to set that body in motion.198   
                                                          
197 Foss v Harbottle, supra note 190 at 203 para 493. 
198 Foss v Harbottle, supra note 190 at 203 para 494. 
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In this case, a general meeting had not been held which was why the court decided that 
it was premature for the Plaintiff to bring the action. The court went further and said, as 
the matter was before him and the meeting had not been held, he could not make an 
order on the action because the option of the general meeting was still available.199  The 
judge said that it would be pointless to make an order on the conduct because the 
shareholders could lawfully hold a meeting to allow the directors conduct and this 
decision would be binding on all the shareholders200 and this decision would essentially 
override the court’s judgment. 
3.3 Fraudulent conduct 
 
The fraudulent conduct related to how the directors had raised money for the 
corporation. The directors had mortgaged the property which was in contravention of 
the special Act of Parliament. Section 90 of the special Act of Parliament specifically 
stated that, 
after one-half of the capital of £150,000 should have been paid up, the 
board of directors, with the sanction of a general meeting, empowered to 
borrow at interest any sum or sums of money not exceeding £150,000 in the 
whole, on the security  of the lands, property  and effects of the company, 
by deed or writing under their common seal...201 
 
                                                          
199 By holding a general meeting of shareholders, the director is brought to account for his 
actions in front of the shareholders. Once a decision is made regarding the directors conduct it 
binds all the shareholders even the dissenting ones. This is the principle of majority rule. 
200 This is the application of the majority rule, this fundamental principle is being applied within 
the context of the statute which governs the corporation. 
201 Foss v Harbottle, supra note 41 at 193. 
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In relation to fraudulent conduct, the judge posed the question as to whether an 
individual could bring an action on behalf of the company, on the basis of the fraudulent 
conduct, despite the powers of the shareholders being in existence.202 The court held 
that firstly, the shareholders at a general meeting could not confirm a fraudulent act, 
meaning the minority shareholder would not be bound to any decision of the 
shareholders at that meeting. Therefore in answering the question the court said that 
the individual, or in this case the minority shareholder, could bring an action in the case 
of fraud and the directors would be held personally liable for their fraudulent conduct.  
If a transaction be void, and not merely voidable, the corporation cannot 
confirm it, so as to bind a dissenting minority of its members... [I]f the object 
of the suit was to rescind these [fraudulent] transactions, and the allegations 
in the bill shewed that justice could not be done to the shareholders without 
allowing two to sue on behalf of themselves and others, very different 
considerations arise in a case like the present, in which the consequences 
only of the alleged illegal Acts are sought to be visited personally upon the 
directors.203 
This case confirms three key elements that relate to a corporation. Firstly, the 
importance of the statute is emphasised, because the powers of the directors and 
shareholders are expressly stated therein. Secondly, the Rule is that only the 
corporations in its corporate character and its statutory representatives may bring an 
action to remedy wrongful conduct done to the corporation. Anyone else, who wanted 
to bring an action on behalf of the corporation must establish three things (1) a right 
under the statute, (2) there are no other remedies available to address the conduct and 
                                                          
202 This is against the principle of corporate personality, because only the corporation or its 
representative could bring an action on behalf of the company. 
203 Foss v Harbottle, supra note 190 at 208 para 505. 
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(3) the urgent reason to justify a departure from the Rule that only a corporation or its 
statutory representative may bring an action on behalf of the corporation. Lastly, the 
only time a minority shareholder may bring an application without these strict 
requirements under the Act of Parliament is in the case of fraud. 
The judgment of Foss v Harbottle has, over the years been modified and applied in all 
sorts of cases, only to yield undesirable results.  The importance of the type of 
corporation is evident here. The Foss v Harbottle case dealt with a corporation created 
under an Act of Parliament, the court applied the provisions of the Act of Parliament 
strictly to obtain the judgment found.   A case that applied these rules to a joint stock 
company was Burland v Earle, which is discussed below.   
4. The Rule in Foss v Harbottle 
The case that applied the Foss v Harbottle case was Burland v Earle.204 This case is 
known for the following quotation. 
It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that 
the court will not interfere with the internal management of companies 
acting within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is 
clear law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, or to 
recover moneys or damages alleged to be due to the company, the action 
should prima facie be brought by the company itself. These cardinal 
principles are laid down in the well-known cases of Foss v Harbottle and 
Mozley v Alston.205 
 
                                                          
204 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83. 
205 Ibid at 93. 
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In comparison to the Foss v Harbottle case, Foss v Harbottle dealt with a corporation 
created under an Act of Parliament, but in Burland v Earle, the courts dealt with a 
corporation created by a Letters Patent statute in Canada. Essentially, we have a case 
that applied the Rule of corporations to a Letters Patent statute all while considering the 
entity seeking redress as a joint stock company instead of a corporation. Let us consider 
the facts and decision of this case. 
4.1 Burland v Earle 
A corporation was formed by a Letters Patent statute. It was called the British American 
Bank Note company.206 A director in this corporation, British American Bank Note 
Company (“BABNC”) named Burland bought plant and material of an insolvent company 
called Burland Lithographic Company (“the property”). He sold the property to BABNC 
and retained the profits. BABNC paid him from a reserve fund of BABNC. The Plaintiff’s 
argued that Burland’s actions were illegal because the statute did not expressly state 
that a reserve fund could be created and that Burland was acting as a trustee of BABNC 
when he sold the property to BABNC. The defendant argued that BABNC was authorised 
to create by-laws by the statute and the by-laws made provision the creation of a 
reserve funds. 
According to this statute, “a company was not bound to divide all its profits on each 
occasion among its shareholders.”207 The company could legally reserve any portion of 
                                                          
206 References to company and corporation are made in this case analysis and will mean a 
separate legal entity or a legal person. 
207 Ibid at 83. 
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the profits at its own discretion, and a Court had no jurisdiction to regulate it.208 The 
statute provided that, “whether the undivided portion is retained to credit of profit or 
loss or even carried to credit of reserve, it may lawfully, in the absence of an express 
power, be invested on the securities selected by the directors, subject to the control of 
the general meeting, [but the control should not be] restricted to such investments as 
trustees are authorised to make.”209  
The statute further said that, “it is not ultra vires for a company to invest in the name of 
a sole trustee. He [the trustee] is strictly accountable, but the dissentient shareholders 
are not entitled to an injunction against the directors and the company in respect of 
such investments so long as it appears to be bona fide.”210  
Court of Appeal Decision 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Chief Justice that the statute did not 
expressly say that, a reserve fund could be created; therefore, it ordered the 
distribution of Burland’s profits as dividends to the shareholders. Burland appealed to 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.  
 
 
 
                                                          
208 Ibid at 83. 
209 Ibid at 83. 
210 Ibid at 83. 
78 
 
 
Decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) 
The arguments put forward by the Appellants (Burland) and the Defendants (Earle) are 
discussed before the JCPC’s decision as this will assist in contextualising the Judicial 
Committee’s decision.  
Appellant’s Arguments. 
The arguments made by the appellant were that “the Court, in the absence of fraud or 
oppression had no right or duty of interference”; that the amount of money that the 
Court of Appeal allowed to be distributed to the shareholders as dividends, was a 
matter for the internal management of the company to decide not the Courts, “the 
amount...was a question of internal management and policy to be decided by the 
directors or majority shareholders acting in the legitimate exercise of their 
judgment.”211 
In regards to the creation of the reserve fund the appellants argued that the director, 
Burland, was authorised to create a reserve fund in terms of the by-laws, subject to the 
approval at a general meeting. Creation of the by-laws is a statutory power granted to 
the directors of the corporation. “In the case of this company the creation of a reserve 
had been its settled policy for thirty years and had never been objected to by any 
shareholder...” It not clear from this argument, whether the appellant argued that the 
statute need not be complied with if a company becomes accustomed to doing things a 
certain way.  It does not make sense; the law must be complied with.  
                                                          
211 Ibid at 86. 
79 
 
 
Lastly in regards to the sale of the property by Burland to BABNC, the appellants argued 
that Burland was not acting as a trustee of the BABNC, “the evidence shows that he 
[Burland] bought as a creditor of the insolvent company to protect himself from loss, 
not with an intention of reselling to the company of which he was director.”212 
Defendant’s Arguments. 
In relation to the creation of the reserve fund, the defendant argued that even though 
the by-laws said that the directors could create a reserve fund, it was never created. The 
amount that was used by the directors to buy the property from Burland came straight 
out of the profits available to be distributed to the shareholders.213 In regard to the by-
law that allowed the creation of the reserve fund, the defendant argued that the 
particular by-law was illegal because the Letters Patent statute did not expressly state 
that the directors could reserve the funds, the statute stated that “it (the company) can 
legally reserve any portion thereof at its own discretion...”not the directors. With 
reference to the different jurisdictions (England and Canada), the defendant argued that 
although there were provisions in English statutes that allowed directors to create a 
reserve fund, there were no similar provisions in the Canadian statute, and none in this 
particular Letters Patent statute.214 This aspect is particularly important as the court was 
                                                          
212 Ibid at 87. 
213 Ibid at 88. 
214 Ibid at 88 “Sub-section 7 authorised by-laws and by-law 13 authorised a reserve fund, subject 
to the approval of a general meeting. But it was never acted upon. No reserve account was 
opened and no reserve fund was alluded to in the annual balance- sheets or reports. It was 
contended that the company had no power to create a reserve fund either by by-law or 
otherwise. In England the general Act under which nearly all companies are incorporated give 
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aware, through these arguments, of the significance of applying law from different 
jurisdictions. 
On the issue of the sale of the property from Burland to BABNC, the defendants argued 
that Burland purchased the property with a view to sell it to BABNC, he should have 
been deemed a trustee of BABNC because “it was his duty [as trustee] to buy [the 
property] for the company [BABNC] and not for himself.”215 
In light of the facts and the arguments, the court proceeded to identify the legal 
principles applicable to this case. 
The Legal Principles 
The principles on which Lord Davey’s judgment was based are set out below. This is the 
key part of the Burland v Earle judgment and the part that is often cited as the Rule in 
Foss v Harbottle. 
 
It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that 
the court will not interfere with the internal management of companies 
acting within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is 
clear law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, or to 
recover moneys or damages alleged to be due to the company, the action 
should prima facie be brought by the company itself. These cardinal 
principles are laid down in the well-known cases of Foss v Harbottle and 
Mozley v Alston.216 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
power to create a reserve fund (Reference made to the 1862 Companies Act). There is no 
corresponding provision in any Act applicable to this company and accordingly the power does 
not exist.”  
215 Ibid at 89. 
216 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 at 93. 
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The two elementary principles are: (1) the court will not interfere with the internal 
management of companies, and (2) the company is the only person who may bring an 
application to redress a wrong done to it.217  Lord Davey provides an exception to the 
second rule.  
Where the person against whom the relief is sought themselves hold[s] and 
control[s] the majority of the shares in the company, will not permit an 
action to be brought in the name of the company. In that case the Court will 
allow the shareholders complaining to bring an action in their own names.218 
 
In the judgment in Salomon v Salomon, the court showed that its powers are limited to 
the statute; it could only apply the provisions of the statute.  Therefore in this case, 
Burland v Earle, the question is where does the Court obtain the power to allow the 
plaintiff to bring an application or to say “[i]n that case the Court will allow the 
shareholders complaining to bring an action in their own names”?   The court did not 
have any such power. With reference to the Salomon v Salomon case, the court should 
have referred to the Letters Patent statute as the point of reference, to determine what 
the statute provided regarding a shareholders rights to bring an action, if at all. The 
court in Burland v Earle simply made it up without any authorisation, the court simply 
created the Rule of Foss v Harbottle.   
Lord Davey explained that “a plaintiff cannot complain of acts which are valid if done 
with the approval of the majority of the shareholders or are capable of being confirmed 
                                                          
217 Note that this is neither the judgment nor the summary of the Foss v Harbottle judgment; 
this is purely a rule that was created from the misinterpretation of the Foss v Harbottle 
judgment. 
218 Burland v Earle, supra note 204 at 93. 
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by the majority.”219 The Judge in this case, takes the development of the company law a 
step back to the situation where the shareholders are the company.220 
Even though the rule does not allow a plaintiff to bring an action, Lord Davey provided 
the types of actions a plaintiff could bring to court to be remedied because they could 
be remedied by the majority.  
It should be added that no mere informality or irregularity which can be 
remedied by the majority will entitle the minority to sue, if the act when 
done regularly would be within the powers of the company and the 
intention of the majority of the shareholders is clear.221 
 
This legal principle confirms the ambiguous situation under section 18 of 1862 
Companies Act. Up until this case a company registered under 1862 Companies Act was 
a legal person.222 Now, in 1902 where the intention of the majority of the shareholder 
should have nothing to do with the powers of a company, they are intertwined by this 
judgment and furthermore confirmed and emphasised by the language in section 11 
and section 18 of the 1862 Companies Act.  
                                                          
219 Burland v Earle, supra note 204 at 93. 
220 Section 18 of the 1862 Companies Act stated that the shareholders are the company but after 
Salomon v Salomon the corporate personality of the corporation was confirmed.  Now with 
Burland v Earle, we find ourselves back to the point where the nature of companies was 
ambiguous. 
221 Burland v Earle, supra note 204 at 94. 
222 Salomon v Salomon, supra note 177. 
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The last main principle (3) is the one decided in the case of North-West Transportation v 
Beatty.223 The facts and decision are briefly as follows. 
North-West Transportation Company v Beatty 
James H Beatty (Beatty) owned a ship called the United Empire, which he wanted to sell 
to the company, in which he was a director. The company was incorporated under a 
Letters Patent statute, the Canada Joint Stock Companies Letters Patent Act of 1869. In 
order to give effect to the sale Beatty acquired more than half of the shares in the 
company. 
Thereafter, the board of directors (empowered by the Act) passed a by-law authorizing 
the purchase by the company of the said ship and a meeting of the shareholders was 
subsequently called and held at which the by-law was confirmed. James Beatty holding 
301 shares in the company, voted as a shareholder in the meeting to confirm the sale 
and the sale was approved. One of the shareholders, Henry Beatty, who voted against 
the confirmation of the by-laws at the special meeting of shareholders, brought an 
application to have the sale of the ship set aside.  
The trial court held that Beatty’s actions resulted in a conflict of interest due to his 
three-fold character as a shareholder, a director and a vendor. However, the Judicial 
Committee held that in terms of the letters patent statute the director, Mr. Beatty was 
                                                          
223 North-West Transportation Company Limited v Beatty [1887] 12 AC 589 HL (Eng). 
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entitled to purchase more shares and to vote on those shares, “he had a perfect right to 
acquire further shares.”224 The court further held that:  
The acquisition of the United Empire was a pure question of policy, as to 
which it might be expected that there would be differences of opinion, and 
upon which the voice of the majority ought to prevail; to reject the votes of 
the defendant upon the question of the adoption of the bye-law would be to 
give effect to the views of the minority and to disregard the majority. 225  
 
 
Lord Davey in the Burland v Earle case drew the following from the judgment in North-
West Transportation v Beatty: “a shareholder is not debarred from voting or using his 
voting power to carry a resolution by the circumstance of his having a particular interest 
in the subject matter of the vote.”226 This was the last legal principle identified by Lord 
Davey.  
In summary, the legal principles applied by the Burland v Earle case suggest that the 
company does not have any corporate personality despite the Salomon v Salomon case, 
secondly, the majority shareholders are the company and this is emphasised by the 
1862 Companies Act.  
These principles mentioned above were applied to the facts of the Burland v Earle case 
by the Judicial Committee. Judicial Committee’s decision is discussed below. 
 
                                                          
224 Ibid at 601. 
225 Ibid at 601. 
226 Beatty v North-West Transportation Company Limited [1884] 6 OR 300 at 311. 
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The JCPC Decision in Burland v Earle 
 The JCPC decision was based on the legal principles identified by Lord Davey. The 
Judicial Committee incorrectly referred to the litigants in the case as “alike shareholders 
in a joint stock company called British American Bank Note Company.”227  The Judicial 
Committee then proceeded to the issue of the sale of the property to BABNC, and said 
that Burland was liable on the amounts he received as a profit, but on the issue of 
Burland being a trustee, the Judicial Committee said that “[t]here is no evidence 
whatever of any commission or mandate to Burland to purchase on behalf of the 
company, or that he was in any sense a trustee for the company of the purchased 
property. It may be that he had an intention in his own mind to resell it to the company 
but it was an intention which he was at liberty to carry out or abandon at his own 
will.”228 On the reasons and principles set out above the Judicial Committee decided in 
favour to the defendants.  
What the decision of Burland v Earle did to the development of the English company law 
was to undo the work done or the progress made by the decision in Salomon v Salomon 
regarding corporations created by a contractarian statute. The legal principles identified 
by Burland v Earle became known as the Rule of Foss v Harbottle, despite its incorrect 
application of the actual Foss v Harbottle case. The Rule of Foss v Harbottle was also 
adopted by the South African company law. An analysis of the Rule of Foss v Harbottle 
will now be provided. 
                                                          
227 Burland v Earle, supra note 204 at 89. 
228 Burland v Earle, supra note 204 at 98. 
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4.2 Analysis of the Rule in Foss v Harbottle 
In an article published in the Cambridge Law Review, written by K.W. Wedderburn229, 
“Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle,”230 Wedderburn says there are 
two sources of the Rule of Foss v Harbottle. As mentioned above the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle, is drawn from the Burland v Earle case.  
It is an elementary principle of the law relating to joint stock companies that 
the court will not interfere with the internal management of companies 
acting within their powers, and in fact has no jurisdiction to do so. Again it is 
clear law that in order to redress a wrong done to the company, or to 
recover moneys or damages alleged to be due to the company, the action 
should prima facie be brought by the company itself. These cardinal 
principles are laid down in the well-known cases of Foss v Harbottle and 
Mozley v Alston.231 
Wedderburn explains that the two sources of this Rule in Foss v Harbottle, are the 
corporation principle and the partnership principle. The first principle is that the 
corporation is the only person who may bring an application to remedy wrong done to 
it. 
“[T]his springs naturally from the treatment in the law of corporation as a 
‘person’ separate from the members of which it is composed... Thus, injuries 
allegedly caused to the corporation, not only by outsiders, but also its own 
directors where their duties are owed to the corporation alone and not its 
members, must be remedied not by the members but by corporate action. 
That was the decision of in Foss v Harbottle itself.”232 
                                                          
229 Kenneth William Wedderburn, Baron Wedderburn of Charlton, Queens Counsel, (13 April 
1927 – 9 March 2012). 
230 Wedderburn KW. “Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle” (1957) Cambridge LJ 
194 [Wedderburn]; Wedderburn KW. “Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule of Foss v Harbottle 
continued…” (1958) Cambridge LJ 93-106. 
231 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 at 93. 
232 Wedderburn, supra note 230 at 196. 
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Regarding the second principle, which springs from the partnership doctrine, 
Weddernburn says, 
In the early 19th century, courts of equity were averse to interfering at all 
between one partner and another, unless it was for the purpose of 
dissolving the partnership, it being no duty of the court to settle all 
partnerships squabbles. [This] approach was taken over by the judges in 
dealing with the internal affairs of the trading companies which were, after 
1844, incorporated. Once established, the principle was applied rigorously to 
the many ‘irregularities’ committed by those managing joint stock 
companies.  
 
As mentioned above regarding the deed of settlement, the origin of the joint stock 
companies stemmed from partnerships under those deeds of settlements. By virtue of 
this deed, courts of equity would not interfere in partnership business because their 
relationship grew out of equitable principles as opposed to individuals enforcing rights 
under a statute.233 Individuals within a company could not complain of various 
irregularities, such as unfairly made calls by a director or an irregular quorum at a 
director’s meeting because, these matters were of internal management and under the 
control of the majority. According to Wedderburn, this is the unsatisfactory origin of 
Lord Davey’s proposition to the effect that the court has no jurisdiction in matters of 
“internal management”.234  
                                                          
233 The jurisdiction of the court of equity was to provide “relief against the rigidity of the law”. 
The rules of equity or the principle of equity stemmed from interests of good faith and fair 
dealing. The courts of equity would remedy those that did not have these equitable principles to 
rely upon. 
234 Wedderburn, supra note 230 at 197. 
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The principle of majority rule was already known as a fundamental principle of 
corporations. Courts however used the principle to justify the non-interference which 
was borrowed from the partnership principle. Therefore, “whatever the ordinary 
majority of members could ratify was a matter outside the purview of the court. Internal 
affairs were for the majority to decide.”235 
The majority decided matters of internal management and also decided whether action 
could be taken in a particular instance. If there was an irregularity that the minority 
wanted to take to court, it was up to the majority to decide whether to litigate or not.236 
Therefore in summary:  
1. if they (the majority) decided to litigate the corporation was the plaintiff – the 
corporation principle (the individual would get some recourse through the 
corporation) 
2. if they ratified237 the irregularity and therefore did not proceed to litigate, there 
was no recourse for the individual, and he or she could not act in his or her 
personal capacity on behalf of the corporation. 
3. if there was no ratification and no litigation, there was still no recourse for the 
individual because 
i. he or she could not act in his or her personal capacity,  
                                                          
235 Wedderburn, supra note 230 at 198. 
236 Wedderburn, supra note 230 at 198. 
237 Ratification is a legal principle drawn from the law of agency. Where the principal of an agent 
could ratify or confirm or allow the actions of his agent who had exceeded his or her authority 
under the mandate.  
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ii. he or she had no standing because the company was the proper plaintiff, 
and lastly, 
iii. regardless of (i) and (ii),  courts could not interfere because of the 
partnership principle238  and matters of internal management were for 
the majority to deal with not the court. 
It is clear that there was no real remedy available. The only hope for the individual was 
to determine if he or she could fall under one of the exceptions to the Rule in Foss v 
Harbottle. According to Wedderburn, the exceptions are not real exceptions, except for 
one. These exceptions suggest that the individual can obtain redress in the following 
circumstances.  
1. The action is ultra vires- the Rule does not apply here, because the majority 
cannot ratify an ultra vires or illegal rule, it is contrary to the Act.239 
2. Special majorities- If the director had committed an irregularity by not obtaining 
a special resolution where one was required under the memorandum and 
articles of association, the director would assert that he or she would take the 
corporation to court, and because the majority would not want to go through 
litigation only to be told to ratify the conduct, the directors simply an obtained 
ordinary resolution on an action the initially required a special resolution. This 
became known as an exception to Rule. However, the statute amended the 
                                                          
238 This is drawn from the court of equity’s reluctance to interfere in partnership issues. 
239 Wedderburn, supra note 230 at 204. 
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procedure of obtaining shareholder approval for particular transactions, thereby 
eliminating this exception to the Rule.   
3. The individual has a personal action- in this instance the Rule does not apply 
because here the individual’s personal action stems either from the articles or 
statutorily and has nothing to do with acting on behalf of the Company.240 
4. There is fraud- this is the only instance in which the Rule has an exception.241 
This exception was recognised as early as the Rule itself, “it will already be 
apparent that it constitutes a relaxation not so much of the ‘internal 
interference’ prohibition, as of the rule demanding that actions brought to 
remedy wrongs done to the company should be brought in the name of the 
company itself, i.e. under the authority of the majority.”242 
Conclusion 
The lack of clarity within the statute has been a confusing and unfortunate application 
of principles of corporate personality and majority rule in cases involving corporations 
created by a contractarian statute. The Salomon v Salomon case clarified the position for 
some time, by directing one to the statute as the first point of reference, through which 
the company was created. However, once the Burland v Earle case was decided, the 
ambiguity had returned and this time with reinforcements under section 11 and section 
                                                          
240 Wedderburn, supra note 230 at 207. 
241 KW Wedderburn, “Shareholders’ Rights and the Rule of Foss v Harbottle continued…” 1958 
Cambridge LJ 93-106. 
242 Ibid at 94. 
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18 of the 1862 Companies Act.  The judgment of Burland v Earle simply contributed to 
the lack of clarity and confusing concept that the decision of majority of the 
shareholders is the decision of the company. Burland v Earle misapplied the Foss v 
Harbottle case to create what is known as the Rule in Foss v Harbottle which in fact has 
nothing to do with the actual case of Foss v Harbottle. Burland v Earle incorrectly 
applied the Foss v Harbottle case. The facts of the Foss v Harbottle case relate to a 
corporation created by a special Act of Parliament and yet the Judge in Burland v Earle 
saw it fit to apply that case to the facts in Burland v Earle which relate to a corporation 
created by a Letters Patent statute.  Furthermore, Burland v Earle emphasised the 
Predicament. The Predicament is created where the statute is not sought as the point of 
reference when considering any aspect relating to a corporation and more so, when 
considering the rights and duties of the shareholder and each director in the 
corporation. 
Foss v Harbottle involved a corporation created under a special Act of Parliament. The 
court applied the principles of corporate personality clearly and strictly, in accordance 
with the Act of Parliament. This shows that when dealing with corporations, the statute 
must be complied with strictly, as that is where it derives its power of existence. 
Similarly, Salomon v Salomon applied the law strictly but in a case involving a 
corporation created by a contractarian statute. These two cases have simply provided 
the solution to the Predicament which is to seek clarity of the statute. Today, this 
statutory clarity may be found in adopting a division of powers statute. The clarity of the 
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statute will ensure that the principles of corporate personality and majority rule are 
developed properly. 
South Africa has followed in the footsteps of Burland v Earle due to the influence of 
English company law. However, since May 2011, South Africa has adopted a new 
Companies Act and with it a new perspective for the development of South African 
company law, a perspective based on transparency and accountability.  
The 2008 SA Companies Act is not clear on the duties of the individuals. If transparency 
and accountability, inter alia, are the goals of the 2008 SA Companies Act then clarity 
needs to obtained. This clarity of the statute is obtained by adopting of a division of 
powers model statute; a statute that divides the powers of the individuals in a company. 
Further discussion on ascertaining the clarity of the statute is provided in Chapter 5.  
 In chapter 5, I recommend specific amendments to the 2008 SA Companies Act, in light 
of the importance of the clarity in the statute. The recommendations are aimed at 
enabling South Africa to take full advantage of the oppression remedy under section 163 
of the 2008 SA Companies Act. The oppression remedy was created in order to provide 
relief for oppression or unfair prejudice which arose as consequence of the strict 
compliance with the statute or as a consequence of each individual exercising his or her 
duty as provided in the statute. This is why it is crucial that the statute state the rights 
and duties of the individual clearly, so that the only point of reference is the statute.  
Let us now consider the particular provisions of the oppression remedy under the 
section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act and section 241 of the CBCA.  
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Chapter 4: The Oppression Remedy 
Introduction 
The oppression remedy in Canada is often described as the widest corporate law 
remedy in the world. The oppression remedy “seeks to enforce fairness and equity, and 
is not limited to the enforcement of lawful conduct. The potential protection it offers 
corporate stakeholders is awesome”.243  This was the description of the oppression 
remedy under section 241 of the CBCA: it is hoped that section 163 of the 2008 SA 
Companies Act is considered as awesome as section 241 of the CBCA when compared to 
its predecessors. Now that South Africa has adopted this wide remedy the courts have 
an opportunity to provide even better shareholder remedies than in previous years. 
However, clarity in the interpretation of the principles of majority rule and corporate 
personality are key elements to providing the best possible shareholder remedy. Once 
this clarity is obtained through a clearer division of powers statute, South Africa can take 
full advantage of the vast number of cases on the oppression remedy in Canada.   
This chapter aims to provide a comparison of the provision under section 241 of the 
CBCA and section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act, in order to determine the scope of 
this remedy.  This chapter is separated into three parts. Part 1 discusses the provisions 
of section 241 (1) and (2) as well as section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. The 
oppression remedy provisions in both jurisdictions fall in to the following categories: 
                                                          
243 Dennis H Peterson, Shareholders Remedies in Canada, loose- leaf (consulted on 21 May 
2009), (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1960) at 17-1 at para 17.1. 
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standing under the oppression remedy (this relates to who has standing to bring an 
application to the court), the scope of the conduct, standard of corporate conduct, 
whose interests are being protected and what interests are being protected in the 
context of the reasonable expectations of shareholders.  Thereafter, Part 2 provides a 
discussion of the wide judicial powers to provide shareholder relief. Lastly, Part 3 
addresses whether the oppression remedy may be invoked by to public corporations 
and majority shareholders.  
PART I: Interpretation 
 
The table below shows the comparison between the provisions of section 241 (1) and 
(2) of the CBCA with those of section 163(1) of the 2008 SA Companies Act. These 
particular sections provide the statutory elements that an applicant or complainant 
must identify to bring an application for the oppression remedy and they include: the 
conduct, the standard of conduct and standing. The parts that are highlighted below 
represent the similarities and other parts are the differences.  
CBCA section 241 (1) &(2) 
 
2008 SA Companies Act section 163 (1)  
(1) A complainant may apply to a court for an 
order under this section. 
 
(2) If, on an application under subsection (1), 
the court is satisfied that in respect of a 
corporation or any of its affiliates 
 
(a) 
any act or omission of the corporation or any 
of its affiliates effects a result, 
 
(1) A shareholder or a director of a company 
may apply to a court for relief if— 
  
(a)  
any act or omission of the company, or a 
related person, has had a result that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that 
unfairly disregards the interests of, the 
applicant; 
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(b) 
the business or affairs of the corporation or 
any of its affiliates are or have been carried on 
or conducted in a manner, or 
 
 
 
(c) 
the powers of the directors of the corporation 
or any of its affiliates are or have been 
 
exercised in a manner that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of any security holder, 
creditor, director or officer, the court may 
make an order to rectify the matters 
complained of. 
(b)  
the business of the company, or a related 
person, is being or has been carried on or 
conducted in a manner that is oppressive or 
unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of, the applicant; or 
  
(c)  
the powers of a director or prescribed officer 
of the company, or a person related to the 
company, are being or have been exercised in 
a manner that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the 
interests of, the applicant. 
 
 
Table A: Provisions of section 241(1) and (2) of the CBCA and section 163(1) of the 2008 SA 
Companies Act compared 
1. Standing 
This category deals with who may bring and application to court. The term used in 
Canada is “complainant” and in South Africa is “applicant”. The CBCA has much wider 
standing provision than South Africa.  In terms of section 163 of 2008 SA Companies Act, 
the applicant is a shareholder or a director. These applicants are described as follows 
under section 1 of the 2008 SA Companies Act, 
 “shareholder”- subject to section 57(1) means the holder of a share issued by a 
company and who is entered as such in the certificated or uncertificated244 
securities register as the case may be, 
 “director” – means a member of the board of a company contemplated in 
section 66 or an alternative director of a company and includes any person 
occupying the position of a director or alternative director by whatever name 
designated. 
 Under section 238 of the CBCA the complainant is defined as: 
                                                          
244
 “uncertificated securities means any securities defined as such in section 29 of the Securities Services 
Act, (S Afr), No. 36 of 2004. 
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“complainant” means 
(a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or 
beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates, 
(b) a director245 or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or 
any of its affiliates, 
(c) the Director246, or 
(d) any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make 
an application under this Part. 
A brief description of each complainant is provided hereunder.  
1.1 Security holder 
In the CBCA, security is defined under section 2(1) as follows, “security” means a 
share of any class or series of shares or a debt obligation of a corporation and 
includes a certificate evidencing such a share or debt obligation.  
1.2 Director and director 
 “director” means a person occupying the position of director by whatever 
name called and “directors” and “board of directors” includes a single 
director and 
 “Director” means the Director appointed under section 260 (which 
relates to the Minister’s election to appoint a director to carry out the 
duties and exercise the powers of the Director under this Act) 
In 1970, the Dickerson Committee was mandated to create a new Federal corporate 
statute. While creating the draft statute they considered who the complainant might be. 
They said the broadest definition should be provided to include the persons who clearly 
might be interested. They also added section 238 (d) which leaves the task of 
                                                          
245 CBCA, supra note at Section 2(1) “director” means a person occupying the position of director 
by whatever name called and “directors” and “board of directors” includes a single director; 
246  CBCA, supra note at Section 2(1) “Director” means the Director appointed under section 260; 
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determining whether a person that brought an application is a proper person to the 
court. Section 238 (d) provides that “any person the court thinks is a proper person to 
participate in the litigation.”  
The Dickerson Committee even considered including legal representatives of a 
deceased’s estate, as it was recommended by the Jenkins Report, but later decided 
against it due to the fact that the court could use its discretion to determine who was a 
proper person to make an application.  
South Africa may consider an expansion of the “applicant” under the oppression remedy 
considering the nature of the remedy. I suggest that the South African legislature insert 
an equivalent to section 238(d) into the section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. The 
inclusion would mean that no one is expressly excluded by the Act and that anyone’s 
“exclusion” would take the form of dismissal by the court, which would have the power 
to determine a proper person.  
2. The Scope of the Conduct 
This category addresses where the oppression remedy may be applied, what conduct to 
look for. In terms of section 241 of the CBCA and section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies 
Act, the conduct complained of relates to (1) an act or omission of a related or affiliated 
person, (2) the business (South Africa) or business and affairs (Canada) of the company 
and (3) the powers of the Directors (Canada) or director or prescribed officer (South 
Africa). 
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2.1 “Affiliate” or “Related Person” 
CBCA  2008 SA Companies Act 
any act or omission of the corporation or any 
of its affiliates effects a result, 
any act or omission of the company, or a 
related person, has had a result that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that 
unfairly disregards the interests of, the 
applicant; 
Table B: section 241 (2) (a) of the CBCA and section 163 (1) (a) of the 2008 SA Companies Act. 
Under the CBCA, “affiliate” means an affiliated body corporate within the meaning of 
section 1 (2). For the purposes of this Act, 
(a) one body corporate is affiliated with another body corporate if one of them is 
the subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same body corporate 
or each of them is controlled by the same person; and 
(b) if two bodies corporate are affiliated with the same body corporate at the 
same time, they are deemed to be affiliated with each other. 
Under the 2008 SA Companies Act, a related person is defined with reference to section 
2 which states247, a juristic person is related to another juristic person if— 
i. either of them directly or indirectly controls the other, or the business of the 
other, as determined in accordance with subsection (2); 
ii. either is a subsidiary of the other; or 
iii. a person directly or indirectly controls each of them, or the business of each of 
them, as determined in accordance with subsection (2). 
This oppression remedy has substantially widened the scope of the shareholder remedy 
compared to section 252 of the 1973 SA Companies Act.248 Under the 2008 SA 
Companies Act, an applicant can claim for oppression by a related person. 
                                                          
247 Refer to 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 15 at section 2 “Related and inter-related 
persons and control” for the complete section. 
99 
 
 
2.2 “Act” or “Omission” 
According to the Dickerson Report, the oppression remedy includes isolated acts as well 
as a continuing course of oppressive conduct.249 It is easier to prove an act than a lack of 
action. When proving the lack of action focus instead on the effect of the result of a 
person not doing something or not having done something.250 
2.3 “Business” or “Business and Affairs” 
The South African section does not contain the word “affairs”. In Canada, “affairs” are 
described as the non-business activities of the corporation and includes the internal 
management of the corporation; these are matters that go beyond the day-to-day 
business activities of the corporation.  Therefore the oppression remedy may be sought 
in the event of irregularities regarding internal management of the corporation.251 As 
mentioned, section 163 of 2008 SA Companies Act only provides for the “business” 
carried on. In section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act, the Legislature provides that the 
directors’ duties include “business” and “affairs” of the corporation.  For the sake of 
consistency I suggest that the South African Legislature add the word “affairs” to section 
163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act in order that the provision is complete and in order 
to eliminate issues of trying to distinguish whether one’s conduct really falls under 
                                                                                                                                                                             
248 Refer to Appendix A below for the provision under section 252 (1) of the 1973 SA Companies 
Act 
249 Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 163. 
250 Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 538. 
251 Corporate Law in Canada, supra note 37 at 540 citing CBCA, supra note 16 at section 2 (1) 
“affairs” means the relationships among a corporation, its affiliates and the shareholders, 
directors and officers of such bodies corporate but does not include the business carried on by 
such bodies corporate;  
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“affairs” or just “business”. This would be an unnecessary limitation on the South 
African oppression remedy. Now let us consider the Powers of Directors under the 
oppression remedy. 
2.4 “Powers of the Director or Prescribed Officer” 
Section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act expressly provides the power of the board of 
directors. This is a significant change from the delegated powers of the shareholders in 
the 1973 SA Companies Act. It is a significant development as the problems arising from 
the delegation of powers to directors will no longer applicable. In addition, the South 
African oppression remedy also includes the conduct of the prescribed officer, whose 
powers are provided under Regulation 38 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.  
Canada also has a similar provisions relating to the powers of the directors which is 
provided under section 102 of the CBCA. “As most of the corporate activity is 
undertaken at the behest of the Board of Directors, the exercise of the directors’ powers 
is often the source of the oppression remedy”.252 In light of this quotation and section 
66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act, it makes more sense to clarify the scope of conduct 
which provides for the “business of the company…”, that the Legislature also include 
“affairs” in section 163 (1) (c) of the 2008 SA Companies Act . 
                                                          
252 Dennis H Peterson, Shareholders Remedies in Canada, loose- leaf (consulted on 21 May 
2009), (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1960) at 17-21 at para 17.38. 
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2.5 Threatened Oppressive Conduct 
Threatened conduct is not included in the CBCA, however two provincial statutes have 
included this conduct, namely, Ontario and British Columbia.253 An Ontario court held 
that the apprehension of future oppression might be dealt with if it was clear on a 
balance of probabilities that such oppression would take place.254 In comparison, South 
Africa does not include this type of conduct under the section 163 of the 2008 SA 
Companies Act. 
3. Standard of Conduct 
The standards of conduct under both oppression remedies, Canada’s section 241 and 
South Africa’s section 163, are oppressive conduct, unfairly prejudicial conduct and 
unfairly disregarding conduct. When drafting the oppression remedy provision the 
Dickerson Committee said that the changes to section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies 
Act would include the following under the proposed CBCA.  
To the basic criterion [of] “oppressive” is added the phrase “unfairly 
prejudicial to or in disregard of the interest of”, which makes abundantly 
clear that the section applies where the impugned conduct is wrongful, even 
if it is not actually unlawful.255  
The intention of the oppression remedy was to broaden the remedy to an extent never 
provided under section 210 of the 1948 UK Companies Act. Bear in mind that these 
                                                          
253 Refer to Chapter 5 for the oppression remedy provisions under the various Canadian 
provincial corporate statutes. 
254  820099 Ontario Inc. v Harold E. Ballard Ltd (1991), 3 BLR (2d) 113 at 123. 
255 Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 163 para 485. 
102 
 
 
standards go hand in hand with the reasonable expectations of the shareholder, 
discussed below. 
3.1 “Oppressive” conduct 
This standard describes conduct that is coercive and abusive. Courts have described it as 
conduct that is burdensome, harsh and wrongful, a visible departure from the standards 
of fair dealing and an abuse of power which results in an impairment of confidence in 
the probity with which the company’s affairs are being conducted.256   
Bad faith is not a necessary element of the standard; the act can be abusive or harsh 
without the element of bad faith from the person inflicting the abuse.257 Over the years 
oppressive conduct in Canada has included “failure on the part of the corporation and 
its controlling shareholders to take reasonable steps to simulate an arm's-length 
transaction; lack of good faith on the part of the directors of the corporation; 
discrimination among shareholders with the effect of benefiting the majority 
shareholders to the exclusion of the minority shareholders; lack of adequate and 
appropriate disclosure of material information to minority shareholders; and a plan to 
eliminate a minority shareholder.”258 
From the South African perspective, it may seem as though this is the return of the term 
“oppressive conduct” to the South African shareholder’s remedy. Section 252 of the 
                                                          
256 Scottish Co-Operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [1958] 3 All E.R. 66. 
257 Oppression and other Related Remedies, supra note 132 at 81 citing Brant Investments 
Limited v KeepRite Inc, [1991] 3 OR (3d) 289 at 305-306. 
258 Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Poonam Puri, “The Canadian Oppression Remedy Judicially 
Considered: 1995- 2001” (2004) 30 Queen’s LJ 79 at 89. 
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1973 SA Companies Act had developed from the oppressive conduct259, to the “unfair 
prejudice” requirement needed to make an application under section 252 of the 1973 
SA Companies Act. Under section 111bis the 1926 Union Companies Act the “oppressive 
conduct”, involved no more than a lack of probity or fair dealing, or a visible departure 
from the standards of fair dealing, or a violation of the conditions of fair play on which 
every shareholder who entrusts his money to a company is entitled to rely.”260 This is 
fundamentally different from “oppression” under the CBCA. In the CBCA the description 
of oppression “...involving more than a lack of probity or fair dealing...” is used in the 
context of the oppression remedy as whole. In the Dickerson Report, the Dickerson 
Committee created a whole oppression remedy not merely a provision for oppressive 
conduct to address that particular conduct but a wider scope of the remedy. Now that 
South Africa has adopted this CBCA oppression remedy, it is only fair that the widest 
possible interpretation of the oppression remedy is provided to the shareholders 
instead of unnecessarily limiting the effect of the oppression remedy by looking back at 
an inadequate statutory shareholder remedy merely because the terms are similar or 
identical. 
                                                          
259In section 111 bis of the 1926 Union Companies Act. 
260 Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd v Anglo Transvaal Collieries, [1979] 3 S Afr L 713 (Wit Local 
Div)  at 720 with reference to Elder v  Elder and Watson Ltd [1952] SC 49 at 55; Aspek Pipe Co 
(Pty) Ltd and Another v Mauerberger and Others 1968 (1) SA 517 (Cape Prov Div) at 527. 
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3.2 “Unfairly Prejudicial” conduct 
Conduct that may fall short of “oppression” may still amount to unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. The conduct described may be prejudicial but not unfair.261 “The normal 
operations of a corporation must maintain a balance between the interests of corporate 
stakeholders262, which necessarily means some unequal accommodation.”263 Examples 
of unfairly prejudicial conduct include but are not limited to the following: failing to 
disclose related party transactions, changing the corporate structure to drastically alter 
debt ratios, paying dividends without formal declaration and breach of equitable 
rights.264 
3.3 Conduct that “unfairly disregards the interests of...” 
This criterion is viewed as the least stringent of the three statutory categories. Similar to 
unfairly prejudicial conduct, the interest may be disregarded but not unfairly. For 
example “a corporation may require additional capital that the shareholders cannot 
provide. Recapitalisation may dilute their interests or subject their returns to prior 
claims, but the continued viability of the corporation is ensured.”265 
                                                          
261 Oppression Remedy and Related Remedies, supra note 132 at 81. 
262 Similar to the words “company” and “corporation” the words “stakeholder” and 
“shareholder” differ as well. In this thesis, I equate stakeholder with shareholder.  
263 Dennis H Peterson, Shareholders Remedies in Canada, loose- leaf (consulted on 21 May 
2009), (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1960) at 17-35 para 17.69. 
264 Ibid at 17-36 para 17.68. 
265 Ibid at 17-42 para 17.88. 
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4. Whose interests are being protected under the oppression remedy? 
According to the Dickerson Report, the oppression remedy was made applicable to all 
cases of conduct that are “oppressive” or “unfairly prejudicial” or “unfairly disregards 
the interests of” any security holder, creditor, director or officer and not just to the 
narrow case where a shareholder is oppressed in his or her capacity as a shareholder.266  
South Africa has limited its oppression remedy to the interests of shareholders and 
directors. As discussed in chapter 3, addressing the Predicament is about the clarity of 
the statute, the duties of each individual set out clearly in the statute and the strict 
application of the statute. With this in mind, the court in applying the statute will be 
able to clearly identify the powers of each director and shareholder, so the applicant 
need not be limited to applying for the oppression remedy in his or her capacity as a 
shareholder or director as identified in section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.  
The clarity of the statute will allow a director to claim is his or her capacity as a 
shareholder or allow a shareholder to claim in his or her capacity as a director therefore, 
I suggest this wide interpretation should be adopted by South Africa, it would emphasise 
the development South Africa has made through the introduction of its section 163 
oppression remedy. 
5. What interests being protected? Reasonable Expectations 
The reasonable expectations of shareholders have come to be known as the 
cornerstone of the Canadian oppression remedy. The advantage of seeking the 
                                                          
266 Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 163. 
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reasonable expectations first as opposed the standard of conduct, is that in the search 
for the reasonable expectation through the various facts also helps to identify the 
“oppressive”, “unfair prejudicial” and “unfairly disregarding conduct”. This is not to say 
that by addressing the reasonable expectation one ignores the standards of conduct: 
they, in fact, go hand in hand. The principle was identified in the often cited case of 
Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others.267  This case involved a company 
registered under the 1948 UK Companies Act, but the case has been adopted by Canada 
in the case of Krynen v Bug, which I discuss below. 
5.1 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others 
The company was a private company which carried on a business. It was formed to take 
over a business founded by Mr Nazar. Since 1945, the business was carried on by Mr. 
Nazar and Mr. Ebrahimi as partners, equally sharing the management and the profits. 
Soon after the company was formed, Mr G Nazar (Mr Nazar’s son) was made a director 
and a shareholder. The Nazars then had a majority of the votes in a general meeting. 
Until the dispute arose, all three were directors of the company. In 1969, an ordinary 
resolution was passed by the company in general meeting removing Mr. Ebrahimi from 
the office of director, a resolution which was effective in law by virtue of section 184 of 
the 1948 UK Companies Act and article 96 of Part 1 of Table A of the company’s Articles 
                                                          
267 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Others [1973] AC 360 [Ebrahimi]. 
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of Association. The application was based on section 210 of 1948 UK Companies Act and 
the relief sought was an order that the Nazars purchase Mr.Ebrahimi’s shares.268  
This case dealt with an application to wind up a company; within the winding up 
provision, there was a requirement that the wind-up must be just and equitable.269 In 
light of the discussion in chapter 1 regarding the “company”, this court discussed the 
nature of a company as a legal person and its relationship to the partnership aspects of 
its origin.  Despite the term being used by many cases, it did not negate the nature of a 
company, which is a separate person. The court confirmed the confusion that was 
created due to the manner in which the company developed but that did not mean one 
was dealing with a partnership, even though the equitable clause were drawn from the 
partnership rule. 
To refer, as many of the cases do, to “quasi-partnership” or “in substance 
partnerships” may be convenient but may be confusing... A company, 
however, small is a company not a partnership or even a quasi-partnership 
and it is through the just and equitable clause that obligations, common to 
partnership relations may come in. 270 
 
                                                          
268 The judge found that the complaint did not amount to such course of oppressive conduct to 
justify an order under section 210. However he made an order for winding up of the company 
under the “just and equitable” provision. The decision was appealed by the respondents 
(Nazars) and set aside by the Court of Appeal, the appellants sought to have the decision of the 
court restored. 
269 As mentioned in Chapter 2 regarding section 210 of 1948 UK Companies Act- the remedy was 
only used if one could show that he or she was entitled to liquidate the company. Using this 
section 210 or section 111bis of the 1973 SA Companies Act meant that it was the only remedy 
available, the last remedy before the company metaphorically dies. 
270 Ebrahimi, supra note 267 at 380A-B. 
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The case provided a clear context from which a remedy could be developed. In regards 
to reasonable expectations, the often cited part of the case is quoted below. From this 
judgment the court seems fully aware of the Predicament and therefore seeks to 
provide clarity regarding the nature of a company registered under a contractarian 
statute. The court made the following comments. 
The words “just and equitable” are a recognition of the fact that a limited 
company is more than a mere judicial entity, with a personality in law of its 
own: that there is room in company law for recognition of the fact that 
behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations and 
obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the company 
structure… It does, as equity always does, enable the court to subject the 
exercise of legal rights to equitable considerations; considerations, that is, of 
a personal character arising between one individual and another, which may 
make it unjust, or inequitable, to insist on legal rights, or to exercise them in 
a particular way. 271 
The court acknowledged the legal rights that are available to the parties but the remedy 
discussed actually came from subjecting these legal rights to equitable considerations 
because to apply the legal right as they are would be unjust and inequitable. In Canada’s 
case, the corporate law mainly developed from a Letters Patent statute where the legal 
rights were identified in the statute expressly. To simply apply the statutory legal rights 
when seeking a remedy would be unjust, which is why the inclusion of the oppression 
remedy was required. The oppression remedy was created to limit the harsh 
consequences of applying the legal rights. Identifying this distinction in a contractarian 
statute was difficult because of the statute-based contract, which courts already 
assumed had that the equitable right therein due to the company’s origin. That is why 
                                                          
271
 Ebrahimi, supra note 267. 
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the Ebrahimi case is crucial; the case emphasized that the company is a legal person 
thereby subjecting its legal right to the equitable considerations and ultimately 
providing an adequate remedy. 
The court proceeded to identify what these equitable considerations were and said that 
the list provided is non-exhaustive. In the application of the Ebrahimi case to the CBCA 
oppression remedy, Canadian courts have established that in ascertaining the 
reasonable expectations in a particular case, the court considers the following: the 
evidence of the history and relationship between the parties including public 
announcements, provisions of agreements including the shareholders agreement and 
other types of promises.272 The court will look objectively at the facts of the case and 
will not accept a “wish list” in considering whether there has been oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial or unfairly disregarding conduct.273 
Due to the kind of information sought to establish reasonable expectations, it is no 
wonder that there are numerous cases in Canada. Every case is different, so much so 
that oppression in one may not necessarily mean oppression in another.  The broad 
statutory language is the source of one of the most rapidly expanding areas of modern 
Canadian corporate litigation, and this growth stems from the strict nature of the 
statute.274 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the division of powers model in the CBCA was 
adopted by most of the provinces although with a few differences. Most of the cases 
                                                          
272 David S Morritt, Sonia L Bjorkquist & Allan D Coleman, The Oppression Remedy (Aurora: 
Canada Law Book, 2004) at 3-2. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Corporate Law, supra note 17 at 424. 
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discussed under the Oppression Remedy come from the province of Ontario.275 The only 
difference between section 241 of the CBCA and section 248 of the Ontario Business 
Corporations Act276 is the addition of the remedy’s application to a threat of oppression 
under section 248. The cases identified below were decided by Ontario courts. The 
nature of the wide scope of the Canadian oppression remedy and the emphasis on the 
particular facts of each case, leads to an array of varied decision under the section. 
Therefore, in order to provide the principles of the oppression remedy in context of the 
Canadian corporate law, the recent case of Krynen v Bugg, which clearly identifies and 
summarises these fundamental aspects, is chosen for this purpose and is discussed 
below.  
5.2.1 Krynen v Bugg277 
Krynen was fired on 23 September 2000. He applied for a declaration that the other 
shareholders of Duracap International, Bugg and Simms, acted oppressively, unfairly, 
and prejudicially toward him. Krynen established Duracap in 1993. He contacted Bugg 
and Simms to provide venture capital and other support. The original idea was that 
Krynen would be the president, with a controlling interest in Duracap.  
He was made president, but held half the shares, while Simms and Bugg held a quarter 
each. Simms and Bugg considered that the president title was merely ceremonial, and 
that each of the shareholders had equal managerial responsibility. Although the 
                                                          
275
 Ontario courts apply both the CBCA oppression remedy as well as its own section 248 of the 
OBCA. 
276 Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16 [OBCA]. 
277Krynen v Bugg [2003] OJ 1209. 
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corporation was successful, the different views of management and particularly 
Krynen's habit of micro-managing according to his whim, caused conflict and morale 
problems. When Krynen refused to take six-months paid leave so that the problems 
could be addressed, the board passed a resolution forcing the issue and taking away his 
main responsibility as marketing manager. In return, Duracap gave him a severance 
package, and he continued to sit as a director, shareholder, and president, although he 
was no longer a Duracap employee. Krynen argued that the resolution was the 
culminating incident in a series of oppressive actions. After his removal, Duracap's 
fortunes steadily improved.  
The Court dismissed the application on the grounds that there was no evidence that 
Simms and Bugg embarked on an improper plan to exclude or oust Krynen from 
management. They acted honestly and in good faith, in the best interests of Duracap. 
Krynen's expectations were unreasonable in that he envisioned that he would be able to 
run the corporation his way as chief executive and have it provide him life-long 
employment.  
According to the court, “a useful starting point for the oppression remedy and its 
ramifications may be found in Professor Welling's landmark treatise, Corporate Law in 
Canada, 2nd ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) where he says this about the purpose 
and philosophy behind the oppression principle and remedy”:278 
                                                          
278 Krynen v Bugg [2003] OJ 1209 at para 72. 
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Thwarted shareholder expectation is what the oppression remedy is all 
about. Each shareholder buys shares with certain expectations. Some of 
these are outlandish. But some of them, particularly in a small 
corporation with few shareholders, are quite reasonable expectations in 
the circumstances. It is not unusual for three or four individuals to go into 
business together with shared expectations of mutual profits, to use a 
corporate form as a convenient organizing vehicle, and to have a 
subsequent falling out. Individuals in such a situation are like the parties 
to a decaying marriage relationship: they cannot be expected to operate 
by friendly compromise in search of mutually satisfactory or "fair" 
settlements of the many routine disagreements that can arise. The 
corporate vehicle that was once a convenience now becomes a prison 
with rigid rules for bars, a frame of reference for bad-tempered dispute 
settlement. The rules in a corporate constitution, like all legalistic rules, 
can become practical tools for dictatorship of the majority and oppression 
of the minority. 
 When this occurs, some measure of disinterested judicial activism can 
be useful. As the situation will usually (though not always) arise in 
smaller corporations one assumes that the oppression remedy was 
essentially designed for these corporations, where legitimate 
shareholder expectations are highly likely to exist, are unlikely to be set 
out on paper, yet are, because of the parties involved, susceptible of 
objective proof in the usual legal manner. This, I suggest, is the place for 
the oppression remedy”.279 
In light of the resemblance between the Canadian oppression remedy and the South 
African oppression remedy, this is a philosophy South Africa courts as well as legal 
counsels should adopt. This philosophy encompasses the essence and purpose of the 
oppression remedy. The court in Krynen v Bugg then provided a summary of the leading 
                                                          
279 Ibid at para 72. 
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principles and guiding rules which have come out of the Canadian cases, a few of which 
are included below.280 
1. The overriding lodestar principle of oppression law is that, when determining 
whether there has been oppression of a shareholder, the court must determine 
what the reasonable expectations of that person were according to the 
arrangements which existed between the principals. The cases on this issue have 
been helpfully collected and reviewed by Farley J. in 820099 Ontario Inc. v. 
Harold E. Ballard Ltd281 where he said this at pp. 185-86: 
Shareholder interests would appear to be intertwined with shareholder 
expectations. It does not appear to me that the shareholder 
expectations which are to be considered are those that a shareholder 
has as his own individual "wish list". They must be expectations which 
could be said to have been (or ought to have been considered as) part 
of the compact of the shareholders. 
2. The term oppression suggests an inequality of bargaining power while 
unfairness suggests an obligation to act equitably and impartially in the 
exercise of power and authority.282 
 
3. The terms, "unfair prejudice to" and "unfair disregard of the interests of" 
require less rigorous tests than oppression. Where on the totality of the 
evidence the actions and conduct complained of go beyond mere 
inconvenience and lack of information, and the interests of the 
complainant have been unfairly disregarded, the complainant will be 
entitled to a remedy.283 
 
                                                          
280 Ibid at para 73. 
281 Krynen v Bugg [2003] OJ 1209 at para 72 citing 820099 Ontario Inc. v Harold E Ballard Ltd.  
[1991] OJ No. 266. 
282 Krynen v Bugg [2003] OJ 1209 at para 72 citing Re Alldrew Holdings Ltd. v Nibro Holdings 
(1993), 16 OR (3d) 718 at 732 (Ont Gen Div). 
283 Krynen v Bugg [2003] OJ 1209 at para 72 citing Re Mason and Intercity Properties Ltd (1987), 
59 OR (2d) 631 at 635. (Ont CA). 
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4. There is no requirement that bad faith must be shown before an order to 
rectify a complaint may be made in an oppression case.284  
 
5. Where expectations are apparently reasonable on their face but where 
there is a contract dealing with these expectations, the reasonableness of 
these expectations cannot prevail over the contract. 
 
6. Reasonable expectations are not necessarily "static" or frozen expectations 
and may evolve or change as the principals adapt their arrangements from 
time to time.285 
 
It is clear that the oppression remedy has a wide scope as it deals with the reasonable 
expectations of shareholders. South Africa has the opportunity to enable its 
shareholders to obtain a wide range of remedies by focusing on the reasonable 
expectation of shareholders. South Africa can seek guidance from Canadian corporate 
law in the development of its shareholder remedy. It should be noted, however, that the 
scope of the oppression remedy is dependent on the clarity of its statute. Therefore, 
until the South Africa’s legislature attends to the clarity of the 2008 SA Companies Act, 
this wide oppression remedy may only be marvelled at from a distance, as its 
application will be limited by the Predicament created through the English company law.  
5.2.2 Quebec Law: BCE Inc. v DebentureHolders  
There are numerous cases decided under the oppression remedy. But as one researches 
the oppression remedy today, there is one case, in 2006, which often comes up and is 
cited in various decisions in a few Canadian provincial courts. The case is BCE Inc. v 
                                                          
284 Krynen v Bugg [2003] OJ 1209 at para 72 citing Re Sidaplex-Plastic Suppliers Inc. v Elta Group 
Inc. (1998), 40 OR (3d) 563 at 567 (Ont CA) and Loveridge Holdings v King-Pin Ltd. (1992), 5 BLR 
(2d) 195 at 203 (Ont Gen Div).  
285 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold Ballard Ltd, supra note 254 at 191. 
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DebentureHolders.286 Despite its use by Canadian courts outside of Quebec, this case 
should be approached, if at all with utmost caution. Chapter 2 addressed the 
importance of ascertaining how a corporation came into existence and the concerns 
raised above in Chapter 3 are similarly applicable here.  Quebec law differs substantially 
from the English Law which gave rise to the Letters Patent statute or the contractarian 
statute. Where the source of South African and the rest of Canadian law is English 
common law, the source of law in Quebec stems from the Quebec civil law.  
One could argue that the same is true for South Africa, which comes from a Roman-
Dutch history. However, South Africa and Quebec differ in that Quebec civil law is still 
applied today whereas in South Africa, the Roman-Dutch law is not, it was abandoned 
due to its inadequacy.287 
During the course of the nineteenth century, South Africa came under the 
influence of the surge of industry and trade in England and Europe but the 
opening up of the diamond- and gold-fields in the later nineteenth century 
English Law began to have a profound influence and this became 
pronounced when in 1827 ... Roman Dutch commercial law [which had been 
applied since 1795, when the Dutch settlers arrived] was now so inadequate 
that the developments of English law were irresistible, especially when all 
the judges recently appointed were English and thus familiar with English 
mercantile law. 
 
Therefore, I suggest that South Africa consider not only this case, but every case that it 
considers, very carefully before application. The Predicament was created on the backs 
                                                          
286 BCE Inc. v DebentureHolders 2008 SCC 68. 
287 Steven D. Girvin, “The Antecedents of South African Company Law” 13:1 J Legal Hist (London 
UK: Frank Cass, 1992) 63-77 at 69-70. 
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of judges not carefully considering the jurisdiction of the cases that they applied.288 
Therefore, in order to ensure that South Africa does not end up struggling with statutory 
ambiguity and decisions of court that have incorrectly applied legal principles, like 
Burland v Earle, careful consideration of cases as well as strict adherence to the clear 
division of powers model statute will be required. The statute must be the point of 
reference. 
In summary, the essence of the oppression remedy is found in the reasonable 
expectations of the parties which are not necessary stated on paper. The elements of 
the oppression remedy namely “oppressive”, “unfair prejudicial” and “unfair disregards 
the interests...” are identified in the search for the reasonable expectations and are 
therefore not altogether abandoned. The other aspect of the oppression remedy is the 
court’s discretion.  
PART II: Court Remedies 
The Second Part of the oppression remedy relates to the court’s discretion or judicial 
powers. There are a few similarities between section 241 (3) of the CBCA and section 
163 (2) of the 2008 SA Companies Act as to the court’s powers to provide a remedy. 
However, the list provided is non-exhaustive. The wide discretion was noted in the case 
of 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd289 
                                                          
288  Burland v Earle, supra note 145. 
289 Cases, Notes and Materials, supra note 33 at 502 citing 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. 
Ballard Ltd.  [1991] OJ 266. 
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Section 247 (3) [now s. 248(3)] gives the court tremendous latitude. Subject 
to being concerned about interfering as little as possible, a judge should be 
able to use his [or her] ingenuity to effect the remedy most suitable to the 
situation. 
 
With this tremendous latitude, the South Africa courts have an opportunity to change to 
face of the South African corporate law forever, through the proper use of their powers. 
The responsibility they also have is to ensure that the cases that are applied are 
carefully considered. Section 5(2) of the 2008 SA Companies Act says “[t]o the extent 
appropriate, a court interpreting or applying this Act may consider foreign company 
law”. Not only are the South African courts given a wide discretion under the section 
163 oppression remedy, they are also statutorily empowered to consider foreign 
company to the extent they are appropriate.  
There are 17 different remedies available, but also note that in both the South African 
statute and the CBCA, this list of remedies is non- exhaustive. Of the 17 remedies, South 
Africa and Canada share nine. Let us now consider the similarities and differences 
between the courts powers under section 241 (3) of the CBCA and section 163 (2) of the 
2008 SA Companies Act.  
1. Shared Court Remedy Provisions: Canada and South Africa 
The court can issue any of these remedies in addition to the following: it can issue, 
change or amend a shareholders’ agreement290 or set aside resolutions291 or even alter 
                                                          
290 Dennis H Peterson, Shareholders Remedies in Canada, loose- leaf (consulted on 21 May 
2009), (Toronto: Butterworths Canada, 1960) at 17-111 para 17.189. 
291 Ibid. 
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the composition of the board of directors.292 Although the order to change the board of 
directors may be issued, should only be issued as a last resort.293 Below is a list of the 
nine remedies shared in both jurisdictions, Canada and South Africa (in italics). 
(a) an order restraining the conduct complained of;294 
(c) an order to regulate a corporation’s affairs by amending the articles or by-laws or 
creating or amending a unanimous shareholder agreement; under the South African 
legislation there is no definition of a unanimous shareholder agreement;295  
 (e) an order appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the 
directors then in office; the South African law further provides for an order declaring 
any person delinquent under the relevant section;296 
 (g) an order directing a corporation, subject to subsection (6), or any other person, 
to pay a security holder any part of the monies that the security holder paid for 
securities; under the South African provision, although similar it states, an order 
directing the company or any other person to restore to a shareholder any part of the 
consideration that the shareholder paid for shares, or pay the equivalent value, with 
or without conditions;297 
(h) an order varying or setting aside a transaction or contract to which a corporation 
is a party and compensating the corporation or any other party to the transaction or 
contract;298 
(i) an order requiring a corporation, within a time specified by the court, to produce 
to the court or an interested person financial statements in the form required by 
section 155 or an accounting in such other form as the court may determine;299 
(j) an order compensating an aggrieved person;300 
                                                          
292 Ibid at 17-117 para 17.191. 
293 Ibid; Kudumane, supra note 150. 
294 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s 163 (2) a. 
295 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s 163 (2) d. 
296 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s163 (2) f. 
297 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note1 at s163 (2) g. 
298 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s163 (2) h. 
299 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s163 (2) i. 
300 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s163 (2) j. 
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(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a corporation 
under section 243;301 
(n) an order requiring the trial of any issue.302 
 
2. Contrasting Court Remedy Provisions  
The different provisions under each jurisdiction are as follows:  
Section 241 (3) of the CBCA Section 163 (2) of the 2008 SA Companies Act 
(b) an order appointing a receiver or 
receiver-manager; 
 
(b) an order appointing a liquidator, if the 
company appears to be insolvent; 
(d) an order directing an issue or 
exchange of securities;  
 
(e) an order directing an issue and 
exchange of shares; 
(f) an order directing a corporation, 
subject to subsection (6), or any other 
person, to purchase securities of a 
security holder; 
 
(c) an order placing the company under 
supervision and commencing business 
rescue proceedings in terms of 
Chapter 6, if the court is satisfied that 
the circumstances set out in section 
131(4)(a) apply; 
 
(l) an order liquidating and dissolving 
the corporation; 
 
 
(m) an order directing an investigation 
under Part XIX to be made; and 
 
Table C: Contrasting statutory powers of the court to grant relief under the oppression remedy in the CBCA 
and the 2008 SA Companies Act. 
Section 163 (2) (b) allows the court to appoint a liquidator if the company is insolvent, 
whereas section 241(3) (b) allows the court to appoint a receiver, who is not a liquidator 
per se, who manages the business for a limited period either to re-establish it on a more 
solid economic footing or to liquidate it.303 This receiver resembles South Africa’s 
                                                          
301 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s163 (2) k. 
302 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1at s163 (2) l. 
303 Oppression and Related Remedies, supra note 132 at 343. 
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business rescue practitioner, whom the court may also appoint in terms of section 163 
(2), who is tasked with the temporary supervision and management of a company that is 
financially distressed.304 The other significant provision is section 241(3) (l) which relates 
to liquidation, the court may order a corporation be liquidated, there is no equivalent 
section in the 2008 SA Companies Act. Under this provision the continued existence of 
the corporation rests with the court. It is a “drastic remedy that should only be invoked 
if there is a less invasive mechanism available.”305  
Part 1 and Part 2 show how wide this oppression remedy really is and with the 
additional statutory empowered discretion of the South African court to seek foreign 
company law, the oppression remedy will be the best shareholder remedy South Africa 
has ever seen. However, as mentioned previously, the only way South Africa can make 
proper use of the oppression remedy is to move away from the Predicament, the lack of 
clarity of the statute or else this clearly wide oppression remedy will be vastly limited by 
the Predicament that has stifled South African company law.  
PART III: Additional aspects of the Oppression Remedy 
Does the oppression remedy apply to public corporations and can a majority 
shareholder invoke this remedy against a minority shareholder? These answers to 
questions regarding these additional aspects may be considered as uncertain. To some 
people the answers to these questions may be an unequivocal “No” but that does not 
                                                          
304 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s128 (1) b and d. 
305 Oppression and Related Remedies, supra note 132 at 380. 
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seem to be the case in Canada.  From a South African point of view, this may be an 
aspect worth clarifying by legislation if necessary. 
1. Public Corporations 
Although the oppression remedy was created with a view to protect shareholders in a 
close corporation or private corporations, it could also apply to public corporations as 
well. “As a matter of principle, there is no reason to deny relief under the oppression 
remedy to corporate stakeholders where the corporation distributes its securities to the 
public”.306 This is argued based on the reasoning provided in the Elder v Elder and 
Watson Ltd case. The object of the oppression remedy is to remedy the wrong done to a 
corporation; therefore it applies to all corporations irrespective of size.307  
However, due to one’s ability to sell his or her shares to the public at the sign of 
oppression or unfair prejudice, there would be no need for them to use the oppression 
remedy. “Nevertheless, even in a public securities market, abuse of dominant power can 
depreciate the value of shares...unless corrective action is taken; for example 
management could pay unauthorised directors’ fees or adopt defensive tactics which 
deny shareholders the prospects of take-over bid premiums.”308 Therefore, the 
possibility exists, however the significant aspect is whether the public corporation is 
able to establish that those reasonable expectations existed and need the protection 
under the oppression remedy.  
                                                          
306 Peterson, supra note252 at 17-94 para 17.157. 
307 Peterson, supra note252 at 17-94 para 17.157 citing the Dickerson Report at para 484. 
308 Peterson, supra note 252 at 17-95 para 17.158. 
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2. Majority shareholders 
Although the primary purpose of the oppression remedy contemplated by the Dickerson 
Committee was to protect minority shareholders, there is nothing in the section which 
expressly prohibits a majority shareholder from commencing an oppression action as a 
complainant.309 Considering the broad nature of the oppression remedy it would seem 
possible that a majority shareholder could be oppressed by a corporation’s directors.310 
Nonetheless, in one of the first cases, Vedova v Garden House to decide on a matter 
where the claimant or applicant was a non- minority shareholder, the court held that 
oppression could only be used by a minority shareholder. Meaning, the oppression 
remedy should not be used as a device to mediate between shareholder groups. 
“Subsequent cases have made clear that there is no general restriction on the 
availability of the remedy based on the size of the applicant's shareholding; the only 
question is whether, on the facts, the shareholder was oppressed”. 311 
As mentioned above, South Africa would first need to establish its basic corporate law 
principles before it can decide on even broader aspects of the oppression remedy. The 
oppression remedy is the first step to South Africa’s great reform, a reform that is based 
on transparency, accountability and a division of powers. The first step is to achieve the 
division of the powers statute.  
                                                          
309 Anthony Vanduzer, “Who May Claim Relief from Oppression: The Complainant in Canadian 
Corporate Law” (1993) 25 Ottawa L Rev 463. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Ibid citing Vedova v Garden House [1985] OJ 408. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided a detailed comparison of the both oppression remedies under 
sections 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act and section 241 of the CBCA, within the 
following categories, standing under the oppression remedy, the scope of the conduct, 
standard of corporate conduct, whose interests are being protected and what interests 
are being protected in the context of the reasonable expectations of shareholders as 
well as the judicial powers. The key aspect of the Canadian oppression remedy is its 
growth from the Ebrahimi case to a wide remedy that seeks to enforce reasonable 
expectations of shareholders.  The enforcement of the reasonable expectations is only 
possible where there is a clear statute. A statute that provides for the clear legal rights 
of the individuals in a corporation is required. Although South Africa has only recently 
adopted the 2008 SA Companies Act, further amendments to the South African 
company law are needed in order to take full advantage of this wide remedy.  I chose 
five sections that will establish the clarity needed in the 2008 SA Companies Act in order 
to apply the oppression remedy effectively. These five sections discussed in Chapter 5 
relate to:  
i. The Capacity of the Company 
ii. Director’s Powers  
iii. Unanimous Shareholder Agreements 
iv. Evidentiary value of a Shareholders’ ratification 
v. Oppression Remedy 
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Chapter 5: Solving the Predicament  
Introduction 
In an effort to ensure that South Africa is able to take full advantage of its newly 
adopted oppression remedy under section 163, recommendations to amend the 2008 
SA Companies Act were provided throughout this thesis. The South African company law 
as it stands today will still be affected by the Predicament. Therefore, in this chapter all 
those recommendations are brought together and applied within the context of the 
particular provisions in the 2008 SA Companies Act in order to make the statutory 
provisions clearer regarding the duties and powers of individuals within the company. 
These suggested provisions are discussed with reference to the Alberta Proposal.312 In 
1980, Alberta reformed its Companies Act by adopting the provisions under the CBCA. 
Essentially, Alberta developed from a contractarian statute to a division of powers 
statute. This is the same situation in South Africa and should the South African 
Legislature elect to adopt these suggested provisions, it will mean corporate law 
freedom from the shackles of the Predicament313 created under the English company 
law.  
Therefore in this chapter, I discuss each 2008 SA Companies Act provision relating to 
corporate personality or majority rule within the context of the amendments made by 
                                                          
312 Alberta Proposal, supra note 137.  
313 The mistaken view of the corporate personality and majority rule as it was applied to 
corporations created by a contractarian statute. 
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the Alberta Committee as well as the Dickerson Committee. The suggested provisions 
that fall under corporate personality relate to the contractual effect of the articles of the 
company, and the capacity and powers of the company. The provisions that fall under 
the majority rule relate to directors’ duties, the unanimous shareholder agreement, and 
the evidentiary value of shareholder approval. Thereafter, a comparison of these 
statutory provisions within each Canadian provincial statute is provided. 
1. Recommendations 
Alberta once had a statute that was a contractarian model and now has a statute based 
on a division of powers model. In 1980 the Alberta Proposal was published. The 
Proposal was a commentary on the whole Act, similar to the Dickerson Report. The 
Alberta Committee considered each provision under the CBCA to adopt in their Draft Act 
and the reasons for the adoption which included the comments from the Dickerson 
Report but were applied within the context of the Alberta Companies Act (contractarian 
statute). This is useful to South Africa in light of the type of corporation that Alberta 
once had. The particular statutory provisions relating to the capacity of the company, 
director’s powers, unanimous shareholder agreements and the evidentiary value of a 
shareholder’s approval will now be discussed in the context of the comments in Alberta 
Proposal as well as the Dickerson Report. 
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1.1 Corporate Personality Provisions 
 
1.1.1. Contractual Effect of the Articles 
 
Before the reform, Alberta had the following provisions under the Alberta Companies 
Act,314 which are comparable to the 1973 SA Companies Act regarding the statute-based 
contract. 
Alberta Companies Act 1980 1973 SA Companies Act 
 
 
Effect of incorporation 
 
28 From the date of incorporation 
mentioned in the certificate of 
incorporation the subscribers, together 
with the other persons that from time to 
time become members of the company, 
are a corporation by the name contained 
in the memorandum, capable of exercising 
all the functions of an incorporated 
company, 
 
Effect of incorporation on company 
and members. 
 
65(1) From the date of incorporation stated in 
the certificate of incorporation, the subscribers 
of the memorandum together with such other 
persons as may from time to time become 
members of the company, shall be a body 
corporate with the name stated in the 
memorandum, capable of exercising all the 
functions... 
 
Effect of memorandum and articles 
 
29(1) The memorandum and articles, 
when registered, bind the company and 
the members thereof to the same extent 
as if they respectively had been signed and 
sealed by each member, and contained 
covenants on the part of each member. 
 
 
65(2) The memorandum and articles shall bind 
the company and the members thereof to the 
same extent as if they respectively had been 
signed by each member, to observe all the 
provisions of the memorandum and of the 
articles, subject to the provisions of this Act. 
Table D: Statutory provisions relating to the statute-based contract in the Alberta Companies Act and the 
1973 SA Companies Act compared. 
 
Before the reform, section 29 of the Alberta Companies Act and South Africa’s 
equivalent section 65 (2) stated that the memorandum and articles of association are 
binding on the company. This is the provision that caused numerous interpretation 
                                                          
314 Alberta Companies Act RSA 1980 cC-20 s28, s 29 (1). 
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issues that led to the Predicament.315 So, the Alberta Committee recommended that the 
new legislation do away with the provision and remain with the statute as the first point 
of reference when seeking the rights and obligations of each shareholder and each 
director.  
We do not think that it is necessary or desirable to carry forward into the 
proposed ABCA any statutory contract between shareholders or between 
company and shareholders. The statute should set out the rights and 
obligations of shareholders, directors and officers, and should provide 
remedies when those rights are infringed. There is no need to resort to the 
artificial implications of a contract and indeed the notion that there is a 
contract likely to interfere with the proper working out of rights and 
obligations which arise because of relationships, the nature of which is 
determined by law. The only exception which we would make to that 
proposition is the unanimous shareholder agreement; a device which is 
intended to be used where the parties wish to bind themselves to something 
which would depart from general law, done consensually.316 
 
Despite the South African company law reform through the 2008 SA Companies Act it 
has retained the statute-based contract and it seems as though this contract will be 
applied in the same way as its predecessor under section 65 (2) of the 1973 SA 
Companies Act. South Africa’s new statute-based contract is provided below, with the 
commentary on how it is intended to be applied.  
s.15(6) A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation, and any rules of the 
company, are binding— 
 
                                                          
315 The Predicament refers to the lack of clarity in the statute regarding the right and duties of 
the individuals in a corporation that has led to the mistaken view of the principles of corporate 
personality and majority, as discussed in Chapter 3.  
316 Alberta Proposal, supra note 137 at 21. 
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(a) between the company and each   shareholder; 
(b) between or among the shareholders of the company; and 
(c) between the company and— 
(i) each director or prescribed officer of the company; or 
(ii) any other person serving the company as a member of the audit 
committee or as a member of a committee of the board, 
in the exercise of their respective functions within the company. 
 
The Commentary on the 2008 SA Companies Act says the following. 
The Memorandum and rules are binding between the company and each 
shareholder, between the shareholders of the company and between the 
company and each director or prescribed officer or other person serving the 
company as a member of the audit committee or as a member of a 
committee of the board in respect of their respective functions [s. 15 (6)]. 
This relationship is similar to that in terms of the 1973 Act where the 
Memorandum and Articles had contractual force between the company 
and its members, i.e. those who were such at its inception and those who 
became such at any time thereafter, but only in their capacity as members. 
 
Considering the difficulty that arises when it comes to this statute-based contract, which 
includes the application of partnership principles and corporate personality all while 
confusing the concept of a corporation being separate and distinct from its members, I 
strongly suggest that the binding aspect of the Memorandum of Incorporation be 
removed. The Memorandum of Incorporation in South Africa will therefore contain only 
matters relating to the company, for example, it name, the classes or number of shares, 
whether the issue or transfer or ownership of the share are to be restricted and the 
number of directors.317  
                                                          
317 I refer to the CBCA Part 2, section 6, as it identifies the contents of the Articles of 
Incorporation: (1) Articles of incorporation shall follow the form that the Director fixes and shall 
set out, in respect of the proposed corporation, the name of the corporation; the classes and 
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1.1.2 Capacity and Powers of the Company 
With the aim of seeking a division of powers statute under the 2008 SA Companies Act, 
the deletion of the statute-based contract was recommended. In order to ensure that 
South Africa does not continue with the Predicament let us consider how the 2008 SA 
Companies Act describes the company under section 19 of the 2008 SA Companies Act. 
ABCA 2008 SA Companies Act 
Capacity and Powers s16 (1) A corporation 
has the capacity and, subject to this Act, the 
rights, powers and privileges of a natural 
person. 
 
Legal status of the company, s19 the 
company— 
 
(a) is a juristic person, which exists 
continuously until its name is removed from 
the companies register in accordance with this 
Act; 
 
(b) has all of the legal powers and capacity of 
an individual318, except to the extent that— 
 
i. a juristic person319 is incapable of 
exercising any such power, or having 
any such capacity; or 
ii. the company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation provides otherwise; 
Table E: Section 16 of the ABCA and section 19 of the 2008 SA Companies Act compared. 
 
The Alberta Business Corporations Act320 describes the corporation as a natural person 
and the 2008 SA Companies Act describes the company as an individual. An individual 
                                                                                                                                                                             
any maximum number of shares that the corporation is authorized to issue, the number of 
directors as well as any restrictions on the businesses that the corporation may carry on. 
318 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 1 at s1 ‘‘individual’’ means a natural person; 
319 2008 SA Companies Act, supra note 115 at s1 “juristic person’’ includes— 
(a) a foreign company; and 
(b) a trust, irrespective of whether or not it was established within or outside the 
Republic; 
320 Business Corporations Act, RSA 1990, c B-9 [ABCA]. 
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under section 1 of the 2008 SA Companies Act means a natural person. However, under 
the 2008 SA Companies Act, the company’s corporate personality is limited by the 
provisions of the Memorandum of Incorporation. I reiterate a company is a legal 
person.321 Its existence is derived directly from the statute, therefore it cannot be 
limited by a statute-based contract, or else the Predicament will be maintained. I 
therefore suggest that either an equivalent to section 16 (1) of the ABCA is provided 
under the 2008 SA Companies Act or at the very least section 19 (1) (b) is deleted or 
both an inclusion of section 16 (1) and the deletion of section 19 (1) (b) is effected in 
order develop the South African company law.  
1.2 Majority Rule: Provisions  
 
Now that we have dealt with the first part of the Predicament, namely the mistaken 
view of corporate personality let us proceed to the second part, the mistaken view of 
majority rule. Majority rule is considered in the context of the directors’ duties and 
powers, the unanimous shareholder agreement and the evidentiary value of 
shareholder approval. The Alberta Committee’s recommendation on the division of 
powers of directors and shareholders was that the ABCA follow the CBCA model, that is 
to provide statutory powers to directors as well as a statutory limitation on their powers 
through the shareholders’ adoption of a Unanimous Shareholder Agreement. This 
                                                          
321 “Company” in this context refers to a juristic person. For the sake of consistency with the 
2008 SA Companies Act, I have opted to use the word company when discussing a juristic person 
under this South African company law statute. 
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division of powers statute model thereby effectively provided for the shareholders 
powers as well as the directors powers which were in no way subject to a contract.322 
ABCA 
 
2008 SA Companies Act 
Directors s.101(1) Subject to any unanimous 
shareholder agreement, the directors shall 
manage or supervise the management of the 
business and affairs of a corporation.   
 
Directors s.66 The business and affairs of a 
company must be managed by or under the 
direction of its board, which has the authority 
to exercise all of the powers and perform any 
of the functions of the company, except to the 
extent that this Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise. 
 
 
Unanimous shareholder agreement 
 
 s.146(1) A unanimous shareholder agreement 
may provide for any or all of the following: 
(a) the regulation of the rights and liabilities of 
the shareholders, as shareholders, among 
themselves or between themselves and any 
other party to the agreement; 
(b) the regulation of the election of directors; 
(c) the management of the business and affairs 
of the corporation, including the restriction or 
abrogation, in whole or in part, of the powers 
of the directors; 
(d) any other matter that may be contained in 
a unanimous shareholder agreement pursuant 
to any other provision of this Act. 
 
 
No Unanimous shareholder agreement 
equivalent.   
 
 
Court approval of stay, dismissal, 
discontinuance or settlement:  
s.243(1) An application made or an action 
brought or intervened in under this Part shall 
not be stayed or dismissed by reason only that 
it is shown that an alleged breach of a right or 
duty owed to the corporation or its subsidiary 
has been or may be approved by the 
 
No Court approval of stay, dismissal, 
discontinuance or settlement equivalent 
provision. 
                                                          
322 The unanimous shareholder agreement is fundamentally a corporate constitutional 
document, governed by statutory not contractual rules; Duha Printers (Western) Ltd v The 
Queen (1998), 159 DLR (4th) 457. 
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shareholders of the corporation or the 
subsidiary, but evidence of approval by the 
shareholders may be taken into account by the 
Court in making an order under section 215, 
241 or 242. 
Table F: Provisions of the ABCA and the 2008 SA Companies Act compared. 
1.3 Directors’ duties 
ABCA 
 
2008 SA Companies Act 
Directors s.101(1) Subject to any unanimous 
shareholder agreement, the directors shall 
manage or supervise the management of the 
business and affairs of a corporation.   
 
Directors s.66 The business and affairs of a 
company must be managed by or under the 
direction of its board, which has the authority 
to exercise all of the powers and perform any 
of the functions of the company, except to the 
extent that this Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise. 
 
Table G: A comparison between the provisions relating to Directors’ duties under the ABCA and the 
2008 SA Companies Act. 
Section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act provides for the director’s duties and powers. 
This is new for South Africa as the powers of directors were delegated by the 
shareholders under the memorandum and articles of association. Today, directors 
duties and powers under section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act are derived directly 
from the statute; this is the same with section 101 (1) of ABCA. However, the difference 
between the ABCA and the 2008 SA Companies Act is that the statutory powers under 
section 66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act are limited by the Memorandum of 
Incorporation, the statute-based contract.  Before delving into the concerns this section 
may bring to the South African company law, let us consider the commentary on the 
South African section 66.  
It can be argued that section 66 merely regulates the division or allocation of 
responsibilities between directors and shareholders subject to the 
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qualifications under the MOI [Assuming that the shareholders are the 
company]. The effect of section 66 would, it is submitted, therefore also 
mean that, unless the qualifications of section 66 are complied with, the 
board of directors is the “ultimate” organ of the company. 323 
 
It is clear that the division of powers statute model was the goal of the South African 
reform however; there will not be much reform unless the limitation on the directors’ 
duties by the memorandum of incorporation is removed. The commentary states that 
“unless the qualifications of section 66 are complied with, the board of directors is the 
“ultimate” organ of the company,” this means that the shareholders through the 
memorandum of incorporation are the ones limiting or qualifying the directors’ duties.  
Although the shareholders are the ones who may limit the directors’ duties, the 
shareholder cannot identify the limited directors’ duties in the memorandum of 
incorporation. The memorandum of incorporation is not supposed to be the document 
that encompasses the interest of the shareholders as well as the company, because this 
leads to the uncertainty in identifying the powers of the individuals within the company. 
The clearer the statute is, the clearer it is to identity the duties and powers of the 
individuals within the company. If the responsibilities of the shareholders and the rules 
that govern the company are put in one document, confusion is created because of the 
lack of clarity. This is the Predicament, which can be illustrated in an example. 
 
 
                                                          
323 Henochsberg, supra note 34 at s 66. 
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The Predicament in 2012  
 
Yuri is injured severely on the head. The doctors inform him that his injuries are so 
severe he might end up in a coma. On a piece of paper in the hospital, Yuri quickly sets 
out who will be responsible for his affairs in the event of a coma (“Document”). Two 
days later his health deteriorates and Yuri ends up in a coma. The doctor informs Yuri’s 
family and refers them to the Document.  
The Document simply states that, Yuri’s sister, Ruth will handle all his affairs in the 
meantime but that Yuri’s brother, Ben can limit some of Ruth’s obligations if he wishes.   
Ben cannot decide to impose his wishes on Yuri. Yuri was clear as to what he wanted 
and set it out in the Document. Yuri and Ben are two different people. Therefore, Ben 
cannot decide he will amend Yuri’s Document, because only Yuri can make changes to 
the Document. All Ben can do, is to discuss with Ruth what responsibilities or duties 
each will take on in compliance with Yuri’s Document regarding his affairs. 
Let us apply the example to the 2008 SA Companies Act, wherein:  
 The Document represents the Memorandum of Incorporation 
 Yuri’s sister, Ruth represents the Directors. 
 Yuri’s Brother, Ben represents the Shareholders. 
 Yuri represents the company, a legal person. 
This means that Yuri and Ben are considered as a single person, if the wording of section 
66 of the 2008 SA Companies Act is applied to the example. This conclusion is impossible 
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as Ben and Yuri are different people. Similarly, in the case of company, a shareholder 
and company are not the same person even though they share one document.  The only 
way to maintain a division of powers statute is to have the shareholders agree on the 
restricted director’s duties, and this would be captured in a written lawful agreement, 
which the CBCA refers to as the unanimous shareholder agreement. The allowance for 
the formation of this agreement must be stated in the Act (Yuri’s Document). The 
Unanimous Shareholder Agreement in comparison to an ordinary Shareholders’ 
Agreement is elaborated upon below. 
1.4 Unanimous Shareholders’ Agreement 
A Unanimous Shareholder Agreement is a corporate contract governed by statutory 
rules. The Alberta Proposal clearly indicates the function of the Unanimous Shareholder 
Agreement in a corporation. The Alberta Committees said “there are some general rules 
that are provided by the CBCA which relate to the relationships among the 
shareholders, directors and officers.324 In discussing the statutory provisions relating to 
the Unanimous Shareholder Agreement below, the provisions of the CBCA are used. 
1.4.1  Statutory Provisions 
The rules are put in place to balance the conflicting interests of those involved in the 
business corporation and to provide for the efficient conduct of its business.325 If 
however, the shareholders want a different rule or an additional rule and if they all 
agree and the change does not prejudice outsiders, the shareholders, under this 
                                                          
324 Alberta Proposal, supra note 137 at 21. 
325 Ibid. 
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agreement can decide what rules will protect their interests and promote business 
efficacy.”326 The Unanimous Shareholder Agreement differs substantially from a 
shareholders’ agreement. The CBCA describes the Unanimous Shareholder Agreement 
as follows.  
s146 (1) An otherwise lawful written agreement among all the 
shareholders of a corporation, or among all the shareholders and one or 
more persons who are not shareholders, that restricts, in whole or in part, 
the powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the management of, 
the business and affairs of the corporation is valid. 
Declaration by single shareholder 
(2) If a person who is the beneficial owner of all the issued shares of a 
corporation makes a written declaration that restricts in whole or in part 
the powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the management of, 
the business and affairs of the corporation, the declaration is deemed to be 
a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
Constructive party 
(3) A purchaser or transferee of shares subject to a unanimous shareholder 
agreement is deemed to be a party to the agreement. 
When no notice given 
(4) If notice is not given to a purchaser or transferee of the existence of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, in the manner referred to in subsection 
49(8) or otherwise, the purchaser or transferee may, no later than 30 days 
after they become aware of the existence of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement, rescind the transaction by which they acquired the shares. 
Rights of shareholder 
(5) To the extent that a unanimous shareholder agreement restricts the 
powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the management of, the 
business and affairs of the corporation, parties to the unanimous 
                                                          
326 Alberta Proposal, supra note 137 at 22. 
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shareholder agreement who are given that power to manage or supervise 
the management of the business and affairs of the corporation have all the 
rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a director of the corporation, 
whether they arise under this Act or otherwise, including any defences 
available to the directors, and the directors are relieved of their rights, 
powers, duties and liabilities, including their liabilities under section 119, to 
the same extent. 
As mentioned above, the Unanimous Shareholder Agreement (“the USA”) is not the 
same as a shareholders’ agreement. The difference is that the USA provides that the 
shareholders may restrict the directors’ powers. In South Africa, if this agreement is 
adopted, it could be used to qualify the directors’ powers under section 66 of the 2008 
SA Companies Act and maintain the division of powers statute model. The important 
aspects of the USA are that the director’s powers are limited and the duties that no 
longer fall on the director become the responsibility of the shareholder, under the USA. 
This way all duties are accounted for, either by the directors under section 101, or by 
the shareholders under section 146 of the ABCA or section 146 of the CBCA. This 
provides a clear division of powers. In addition to carrying the responsibility of the duty 
that the shareholders limited, each shareholder will also be held to the same standard 
as any director in respect of that duty.  This would mean that the shareholders would 
have a fiduciary duty toward the company in respect of that restricted duty. This 
criterion for the directors is similar in the ABCA327 and the 2008 SA Companies Act.328 
                                                          
327 ABCA section 122,  every director and officer of a corporation in exercising the director’s or 
officer’s powers and discharging the director’s or officer’s duties shall 
(a)    act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation, and 
(b)    exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in 
comparable circumstances. 
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The Unanimous Shareholder Agreement also binds a purchaser or transferee under 
section 146 (4) of the CBCA. “Consequently, a transferee without notice would take 
shares free of any restrictions contained in a shareholders agreement”.329 The Dickerson 
Report suggested that for the sake of good practice, the shareholder’s certificate be 
endorsed with a statement regarding the existence of any unanimous shareholders 
agreement.330 
An additional section which was also included in the Dickerson Committee Draft Act but 
not included under section 146 of the CBCA, relates to pre-emptive rights under the 
Unanimous Shareholder Agreement. The reason this provision was included was “to 
maintain the integrity of the unanimous shareholder agreement.”331 According to the 
Dickerson Committee it seemed sensible to include this section at least until the legal 
profession in Canada became accustomed to these agreements, as the need for a pre-
                                                                                                                                                                             
328 2008 SA Companies Act section 76 a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director— 
(a) in good faith and for a proper purpose; 
(b) in the best interests of the company; and 
(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of 
a person— 
(i) carrying out the same functions in relation to the company as those 
carried out by that director; and 
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director. 
329 Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 100. 
330 Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 99. 
331 Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 99. 
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emptive right332 will often be overlooked. In the context of South Africa an inclusion of 
this last section in the Act, is recommended and would read as follows, 
(6) [n]otwithstanding any provision in the memorandum, a unanimous 
shareholder agreement is deemed to confer on every shareholder who is 
party  thereto the pre-emptive right referred to in section 39 (2) unless that 
right is expressly limited or excluded in the agreement. 
 
It is now clear that the USA is different from a shareholders’ agreement, in that the USA 
restricts the powers of the director’s under the Act and is created by the shareholders 
unanimously. More importantly in regards to the powers restricted, the shareholders 
acquire those powers under the same standard as the directors. I suggest that South 
Africa adopt an equivalent provision and with the inclusion of this agreement to the 
2008 SA Companies Act, the division of powers will be maintained.  
1.5 Evidentiary value of shareholder approval 
Another section in the CBCA which is related to the oppression remedy is section 242. 
The equivalent section is provided in section 243 of the ABCA. This section reduces the 
effect of shareholder approval of managerial misbehaviour.  
s242 (1) An application made or an action brought or intervened in under 
this Part shall not be stayed or dismissed by reason only that it is shown that 
an alleged breach of a right or duty owed to the corporation or its subsidiary 
has been or may be approved by the shareholders of such body corporate, 
but evidence of approval by the shareholders may be taken into account by 
the court in making an order under section 214, 240 or 241 [CBCA, 
Oppression Remedy]. 
                                                          
332 A pre-emptive right is a right held by a shareholder that is exercised when a shareholder sells 
his shares. Those shares must first be offered to the existing shareholders before it is offered to 
any other person.  
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According to the Dickerson Report, this section “abrogates that aspect of the rule of 
Foss v Harbottle that bars a shareholder from complaining of an alleged misconduct on 
the ground that the impugned act might be authorised or ratified at a meeting of 
shareholders.”333 Instead of setting out a specific rule declaring how an act of the 
directors may be ratified, the Dickerson Committee thought it “better to characterise 
shareholder ratification or waiver as an evidentiary issue which in effect compels the 
court to go behind the constitutional structure of the corporation and examine the real 
issues.”334 The South African legislature will do well to consider the provision or an 
equivalent provision for South Africa, in light of the discussion in Chapter 3. 
1.6 South African Oppression Remedy  
 
2008 SA Companies Act ABCA 
 
Oppression Remedy: s.163 is substantially 
similar to section 241 of the CBCA. 
(1) A shareholder or a director of a 
company may apply to a court for relief 
if— 
  
(a)  
any act or omission of the company, or a 
related person, has had a result that is 
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or 
that unfairly disregards the interests of, 
the applicant; 
  
(b)  
the business of the company, or a related 
person, is being or has been carried on or 
Oppression Remedy: s. 242 is identical to 
section 241 of the CBCA. 
 
(1) A complainant may apply to the Court for 
an order under this section. 
 
(2)  If, on an application under subsection (1), 
the Court is satisfied that in respect of a 
corporation or any of its affiliates 
 
(a)    
any act or omission of the corporation or any 
of its affiliates effects a result, 
 
(b)  
the business or affairs of the corporation or 
any of its affiliates are or have been carried on 
                                                          
333 Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 164 para 487. 
334 Dickerson Report, supra note 133 at 164. 
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conducted in a manner that is oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of, the applicant; 
or 
  
(c)  
the powers of a director or prescribed 
officer of the company, or a person related 
to the company, are being or have been 
exercised in a manner that is oppressive 
or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly 
disregards the interests of, the applicant. 
 
or conducted in a manner, or 
 
(c)  
the powers of the directors of the corporation 
or any of its affiliates are or have been 
exercised in a manner 
 
that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or 
that unfairly disregards the interests of any 
security holder, creditor, director or officer, 
the Court may make an order to rectify the 
matters complained of. 
 
Table H: A comparison between the oppression remedy provision under the ABCA and the 2008 SA 
Companies Act. 
The Alberta Commission noted that “the reorganisation and extension of the minority 
shareholders remedies for abuse of powers by those in control of the corporation are 
among the most important reforms which the ABCA makes”.335  With reference to the 
derivative action (also known as the statutory representative action) and the oppression 
remedy, the Committee said that the provisions were intended to do away with the 
difficulties created by the Rule in Foss v Harbottle, and the remedies, both the statutory 
representative action and the oppression remedy improve the position of the minority 
shareholder vis-à-vis the majority.336 It is hoped that South Africa’s decision to include 
this section will bring about an improved minority shareholder remedy by putting the 
section to its full use and capability.  
                                                          
335 Alberta Proposal, supra note 137 at 138. 
336 Alberta Proposal, supra note 137 at 138. 
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2 Comparable Statutory Provisions  
This part of the chapter provides the equivalent provisions within the various provinces 
statutes in Canada. The provincial statutes reviewed below are from Manitoba337, New 
Brunswick338, Newfoundland and Labrador339, the North West Territories340, Nunavut341, 
Ontario342, Saskatchewan343, Yukon344, Alberta (both the Companies Act 1980 and the 
ABCA), British Columbia345 and Nova Scotia346. The provincial statutes are then 
separated into their original types of corporate statutes, either Letters Patent or 
contractarian. Only Alberta’s old and new statutes will be provided considering their 
significance to the thesis. The provincial legislative provisions are limited to the five 
sections referred to earlier, capacity of company, director’s powers, unanimous 
shareholders’ agreements, the evidentiary value of shareholder approval and the 
oppression remedy.  
 
                                                          
337 Corporations Act, CCSM c C225. 
338 Business Corporations Act, SNB 1981, c B-9.1. 
339 Corporations Act, RSNL 1990, c C-36. 
340 Business Corporations Act, SNWT 1996, c 19. 
341 Business Corporations Act, SNWT (Nu) 1996, c 19. 
342 Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16. 
343 Corporations Act, Chapter B-10, The Revised Statutes of Saskatchewan, 2012 c.21. 
344 Business Corporations Act, RSY 2002, c 20. 
345 Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 [BCBCA]. 
346 Companies Act (NS), RSNS 1989, c 81 [NSCA]. 
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Statute (1) 
Subscribers 
are the body 
corporate 
(2) 
The articles 
shall bind all 
members. 
(3) 
Capacity of 
Corporation/ 
Legal status of 
company 
(4) 
Director’s 
powers to 
manage 
corporation 
(5) 
Unanimous 
Shareholders 
Agreement 
(7) 
 Oppression 
Remedy 
(6) 
Shareholder 
Approval in 
Court 
Canada 
CBCA 
- - s. 15(1) s.102(1) s. 146 s.241 
s. 242(1) 
Manitoba 
BCA 
- - s. 15(1) s. 97(1) s. 140 s. 234 
s. 235(1) 
New 
Brunswick 
BCA 
- - s. 13 (1) s. 60 s. 99 (3) s. 166 
s. 167 (1) 
New-
foundland 
and 
Labrador 
BCA 
- - s. 27 (1) s.167 s.245 (2) s.371 
s.372(1) 
NorthWest 
Territories 
BCA 
- - s. 15 (1) s.102 s. 148 (1) (c) s. 243 
s. 244 (1) 
Nunavut 
BCA 
- - s. 15 (1) s.102 s.148 (1) (c) s.243 
Ontario 
BCA 
(“OBCA”) 
- - s. 15 s. 115 s.108 (2) & 
(3) 
s.248 
(includes 
threatened 
oppressive 
conduct) 
s. 249 (1) 
Saskatche
wan BCA 
- - s. 15 (1) s. 97 (1) s. 140(2) s. 234 
s. 235 (1) 
Yukon BCA - - s. 18 (1)  s. 102 s. 148 (1) (c) s. 243 
s. 244 (1) 
Table I: Summary of Comparable Provisions under the Canadian Federal and Provincial statutes 
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The list below provides the Canadian provincial corporate law statutes that developed 
from the English or a contractarian model to a division of powers model (CBCA) or 
retained their contractarian model statute. Alberta changed from a contractarian 
statute to a statute based on the division of powers. British Columbia still has the 
contractarian statute but provides a limited scope of application to its oppression 
remedy. Lastly, Nova Scotia has retained its contractarian statute but has incorporated 
the wide oppression remedy verbatim from section 241 of the CBCA. 
Statute (1) 
Subscribers 
are the body 
corporate  
(2) 
The articles 
shall bind all 
members.  
(3) 
Capacity of 
Corporation/ 
Legal status of 
company 
  
(4) 
Director’s 
powers to 
manage 
corporation  
(5) 
Unanimous 
Shareholders 
Agreement  
(7) 
Oppression 
Remedy  
(6) 
Shareholder 
Approval in 
Court  
Alberta  
Companies 
1980 
s.28 s.29(1) - - - - 
- 
Alberta 
BCA 
(“ABCA”) 
- - s.16(1) s.101 s.146 s. 242 
s. 243 
British 
Columbia 
BCA 
(“BCBCA”) 
s.17 s.19(3) - s.136 
(limited by 
the articles) 
- s.227 
(limited to 
conduct that 
is only 
oppressive 
to the 
shareholder 
but includes 
provision for 
threatened 
oppressive 
conduct). 
S 233 (6) 
(Only 
applicable to 
cases of 
statutory 
representati
ve action or 
derivative 
action). 
Nova 
Scotia 
Companies 
s.26 s.24(1) s. 26 (8) s.147 
under 
Table A 
- s.5 of the 
Third 
Schedule 
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Statute (1) 
Subscribers 
are the body 
corporate  
(2) 
The articles 
shall bind all 
members.  
(3) 
Capacity of 
Corporation/ 
Legal status of 
company 
  
(4) 
Director’s 
powers to 
manage 
corporation  
(5) 
Unanimous 
Shareholders 
Agreement  
(7) 
Oppression 
Remedy  
(6) 
Shareholder 
Approval in 
Court  
Act 
(“NSCA”) 
First 
Schedule 
s.7 of the 
Third 
Schedule 
exactly 
drawn from 
the CBCA 
Table J: Specific statutory provisions from the ABCA, BCBCA and NSCA. 
South African company law statutory provisions 
Statute (1) 
Subscribers 
are the body 
corporate  
(2) 
The articles 
shall bind all 
members  
(3) 
Capacity of 
Corporation/ 
Legal status of 
company  
(4) 
Director’s 
powers to 
manage 
corporation  
(5) 
Unanimous 
Shareholders 
Agreement  
(7) 
Oppression 
Remedy  
(6) 
Shareholder 
Approval in 
Court 
1973 SA 
Companies 
Act 
s. 65(1) s. 65(2) - - - - 
- 
2008 SA 
Companies 
Act 
- s. 15(6) s.19(1) (b) (i) s.66 
(limited 
“...to the 
extent 
provided by 
the 
articles”) 
- s. 163 
- 
Table K: Specific statutory provisions in the 1973 SA Companies Act and the 2008 SA Companies 
Act. 
Interpretation of the Table 
 
The aim of this table is to show consistency throughout the Canadian legislative 
spectrum in relation to the fundamental principles of corporate personality and majority 
rule, in light of the provinces particular type of corporation (Letters Patent statute or 
contractarian statute). 
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Columns (1), (2) and (3) deal with the capacity of the company and the Directors’ 
powers; they represent the corporation principle. Columns (4) (5) and (6) represent the 
principle of majority rule, through the provision of a unanimous shareholders’ 
agreement and the evidentiary value of shareholder approval. Columns (1) and (2) were 
inserted to indicate the correlation between the existence of the oppression remedy 
and the statute-based contract from a contractarian or English statute. In the case of a 
Letters Patent statute, the statute did not have any shareholder remedy available.347 
If South Africa is to take full advantage of the vast number of cases under the Canadian 
oppression remedy, it would not be able to do so if it maintained the contract provision. 
The BCBCA and NSCA both have retained their contractarian statute and each statute 
has a shareholder remedy provision. The BCBCA has limited the application of the 
oppression remedy, it only applies to shareholders and the conduct is limited to 
oppressive conduct. The NSCA adopted the wide CBCA remedy.  
If South Africa decides not to include the recommendations, the South African courts 
will only be limited to Canadian cases decided under the BCBCA and NSCA and the 
Predicament will still be maintained within the South African company law despite the 
knowledge, now, of its existence. In this case, I would question the true extent of the 
South Africa’s reform of 2008 SA Companies Act and its future development.  
                                                          
347 The Letters Patent statute provisions of the various provinces, before they adopted the CBCA 
model, were not provided as this chapter only deals with contractarian statutes, from which the 
South African company law has developed. 
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Conclusion 
The recommendations made in this chapter aim to contribute to the further 
development of the South African company law, in light of the Predicament identified in 
Chapter 3. This chapter discussed each provision that will assist in clarifying the 2008 SA 
Companies Act. The recommendations for the 2008 SA Companies Act in this chapter 
were attained from the commentaries in the Alberta Proposal, the Dickerson Report as 
well as statutory provisions of the ABCA and CBCA. The reason the Alberta Proposal was 
used was based on the similarity between Alberta and South Africa, in their 
development from contractarian model statutes to a division of powers model statute. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Predicament is not about the method of incorporation 
but about the lack of clarity of the statute. This chapter provided a solution to the 
Predicament through clarity of statutory provision relating to Directors duties and the 
shareholders’ duties- to the extent that the directors’ duties are limited by the 
shareholders under a unanimous shareholder agreement.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
As far back as 1850, uncertainty has existed in the establishment or understanding of 
corporations in law.  James Grant in Grant on Corporations: A Practical Treatise on the 
Law of Corporations, says “[i]n no branch of law is it of more importance to set out with 
correct and definite ideas of principles, than in that which relates to corporations.”348  
The importance of understanding the fundamental principles of corporate personality 
and majority rule cannot be overemphasized. Corporations are created in various ways 
and this thesis identified how Canadian corporate law has developed from corporations 
created by Letters Patent statutes as well as how English and South African company 
law have developed from corporations created by a contractarian statute.  
Due to the relationship between English and South African company law, South Africa 
adopted the Predicament from the English company law. The Predicament is the lack of 
clarity in the statute that led to the lack of clarity in the interpretation of the 
fundamental principles of the corporate personality and majority rule. Judges did not 
apply or seek the statute as the point of reference when considering the powers, duties 
or rights of the individual in a corporation created by contractarian statute. The 
Predicament is still evident in the South African company law today.  
It is this Predicament that has led to previous inadequate shareholder remedies within 
the South African company law. In May 2011, South Africa adopted a new Companies 
Act 71 of 2008. The new Companies Act does not, however, address the Predicament. 
                                                          
348 Grant on Corporations, supra note 30 at 1. 
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The statute remains unclear as to the duties and powers of each individual in a 
corporation.  However, considering the infancy of the statute, South Africa has time to 
develop and clarify its statute. It is only through the clarity of the statute and the strict 
application of the statute by the courts that South Africa will be able to overcome this 
Predicament and ultimately provide better remedies for shareholders through section 
163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act.  
As we consider the resemblance of section 163 of the 2008 SA Companies Act to section 
241 of the Canada Business Corporations Act, it cannot be denied that the oppression 
remedy in South Africa was adopted from the Canada Business Corporations Act. The 
Canadian oppression remedy was created in order to provide relief for oppression or 
unfair prejudice arising as a consequence of the strict compliance with the statute or as 
a consequence of each individual exercising his or her duty as identified clearly in the 
statute. This is why it is crucial that the statute state the rights and duties of the 
individual clearly. 
However, as long as the South African company law statute remains as is without the 
clarity required to identify the powers or the duties of the individuals in a corporation, 
the application of the South African oppression remedy will not reach its full potential. 
The responsibility to provide this statutory clarity rests with the South African 
Legislature.  
This thesis therefore not only provided a comparison between the oppression remedy in 
South Africa and Canada but also identified the key to the Predicament.  This thesis 
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addressed the historical development of the South African and Canadian corporate law 
as well as the origin of this Predicament. It discussed the statutory provisions of the 
oppression remedy and lastly provided recommendations to the 2008 SA Companies Act 
as a solution to the Predicament.  
This is an exciting time for South African company law. It is a time that is uncertain as 
the country gets to grips with the 2008 SA Companies Act but more importantly it is an 
opportunity to develop. South Africa has an opportunity to review the basics and 
fundamentals of its company law. This thesis marks the beginning of this journey. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Predecessors of the Member’s Remedy Statutory Provisions 
 
Section 210 of the 1948 Companies Act 
(England) 
 
Section 111bis of the 1926 Union Companies 
Act (South Africa)  
 
Alternative remedy to winding up in cases of 
oppression 
 
(1) Any member of a company who 
complains that the affairs of the company 
are being conducted in a manner oppressive 
to some part of the members (including 
himself) or, in a case falling within subsection 
(3) of section one hundred and sixty-nine of 
this Act, the Board of Trade, may make an 
application to the court by petition for an 
order under this section. 
Alternative remedy to winding up in cases of 
oppression 
 
(1) Any member of a company who complains 
in a manner oppressive to some part of the 
members (including himself), may make an 
application to the Court by petition of an 
order under this section; and in a case falling 
within subsection (2)  of section ninety-five the 
Minister may make like application. 
 
Section 252(1) of the 1973 SA Companies Act was enacted as the reformed member’s 
remedy provision from section 111bis of the 1926 Union Companies Act. 
252. Member's remedy in case of oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct. 
 
(1) Any member of a company who complains that any particular act or omission of a 
company is unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable, or that the affairs of the company 
are being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him or to 
some part of the members of the company, may, subject to the provisions of subsection 
(2), make an application to the Court for an order under this section. 
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